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CHAPTER 1 
 
‘ALIGNMENT’, ‘REALIGNMENT’ AND ‘DEALIGNMENT’ IN 
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“[L]ong before having data which can speak for themselves the fundamental articulation of language 
and of thinking is obtained logically – by cumulative conceptual refinement and chains of coordinated 
definitions.” (Sartori 1970:1038) 
 
 
 
Democratic elections are exciting events for politicians, party activists, journalists 
and scholars of Political Science. Before an election everyone attempts to forecast its 
results; immediately after the ballots are counted and the big winner and losers are 
identified is the time for analysing and making sense of these election results. At this 
point, special attention is given to explaining electoral changes and particularly to 
identifying enduring shifts. Whatever the outcome of the election may be, and 
especially in American politics, “there will be political scientist who will ask: Was 
there a realignment?” (Carmines & Wagner, 2006:67) (italics added). This phrase 
introduces a core question and idiom that has preoccupied Comparative Politics 
literature in a broad sense and my research in particular. ‘Alignment’, ‘realignment’ 
and ‘dealignment’ are concepts that are used to typify major changes in a political 
system. 
 
The study of realignment originates in the study of the American party system. Key 
was the first to discuss it in 1955, when he identified what he called a ‘critical 
election’. This is an election, explained Key (1955:4), “in which voters are, at least 
from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of 
electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the 
voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate” 
(italics added). This kind of election is the peak moment of what later will be termed 
a ‘critical realignment’, as “the realignment [which commenced at this election] 
made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding 
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election” (Key, 1955:4). A few years after this publication, Key argued for another 
model of realignment: the ‘secular realignment’. This was defined as “a movement 
of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several 
presidential elections” (Key, 1959:198-9). Dealignment was identified for the first 
time by Inglehart and Hochstein (1972:345) in their study of party identification in 
the U.S.A., almost two decades after Key’s publications. According to these scholars, 
a dealignment is characterised by “declining rates of identification with any party” 
(italics in original), which may happen when multidimensional crisis occurs, and this 
crisis “cuts directly across party lines.” (Inglehart and Hochstein (1972:345) (italics 
in original). 
 
While the study of realignment in the American party system “enjoyed its heyday in 
the 1960s and 1970s” (Mayhew, 2000:449), the study of both phenomena – 
‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’ – was taken up in other Western democratic 
countries slightly later, where it was in vogue in the 1980s and 1990s. Prominent 
publications on the subject were Dalton, et al. (1984a) Electoral Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies- Realignment or Dealignment?, Crewe and Denver (1985) 
Electoral Change in Western Democracies, Bartolini and Mair (1990) Identity, 
Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 
1885-1985, and finally Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) Parties without Partisans - 
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, in which they argued that 
dealignment is an ongoing process in most Western industrialised countries.1 Despite 
this argument, scholarly research that considers both phenomena is still initiated, such 
as the ECPR workshop on “Electoral Change in the 21st Century: De-Alignment or 
Realignment?”, held in 2010. 
 
The journey of the concepts of ‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’ to new empirical 
contexts of Western democracies other than the U.S.A. has prompted scholars to re-
specify the concepts by giving them new definitions and therefore modify their 
                                                
1 I may also mention Franklin, et al., (1992) Electoral Change – Responses to Evolving Social and 
Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, but in this book does not include a discussion of 
‘realignment’ or ‘dealignment’ explicitly. 
 ‘Alignment’, ‘Realignment’ and ‘Dealignment’ in multi-party systems 
 3 
meanings 2 . According to Adcock and Collier (2001:530), this is part of the 
conceptualisation stage, wherein scholars or groups of scholars develop or adopt the 
specific formulation of a concept, which they term ‘systematised concept’. 
 
However, with the widespread availability of scholarly research into enduring 
electoral changes, the concepts of ‘realignmnet’ and ‘dealignment’ have been used 
with different (and even sometimes exclusive) meanings, as Sundquist (1983:4) 
articulated: “after a quarter century of study, the concept of party realignment is still 
far from clear. The writers all employ the same term – realignment – but it is difficult 
to find any two works that give it the same definition.” This quote nicely summarises 
the current state of affairs: both concepts have become vague and ambiguous. 
 
This problem of ambiguity is not confined to the concepts of ‘realignment’, and 
‘dealignment’. Other political terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘legitimacy’, 
‘transparency’, ‘corporatism’ and ‘terror’ are employed by scholars, journalists, 
politicians and sometimes even the public. The popularity of these political terms 
does not come without cost: when the terms become generic, they have several 
meanings, used in multiple political contexts and, in some cases, even in non-political 
contexts. In other cases, the opposite development occurs: the concepts are 
ambiguous because they originate outside the scholarly discourse and therefore 
“carry a backpack of meanings” (Wonka, 2007:44).  
 
Clear and precise concepts are of course important for the progress and existence of 
any scientific discipline. Wonka (2007:44) warned “scientific discourse based in 
ambiguous concepts is at least confusing, more likely unproductive and definitely not 
cumulative.” A collective ambiguity, according to Sartori (1984:35), wherein “each 
scholar ascribes his[/her] own meanings to his key terms […] can be rampant – to the 
point of destroying a discipline as a cumulative fabric of knowledge.” 
 
 
 
                                                
2 In a theoretical discussion of ‘concept specification in Political Science Research’, Wonka (2007:42) 
did not employ the word “definition”, instead arguing that each term has “[a]ttributes which define a 
concept’s meaning.” 
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1.1 The Unique Nature of this Study 
 
Efforts to clarify the concept of realignment in the context of the American politics 
were made in both early and more recent research. Sunquist (1973), for example, 
discussed the diverse definitions of ‘realignment’ and argued that “one element is 
common to all stated or implicit definitions. A realignment is a durable change in 
patterns of political behavior”. Mayhew (2000), on the other hand, identified eleven 
empirical claims regarding realignment (for criticism of this work, see (Carmines & 
Wagner, 2006). 
 
However, similar conceptual work on both the phenomena in other party systems, 
such as multi-party systems, is sparse. The present research is motivated by the 
conviction that there is inadequate conceptual understanding of the phenomena of 
‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’ in multi-party systems. It aims to fill this gap by 
examining empirically both phenomena in eleven European multi-party systems, in 
order to develop a conceptual understanding. 
 
The approach of this research differs from that of many other studies in the field. It is 
structured along conceptual lines rather than on an explanation of events or 
phenomena. This is articulated through its approach, data sources and methodology. 
The two terms of ‘realignment’ and ‘dealigment’ were invented in reaction to the 
concept of ‘alignment’, a phenomenon of continuing patterns of party support or a 
certain immobility in the preference for a party or certain parties. Theoretical and 
empirical arguments of ‘alignment’ were developed (at least until the mid 1960s) 
through two approaches to exploring patterns of electoral behavior – the socio-
psychological and the socio-structural structural approach.  
 
These approaches entail the assumption that individual citizens do not necessarily act 
rationally (as is assumed by the Rational Choice approach), but that there are other 
mechanisms that “reduce complex problem-solving to more simple judgmental 
operation” (Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996:246). In the case of this research, this 
complex problem-solving is that of the electoral decision of party support. According 
to the socio-psychological approach, the mechanisms involved are cognitive 
shortcuts. Scholars of political sociology, on the other hand, have focused on 
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“understanding the politics of individual citizens within the political and social 
setting where they are located” (Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996:246); those who follow 
the socio-structural approach have particularly emphasised the structures of the 
society, i.e. its cleavages. According to these scholars, conflicts at the political arena 
are reflections of “long-standing social and economic divisions within society, and 
the cleavage structure is thought of in terms of social groups and loyalties of 
members to their social groups” (Franklin, et al., 1992).  
 
Each of these approaches – socio-psychological and socio-structural approach – has 
identified different mechanisms involved in the creation of the alignment between 
voters and political parties. The first approach has emphasised voters’ developing 
identification with a political party, “which is not easily changed” (Campbell, et al., 
1960:149). The second approach has argued that the identification of voters with their 
social segment leads to electoral support of the parties representing these segments.  
 
These different mechanisms have influenced (most of) the definitions developed for 
‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’, as well as their indicators and the methods 
employed for studying them. In this research, I contend that each mechanism is a 
manifestation of ‘alignment’ in its own right, rather than a mechanism underlying 
alignment. I propose a unified approach to studying the phenomena of alignment, and 
examine whether ‘realignment’ or ‘dealignment’ have occurred in two manifestations 
of alignment: partisan alignment, and voter alignment along a cleavage. 
 
This research is designed as a comparison between “relatively similar” cases, and 
studies eleven European multi-party systems with electoral systems of proportional 
representation. It begins in 1950 and covers sixty years, concluding in 2010. As far as 
methodology and data source(s) go, individual-level data (i.e. survey data) is scarce 
for some of these cases. In addition, national election surveys have been conducted 
only since the 1960s or 1970s (or even later) for most of these countries. The 
unavailability of data for the crucial period of alignment (between the 1950s and the 
mid 1960s) is a major problem for those investigating this subject (e.g. (Bartolini & 
Mair, 1990:99; Mair, 1989:13).  
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I devised several solutions to deal with this insufficiency of data. I conducted a 
combined analysis of two datasets of individual-level data and aggregate data (i.e. 
election results). The latter dataset was included to enable me to set the reference line 
(with regard to the period of ‘alignment’), to establish a data source for a period not 
covered by national survey datasets, and also as the main data source for cases for 
which national data surveys are not available. This combined dataset is unique, but it 
also has two main drawbacks. Observations were only available for election years 
that impact the quality of a sound longitudinal analysis. Secondly, the study of 
official election results limits the types of analysis that can be performed. To address 
this limitation, I used indices in major parts of my research. However, this research is 
also innovative in this respect as all of these indices are modifications of well-known 
indices: Pederson’s Total Volatility and Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) Cleavage 
Salience index. 
 
My methodological innovations for the research of alignment phenomena serve as 
tools enabling me to answer the main research question of this study: Are the 
connections between voters and political parties in the party systems of the Western 
democratic states still relatively stable and structured, or whether the party system 
changed? Answering this question will help us to answer the following empirical 
questions: Has a change occurred? And if so, what kind of transformation is it? 
 
Answering these questions lays the foundations for a more broad and conceptual 
understanding of alignment phenomena. This understanding and its associated 
empirical evidence of electoral behaviour are important, I believe, not only for 
Political Science students, but also in a wider sense. Firstly, understanding the 
changing relationship between voters and the political parties is of crucial importance 
to the political parties themselves. At the end of the day, their primary role is to 
“articulate and represent the interests existing within a society” (Dalton, 2009:170), 
and they must win voter support. Secondly, in the modern world “many agree on the 
purpose of political representation through elections” (Rosema, et al., 2011:12); for 
this reason, the study of electoral affiliation with elected representatives is one of the 
key issues at the heart of representative democracy.  
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1.2 Chapter Outlines 
 
I begin this investigation by presenting the two mechanisms for explaining the 
phenomenon of alignment – of continuing patterns of party support (Chapter Two). 
Chapter Three introduces the empirical dispute about the occurrence of realignment 
and dealignment in Western democratic countries. It then demonstrates that this 
disagreement has its roots in a conceptual problem: there is no single agreed 
definition for either realignment or dealignment. On top of that, there is not even an 
operational definition agreed on by groups of scholars regarding patterns of 
realignment or dealignment. I identify that the stock of definitions may be separated 
from each other regarding the appearance of signs of change into realignment or 
dealignment in both levels of analysis (the electorate and the cleavage), and that they 
disagree regarding the effects of these phenomena on a third level – the party system 
structure. Thus, I suggest analysing the phenomena of realignment and dealignment 
as they are manifested in these three levels, using a semi-modular approach. This 
enables me to examine two manifestations of alignment and their effects on the party 
system. In Chapter Four, I present the design of my empirical research. This chapter 
elaborates on the eleven similar cases of multi-party systems under examination, and 
the methods and datasets used to examine each of the manifestations of alignment 
and their effects on the party system structure. Chapter Five is the first empirical 
chapter; it uses the socio-psychological approach to study the issue of stability and 
change in partisan alignment. It examines arguments concerning partisan dealignment 
through assessing trends of partisanship as it is articulated in its two meanings: party 
identification and stable party support. This analysis shows that evidence of partisan 
dealignment has appeared in most of the cases studied, while partisan realignment has 
occurred only in one case, and another case suggests that the electorate is still aligned 
with the political parties. In Chapter Six, I test voter alignments along the two most 
salient socio-structural cleavages: class and religion. The chapter demonstrates that in 
most of the cases, the alignment(s) along the most salience cleavage(s) have eroded. 
The changes occurred first in the class cleavage and slightly later in the religious 
cleavage. Chapter Seven examines the issue of alignment regarding the patterns and 
timing of alignment and re/dealignment in their two manifestations. It demonstrates 
that patterns of alignment disappeared in all the cases by the mid 1980s and that all 
cases, except Denmark, have experienced dealignment. The chapter also proves that 
! Chapter 1 
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the dealignment process is developed in two phases: partial and full. Chapter Eight 
tests the possible effects of realignment and dealignment on the party system 
structure. It recommends this test be based on study of the structure of the electoral 
party system. It demonstrates that during periods of partial or full dealignment, the 
stable structure of the electoral party system vanishes. Chapter Nine, the final 
chapter, summarises the findings of the previous chapters, and more importantly, 
proposes a definition for the process of dealignment in multi-party system and 
presents the conceptual, methodological and empirical implications of this study.  
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PHENOMENON OF ALIGNMENT, AND A DISCUSSION OF 
THE EXPLANATIONS FOR AND MECHANISMS OF PARTY 
ALLEGIANCE 
 
 
“Unfortunately, there is little agreement on the nature of voters’ attachments to political parties” 
 Wolinetz (1979:15) 
 
 
 
People in democratic countries have the privilege of choosing their representatives. 
This very fact has raised the question: “how do voters decide who to vote for?” It is 
the most intensively studied question in comparative politics since the mid 1940s, and 
there is no single answer. 
  
Several approaches prevail in the Political Science literature that examines electoral 
choice, which are based on the concept of rational choice, on socio-psychological 
reasons, and on socio-structural considerations. The rational choice approach was 
introduced by Downs (1957). He assumed that citizens act rationally in politics, and 
therefore explained voting behaviour as a rational choice: “each citizen casts his vote 
for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other” (Downs, 
1957:36). This approach implies that an individual’s electoral choice is dynamic and 
might change from one election to another. 
 
The other two approaches assume a stable rather than a volatile electorate. The socio-
structural approach suggests that the act of voting flows from identification with 
particular social group, or as Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (1968:137) argued, 
“voting is essentially a group experience.” According to this approach, political 
parties are articulation of socio-structural divisions, and therefore the party system 
structure is a reflection of the cleavages present in the society. Adherents of the socio-
psychological approach go one step further. They position the socio-demographic 
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background of a voter at the bottom of ‘the funnel of causality’ that explains the act of 
voting. According to this rationale, the socio-economic conditions together with two 
other long-term political predispositions (party identification and political ideology) 
influence the short-term factors – the candidates competing and the issues at stake 
(Lewis-Beck, et al., 2008).  
 
Utilising the latter two approaches, the literature on voting behaviour emphasises 
continuing patterns of party support or certain immobility in the preference for a party 
or certain parties and describes this as an ‘alignment’. In this condition, the voters 
either already have a lasting allegiance to a political party or parties, or they begin to 
develop one. Typically the temporal dimension or durability of this bond is essential 
in this approach.1 Both approaches explicate the mechanisms for stable connections, 
as will be specified below. 
 
This chapter deals with the phenomenon of alignment through the lenses of the socio-
psychological and socio-structural approaches. It explores two explanations for the 
phenomenon to illustrate a particular alignment found in Western democratic 
countries: partisanship, and the identification of voters with their social segment that 
leads to electoral support of parties representing these segments. The chapter begins 
by exploring the socio-psychological approach and its criticism, and from this 
context, discusses the phenomenon of party identification – its development, 
durability, and its level of immunisation against change. It then turns to examine the 
socio-structural approach utilised in Lipset and Rokkan’s theory, along with a 
discussion of their ‘freezing hypothesis’ and relevant debate on mechanisms for the 
creation of party-freezing systems. The last section of the chapter outlines the 
empirical and theoretical arguments regarding the disappearance of these alignments, 
and presents two alternative explanations for the nexus between voters and parties 
raised in the literature – a new social cleavage and the functional model.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Only few scholars exclude the temporal dimension from their definition of ‘alignment’; e.g. (Deegan-
Krause & Enyedi, 2010:688). 
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2.1 The Socio-Psychological Approach: Party Identification  
 
Party identification, or partisanship (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998:634) is “a long-
term, affective, psychological identification with one’s preferred political party” 
(Dalton 1996:199). The concept was developed by Converse and his collaborators 
(later known as the Michigan School) in The American Voter (1960). They assumed 
that party identification has two components: the direction of party choice (for 
example, in the American context, Democratic or Republican), and the strength of this 
attachment (i.e. a strong or weak identifier, or an independent or apolitical 
attachment) (Converse, 1976:10).2 
 
Researchers agree that party identification is developed at a young age (often during 
the primary school years) (Campbell, et al., 1960:146-7), and that it strongly reflects 
one’s immediate social milieu, particular the family. The most prominent factor 
influencing the party identification of children is parental opinion3 (Campbell, et al., 
1960:146; Westholm & Niemi, 1992); this influence is “well known and even 
unquestionable” (Percheron & Jennings, 1981:421).  
   
2.1.1 A Discussion of the Stability of Party Identification  
 
Campbell and his collaborators were also the first to observe the remarkably stable 
nature of party identification throughout life: “once established, [it] is an attachment 
which is not easily changed” (Campbell, et al., 1960:149). They argued that there are 
only a small number of life experiences that might cause a change or fluctuation of 
party identification, namely personal circumstances (marriage, a new job or a change 
in neighborhood) and social factors (such as a new polarisation in response to 
economic forces or national catastrophes) (Campbell, et al., 1960:150). Subsequently, 
Converse explained that partisanship primarily results from a combination of parental 
socialisation and lifestyle. According to Converse’s model, young voters inherit 
partisan loyalty from their parents: they are a “ ‘biased coin,’ particularly with respect 
                                                
2 Later Miller (1991) called for the separation of the two components, arguing that the strength 
component may be responsive to other political preferences while leaving the basic identification 
unaffected. For criticism of Miller’s argument, see (Franklin, 1992).  
3 There are, of course, differences between those children whose parents both identify with the same 
party, and those whose parents identify with different parties (Franklin, 1992; Shrikant, 1992; Trevor, 
1999). 
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to [...] such matters as party identification” (Converse, 1969:142). Once they enter the 
electorate and begin to vote, their electoral experience reinforces their early 
predispositions. This last factor is the mechanism for stable partisan loyalty: the 
greater the length of a psychological identification, the more a voter identifies with a 
party and the more resistant he/she becomes to changing that identification 
(Campbell, et al., 1960:163; Converse, 1969:144). Dalton and Weldon (2007:189-90) 
recently examined these two factors and found that in established democracies the last 
factor – electoral experience – is more important than the socialisation component 
(called the ‘parental push’ by Dalton and Weldon). In the same vein, Van der Eijk and 
Franklin (2009) stated that the self-experience of the political world sometimes 
overrides initial partisanship. 
 
The Michigan School’s model of partisanship was critiqued soon after the publication 
of The American Voter, and especially as levels of partisanship decreased in America 
in the late 1960s. This critique involves several important issues, but for this 
dissertation – that focuses on the phenomenon of alignment – there are two main 
concerns: the process of creating party identification, and the immunisation against 
change of such party attachment.  
 
Critiques of the Michigan School began with empirical research: Dreyer (1973) 
examined the stability of American party identification during 1958-60 and identified 
what he called the “random change” of party identifiers.  Later research challenged 
the Michigan School’s argument about the immobility of partisan identification by 
developing a revisionist model in which partisanship is responsive to more short-term 
political factors (Franklin, 1992). Jackson criticized the traditional approach by 
suggesting that social, economic and geographic variables are exogenous factors for 
explaining party identification. He argued that people developing a party affiliation 
based on issues and party policies are therefore “subject to change if their positions on 
various issues change, if the parties modify their positions, or if new issues arise 
which divide the existing party coalitions” (Jackson, 1975:181-2). Markus and 
Converse (1979) proposed that an individual’s current identification is a function of 
their past identification and their vote in previous elections, but that a series of votes 
counter to this past identification might lead to changed partisanship. Fiorina 
(1981:102) followed the rational choice explanation and argued that party 
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identification is constructed by an individual’s societal conditions, by political events 
and by the performance of incumbent officeholders. These arguments were supported 
by Franklin and Jackson (1983:968), who discovered that party identifications are 
subject to change as individual preferences change or as a consequence of shifts in 
party positions. Further, Franklin and Jackson argued that party identification is 
composed of a person’s accumulated evaluation from previous elections, along with 
leaders’ performance during election campaigns and while in office. It must be 
emphasised that the revisionist model does not contend that voters who change their 
political allegiance do so randomly; on the contrary, these “movement represents a 
series of reasonable adjustments to changing political circumstances” (Franklin, 
1984:475).  
 
Other researchers have illustrated that changes in partisanship are rooted in other 
occurrences. MacKuen, et al., (1989) argue for the measurement party identification 
in aggregate terms, which they term ‘macropartisanship’, and suggest that fluctuations 
in partisanship occur as macropartisanship is subject to the accumulation of economic 
evaluation and voter approval of the incumbent presidential administration.  
 
More recent research suggests other mechanisms for explaining the basis of 
partisanship.  
 
The work of Green, et al., (2002:36-9) is an example of the social identity theory of 
party identification. They argued that partisanship is not a rational choice but rather is 
based mainly on identification with the imaginary social group associated with 
particular parties. Since these perceived partisan groups change slowly over time, 
party attachments tend to be stable (Green, et al., 2002). However, change (according 
to these scholars) can and does occur. Abramowitz and Saunders (1998, 2006) 
criticised Green, Palmquist and Schickler’s claim, asserting that voters choose their 
party identification based on issue position and/or party ideology. 
 
2.2 The Socio-Structural Approach: Lipset and Rokkan’s Freezing Hypothesis 
 
The socio-structural approach is characterised by its emphasis on the concepts of 
social identity and social loyalty as core factors in the creation of alignments. 
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One of the most influential studies of the phenomena of alignment from the socio-
structural perspective is that of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). In their seminal research, 
Lipset and Rokkan dealt with the construction of socio-cultural cleavages and the 
transition of these cleavages into party systems. Lipset and Rokkan (1967; Rokkan, 
1999:284) identified four prominent cleavages, considered to be the products of two 
types of revolutions: national and industrial revolutions. The first type of revolution 
created the conflict between centralised nation-building culture and the increasing 
resistance of populations in the peripheries (i.e. center-periphery cleavage), and the 
conflict between the mobilising nation-state and the historically-established corporate 
privileges of the Church (i.e. the state-Church cleavage). The latter created the 
conflict between those with landed interests and the class of industrial entrepreneurs 
(i.e. the land-industry cleavage) and the conflict between owners and employers (the 
owner-industrial cleavage).  
 
Mass movements, which are based on these four cleavages, brought the cleavages into 
the political arena by instituting political parties. Mass loyalty to political parties 
followed; see also (Converse, 1969:165). In other words, according to scholars of the 
socio-structural approach, in Western countries the foundation of alignment is 
membership and loyalty to a socio-structural group, which then form political 
institutions, mainly political parties that represent their interests (for example, Labour 
parties represent the working class and Christian parties stand for religious groups). 
The party system, therefore, is a reflection of this socio-structural structure.4 
 
Of course, the same social group may be linked to more than one party. For example, 
the working class is connected to Socialist and Communist parties, as both parties 
claim to represent the working class; their approach to achieving the working class’s 
interests is, of course, different (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2009:92-3). 
                                                
4 I should emphasise, however, this is not to say that the transition of socio-structural cleavages into the 
political system by translating them into party oppositions is assured for any divide. Rather, only those 
divisions that pass a sequence of thresholds are represented in the political system. According to Lipset 
and Rokkan there are four thresholds: threshold of legitimation (there is a recognition of the right of 
petition, criticism and opposition), threshold of incorporation (are most of the supporters of the 
movement given political citizenship rights), threshold of representation (the new movement can gain 
representation on its own) and threshold of majority power (an electoral victory will give a party power 
to bring major structural change in the system) (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). 
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The process of creating alignments and the institutionalisation of party systems, 
Lipset and Rokkan concluded, had ended in the 1920s, but the party systems remained 
in the same situation until the 1960s. In Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967:50) words: 
 
        “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant  
          exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s. This is a crucial characteristic 
          of Western competitive politics in the age of ‘high mass consumption’: the 
          party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, 
          are older than the majorities of the national electorates.” (italics in original) 
 
This last argument regarding the stability or freezing of a party system was called “the 
freezing hypothesis”. 
 
Lipset and Rokkan’s theory is accepted in the literature as the most accurate 
explanation of the creation and sustainability of alignments and stable party systems 
in Western democratic countries. Moreover, their “freezing hypothesis” is even 
considered to be a law. Mair (1997:4) remarked “it was hardly even a real hypothesis. 
Rather, and more simply, it was an empirical observation”.  
 
2.2.1 A Discussion of the Freezing Hypothesis: its validity, meaning and empirical 
support 
 
After the publication of Lipset and Rokkan’s study, other researchers examined the 
validity of the freezing hypothesis. The first to do so were Rose and Urwin 
(1970:288), who codified Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis as a “null hypothesis – 
party support is constant”, meaning that the hypothesis is valid if the electoral 
fortunes of individual parties remain stable. After examining patterns of party support 
in nineteen countries5 between 1945 and 1969, they supported Lipset and Rokkan’s 
conclusion, finding that “[w]hatever index is used the picture is the same: the 
electoral strength of most parties in Western nations since the war had changed very 
                                                
5 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the U.S.A. 
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little from election to election, from decade to decade, or within the lifespan of a 
generation” (Rose & Urwin, 1970:295). Wolinetz (1979:8), who investigated thirteen 
Western European party systems 6 between 1945 and 1979 using Rae’s index of 
fragmentation, that measures the number of parties and their size (for an explanation 
on the index calculation, see Appendix A), also affirmed Lipset and Rokkan’s 
hypothesis (and Rose and Urwin’s conclusion), suggesting that until the late 1960s 
most party alignments were stable. 
 
Others, however, found differing evidence. For example, Borre (1980:142), who 
studied partisan instability based on the Total Volatility index, which measures the 
total changes of party support between two sequential elections (for an explanation on 
the index calculation, see Appendix A) in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
between 1950 and 1977, identified that during the 1950s the trend of electoral change 
was not stable, but was rather an upward trend. Ersson and Lane (1982:93-4) tested 
fourteen European countries7 over the period 1920-1980 using five different indices 
(Functional Orientation8, the Fragmentation index, Radical Orientation9, the 
Polarisation index10 and Total Volatility), and maintained that since the 1920s the 
Western-European party systems were not stable, but were characterised by trends 
and some also by fluctuation. Moreover, Shamir (1984:70), who tested nineteen 
Western liberal democracies11 from the creation of the party system until mid 1970s, 
measuring Total Volatility, Fragmentation, and Ideological Polarisation (for an 
explanation on the last index, see note no. 10 in this chapter), did not accept Lipset 
and Rokkan’s argument on frozen party systems. She concluded that “most party 
                                                
6 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
7 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
8 The functional orientation was measured as the aggregated share of the votes for the Conservative, 
the Liberal and the Agrarian parties (Ersson, 1982).  
9 The radical orientation was measured as the as the aggregated share of the votes for the Working-
class parties (Ersson, 1982). 
10 The formula for polarization index that was used is:  
      n             
P= !  (fi(xi- )" 
     i=1 
where n is the number of parties, fi is the share of vote of the respective party, xi is the right-left score 
of the respective party and  is the right-left score of the party system (Ersson, 1982). 
11 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and the U.S.A. 
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systems can not be regarded as stable and surely not as frozen. The freeze hypothesis 
[...] has to be rejected.” 
 
Bartolini and Mair (1990) also attempted to monitor the freezing process by applying 
the Total Volatility index. Similarly to Wolinetz (1979) and Rose and Urwin (1970), 
who argued for the stability of the party system, Bartolini and Mair (1990:100) found 
that between 1886 and 1985 “there is virtually a nil trend”, and this (they argued), 
“reflect[s] a fundamental bias towards stability” (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:68) (italics 
in original). However, like Shamir (1984) and Ersson and Lane (1982), Bartolini and 
Mair (1990:100) admitted that “the development of total volatility over time also does 
not suggest that electoral alignment were frozen in the 1920s.” This argument was 
based on comparison between the level of aggregate volatility during post-war era and 
its level in inter-war years. They found that the average level of aggregate volatility 
during the post-war period and beyond is lower than the level reached in the inter-war 
period, the period during which “everybody agrees that the party systems became 
frozen” (Mair, 1997:80). Therefore, Bartolini and Mair suggested that if the freezing 
process occurred at all, it was in the post-war period and not during the early inter-
war years, as was argued by Lipset and Rokkan (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:100). 
 
This inconsistency between scholars on the validity of the freezing hypothesis 
becomes even more evident in Mair’s critique of the methodological tools used by 
Lipset and Rokkan. Mair argued (1997:63-4) that the different indicators used by 
these authors (and by Mair himself, see (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:96-100), were 
ultimately “based on measures of persistence/change in the aggregate support for 
individual parties” (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:96-100) (italics in original). The use of 
measures based on individual parties is not appropriate in this case, explained Mair, 
because the hypothesis refers to a freezing in the party alternatives that manifest 
themselves not by one party, but two or more parties: there might be more than one 
party representing each side of the cleavage, as explained above. Therefore, Mair 
stated (1997:28), “we must be concerned with blocs or families of parties and with the 
notion of parties which are cleavage allies as against those which are cleavage 
opponents.” For this reason, the measures based on individual parties cannot 
distinguish between intra-bloc and inter bloc electoral change, and therefore cannot be 
used to test Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis (Mair, 1989:13-4). Knutsen (2004:7-8) 
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supported this claim when he argued that for the analysis of social cleavage, we 
cannot use “[s]tudies of aggregate level stability and change”; when studying the 
relationship between social structures and party choice, we should examine “parties 
representing a given party family or the entire party system”. 
 
Based on this argument, Bartolini and Mair developed a new index – the Bloc 
Volatility (BV), which is calculated by using the Total Volatility index based on blocs 
of parties, not on individual parties (for an explanation on the index calculation, see 
Appendix A). When they employed the Bloc Volatility index, and checked the 
volatility of the class cleavage, they found data that that “offer[s] strong confirmation 
of the freezing hypothesis” (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:101) (italics in original). In the 
same vein, Sundberg (1999:236) reached a similar conclusion about the Scandinavian 
party system, for which he examined the electoral success of different party families12 
and especially the three major cleavages, between 1945 and the mid 1990s. 
 
Mair’s criticism of the use of measures of aggregate support for individual parties, 
however, is inaccurate. Rose and Urwin (1970) took the same approach as Bartolini 
and Mair (1990) when they tested the change of the electoral support for party 
families (the working-class and middle-class parties). In this way, they examined the 
total vote for each family, exactly as Bartolini and Mair suggested was necessary to 
test Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis. 
 
Bartolini and Mair’s criticism is based on their understanding of Lipset and Rokkan’s 
freezing hypothesis. Yet not all scholars read the freezing hypothesis in the same way. 
Rose and Urwin (1970:288), for example, maintained that Lipset and Rokkan’s 
analysis “emphasised the persistence of the same types of parties.” Therefore, they 
tested the persistence of electoral support for (old) parties, established before 1914 
(Rose & Urwin, 1970:296-7).  
 
Increasingly different interpretations of the freezing hypothesis occurred in later 
studies testing whether the freezing hypothesis has remained relevant in the period 
                                                
12 Sundberg (1999) examines three groups of party families. Firstly, the three pole parties (which 
include the Social Democrats, Agrarian and Conservatives), secondly the Liberals and Communists, 
and thirdly all other parties. 
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after Lipset and Rokkan’s research – that is, the 1970s onwards. According to Sartori, 
between the middle of the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s, the party system of 
Western Europe “reverse[d] its course into a defreezing”, but this was “counteracted 
by the traditional parties”; during the 1990s, this system has gone through “a new 
defreezing, this time to a deeper one” (Sartori, 1994:50). Wolinetz (1988:296) 
concluded that “[t]wenty years later, it is difficult to reach a similar conclusion [i.e. 
the freezing hypothesis] [...] party systems display considerably more change than 
they did in the 1960s. Electorates have become more volatile and party strengths are 
no longer constant as they were in the past.” 
 
Maguire (1983:63) updated Rose and Urwin’s study by examining the electoral 
support of individual parties between 1948-79, based on the age of the parties, and 
found that since 1960 old parties have been less stable in their votes than inter-war 
and new parties. Maguire concluded that “the assertion of Lipset and Rokkan no 
longer seem so accurate.” Also Drummond (2006) who examined Rose and Urwin’s 
results with new results from 1970 to 1995 for the same countries, argued with regard 
to Lipst and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis “If […] we examine the entire 
constellation of parties and the competition between them, we will see change nearly 
everywhere that bespeaks a growing instability” (Drummond, 2006:641). 
  
Pedersen read Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis in the same way as Maguire. 
He argued that the stability of the party systems was created when voters continued to 
support the same parties and, therefore, the electoral support of the parties was also 
stable (Pedersen, 1983). Based on this assumption, Pedersen invented the Total 
Volatility index to test the stability and change of party system (Pedersen, 1979). He 
found that not all the European party systems were stable; rather, they differ in the 
pattern of aggregated electoral volatility, in that some remained stable but others were 
significantly unstable (Pedersen, 1979, 1983). Pedersen argued the party systems 
could be divided into three or even four distinct groups (Pedersen, 1979:9). Dalton 
and his collaborators (1984b:9-10) also used the Total Volatility index and another 
indicator – the Fractionalization scores13 – in their research on the validity of the 
                                                
13 The scores are based on the party vote shares for the election closest to the time points given. 
Fractionalization is computed as:  
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freezing hypothesis in eighteen countries14 from the late 1940s to the mid 1970s. They 
found that in the 1970s there was an increasing trend of fragmentation and electoral 
volatility, and came to a dramatic conclusion: “one can see signs that the structure of 
democratic party systems, frozen for so much of our lifetime, is beginning to thaw”  
(Dalton, et al., 1984c:459).  
 
As mentioned above, Bartolini and Mair criticised the use of Total Volatility to test 
the freezing hypothesis, due to their distrust of the use of measures based on 
individual parties. As they explained, the Total Volatility index measures two types of 
volatility – intra-bloc volatility (the electoral change is between the political parties 
that are cleavage allies) and inter-bloc volatility (the electoral change is between the 
two sides of the cleavage) (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Mair, 1989). Mair (1997) argued 
that these two types of volatility are different. The first is more likely to occur 
between friends, while the second situation is likely to occur between enemies. 
Therefore, in the analysis of the stability of traditional cleavages, the volatility that 
matters is not individual party volatility but volatility occurring between the blocs of 
parties representing the opposing sides of a cleavage line (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:36). 
Therefore, the freezing hypothesis should be tested by changing level of Bloc 
Volatility (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:97). When Bartolini and Mair applied the BV 
index, they discovered that the contemporary increase in levels of electoral instability 
in Europe was mainly due to increase in intra-bloc volatility “within each class-
cleavage bloc, and that the degree of electoral volatility between the major blocs has 
actually tended to decline over time” (Mair, 1997:29) (italics in original). This 
instability, according to Mair, was “regularly contained within broader and more 
stable political alignment”; see also (Mair, 1989:14-5).  
 
In addition, Bartolini and Mair opposed Dalton and his collaborators’ argument due to 
a lack of evidence. When Dalton, et al., (1984b:10) compared the rates of volatility 
during the 1970s to those of the 1960s, they identified a rising trend of volatility 
during the 1970s. Bartolini and Mair criticised this comparison: they found that the 
                                                                                                                                      ! ! ! ! ! !!"!!!! ! !!" ! !!!! ! !!  
14 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
U.S.A. 
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period between the 1950s until the late 1960s was an exception, in which the Total 
Volatility rate was low compared to the rate of the period prior to the 1950s, and that 
after the late 1960s (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:99); see also (Mair, 1989:13). Likewise, 
Ersson and Lane (1982:94) suggested that during the 1950s and 1960s the volatility 
level was lower than that of earlier periods, and found that the volatility rate between 
1970-1974 was almost identical to the level during the years 1950-1954. 
 
Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis suggests stable electoral support for 
established parties.  Some scholars argue that the electoral success of new political 
parties demonstrates that the party systems are no longer frozen. To be more specific, 
the mobilisation and electoral success of new parties suggests that the party systems 
are no longer dominated by old parties or by parties older than their electorate. 
Pedersen (1979:2), for example, cites several examples of the phenomenon of the 
defection of large portions of the electorate from older parties to new parties, 
supporting those who argued that Rokkan and Lipset’s hypothesis is no longer 
relevant in many European party systems. Inglehart (1987:1299) implied that the 
electoral success of new parties (New Politics parties) was due to the appearance of a 
new cleavage –the Materialist/Post-Materialist –that changed voters’ alignment and 
the axis of the party system, as will be explained below. 
 
Mair, however, held the opposite view. Firstly, he argued (Mair, 1997:82-4) that old 
parties had not experienced substantial losses. When we take into account the fact that 
a large portion of the electorate is composed of new voters: the old parties were 
actually “polling substantially more votes in absolute terms”; see also (Sundberg, 
1999:236). Secondly, with respect to the electoral success of new parties, Mair 
(1999:213-4) confirmed that the number of new parties emerging (that is, parties 
which first began to contest elections no earlier than 1960) increased over the time 
and that these new parties enjoy substantially increasing electoral support (Mair, 
2002b:134). However, he also found that new parties sometimes die after brief and 
temporary electoral success. Other new parties survive and even manage to obtain 
substantial electoral support, but most of these are new only in name, i.e. these parties 
are mergers between existing parties or emerge as result of split from older parties; 
they are not parties that belong to one of the new party families – the Greens or the 
extreme Right (Mair, 1990:220; 2002b:137-8). Similarly, based on election results 
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between the mid 1940s and mid 1990s in Scandinavian countries, Sundberg 
(1999:227) found that parties other than those belonging to one of the old party 
families experience the greatest electoral instability. He discovered that while there 
was a difference in electoral performance amongst the old party families, as the 
Liberals (or the Social Liberals) and Communist parties were electorally “[t]he big 
losers” (Sundberg, 1999:224), “[t]he hypothesis that electoral instability melts the 
frozen party system cannot be verified with our data” (Sundberg, 1999:230). 
Drummond (2006:639), on the other hand, who examined nineteen Western 
countries15, from 1970 to 1995 stated “it is [the interwar] parties […] that are most 
likely driving the majority of the increase in party system instability throughout the 
West”. 
 
Bartolini and Mair emphasised party families and assumed that a change in electoral 
support within the bloc of parties implied that the party system was still stable. Lane 
and Ersson (1999:125) referred to this assumption as the “weak version” of the 
freezing hypothesis. They maintained that “Lipset and Rokkan had in mind a stronger 
version of the frozen party system hypothesis.” Ersson and Lane (1998:24) underline 
the fact that Lipset and Rokkan’s model consists of two hypotheses. The first refers to 
the parties – “parties remain stable over time in terms of electoral support”; the 
second refers to the electorate – “the electorate is frozen in relation to the party 
system behind cleavages.” In other words, Ersson and Lane add to the definition of a 
freezing party system another component – the electorate. A frozen electorate is one 
in which the people vote for the same party from one election to another (Lane & 
Ersson, 1999:125). Namely, the freezing hypothesis implies a freezing of the electoral 
strength of individual parties and the patterns of electorate voting. Therefore, when 
Lane and Ersson found “increasing signs of instability” in gross volatility, they 
concluded “[o]ne part of the Lipset-Rokkan model of the party systems in Western 
Europe cannot be upheld, namely the hypothesis that the electorate is frozen, […] The 
electorates in the West European countries are mobile – this the gross volatility scores 
indicate” (Ersson & Lane, 1998:33). The interpretation of the freezing hypothesis as 
having two components enabled them to conclude “[t]here are no frozen party 
                                                
15 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and the U.S.A. 
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systems in Western Europe any more” (Ersson & Lane, 1998:36). This empirical 
observation is based mainly on changes in patterns of individuals’ party support 
(measured by ‘party switching’16 and ‘gross volatility’17) and not on changes in the 
parties’ aggregate electoral support, since they found that the indicators of change in 
the aggregate support of parties had increased since the mid 1970s but not to the same 
extent as the gross volatility (Ersson & Lane, 1998:30-2; Lane & Ersson, 1999:129-
31). However, they (Lane & Ersson, 1999:131) argued that the difference between the 
levels of instability in the electorate and in party systems would disappear in the 
future, since these factors tend to change together and  “[t]hus, neither the strong or 
the weak version of the party system hypothesis can be upheld.” 
 
Ersson and Lane understood the freezing hypothesis to mean that a frozen electorate 
would not change its party support. This interpretation was shaped by their view of 
the connections between parties and the electorate, and mainly on what they term the 
‘freezing party system’. The main mechanism for this freezing, Ersson and Lane held, 
is the cleavage. They argued the connection between parties and electorate is 
structured by cleavages: the electorate is divided into different sectors corresponding 
to the cleavages that prevail in the society, and each political party can mobilise only 
a certain sector of the electorate (its electoral niche) (Ersson & Lane, 1998:34; Lane 
& Ersson, 1999:110). A similar description is found in Rose and Urwin’s article 
(1970:296). An alignment, Lane and Ersson (1999:124-5) explained, occurs when the 
connection between voters and parties is stable, so that the cleavage functions as glue 
between the voters and the parties; such alignments tend to be long lasting. Put 
differently, the frozen party system is maintained because it is cleavages that 
construct the relationship between parties and voters. Therefore, as long as the 
cleavages are frozen, the relationship between the voters and parties is also frozen. 
Pennings and Lane (1998:3) presented an identical argument, claiming that the 
catalyst that froze the cleavage structures was the introduction of universal manhood 
suffrage. This caused party organisations to incorporate the entire mobilised 
electorate, resulting in the closure of the electoral market and leaving little room for 
                                                
16 ‘Party switching’ refers to those voters who voted in two successive elections and changed their 
party support from one election to another (Ersson & Lane, 1998). 
17 Gross volatility takes into account all the eligible voters in two successive elections and measures the 
proportion of voters who not only change their party support (i.e. party switching), but also those who 
change between voting and non-voting (Ersson & Lane, 1998).  
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the emergence of new cleavages in the party system. A similar argument was also 
proposed by Pedersen (1983:57). 
 
Mair (2001:35) accepted that a frozen cleavage is one “in which more or less the same 
social forces combine and compete in alignment with more or less the same party 
alternatives”. But he rejected the idea that the validity of the freezing hypothesis 
depends on the sustainability of the same socio-structural cleavages. This, Mair 
explained, implies that Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis could be valid only in a 
frozen society, “and this is clearly an impossible precondition.” According to Mair 
(2001:30) “[n]o society is, or has been, frozen, and hence if political alignment are 
stabilized, this process must be due to something else, or to something more”.  
 
Instead, Mair proposed two other types of freezing: the freezing of party alternatives, 
and the freezing of the party system itself (Mair, 2001:35). He admitted that “parties 
have an almost inexhaustible capacity to adjust and to adapt, and hence to survive 
through transformation,” which, he argued, tends to direct the party systems towards 
stability. Put it differently, the party systems are stable since the parties are adaptive 
organisations. Wolinetz (1988:304) also emphasised the role of political parties in the 
continuity of party systems: “parties adjust their appeals to the changing predilections 
of their electorates.” Bornscier (2010:58) also argued that “the patterns of interaction 
between parties […] perpetuate political alignment.”  
 
Logically, Mair is correct that a frozen party system cannot mean frozen social-
structural cleavages. More importantly, it seems that Mair and Wolinetz are right to 
argue that the political parties are the cause of a frozen party system (as was argued 
by Lipset and Rokkan). In their seminal work, Lipset and Rokkan alluded to the 
strategic capabilities of political parties. They (1967:51) suggested that “the leeway 
for new party formations was particular small” in countries where both working-class 
parties, liberals and conservatives formed nationwide organisations. However, this 
emphasis on parties’ adaptive capabilities may conceal Lipset and Rokkan’s main 
argument. In order to hold their positions, parties may adopt non-cleavage issues 
(Sartori, 1968), moving them away from their function as political institutions of 
cleavage representation. This development was already identified by Kirchheimer 
(1966:184), writing at almost at the same time as Lipset and Rokkan. Kirchheimer 
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described the way in which, after the Second World War, mass parties (which 
represented the working class or the denominational division)18 transformed 
themselves into ‘catch-all parties’: parties which broadened ‘their electoral appeal 
beyond their original classe gardée’ (Katz & Mair, 1995:12) (italics in original). They 
drastically reduced the role of party ideology and therefore reduced their role as 
cleavage representatives (Kirchheimer, 1966). 
 
Another issue is the application of this definition of alignment to other countries. 
Lipset and Rokkan’s study claimed that socio-structural cleavages could explain 
voting behaviour in all Western democratic countries, as their historical research 
included European countries as well as the U.S.A.  
 
Lipset and Rokkan were not the first to argue that the basis of cleavages is a potent 
predictor of voting behaviour in the case of the U.S.A. (Beck, 1979). The first were 
Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates (1968) from Columbia University, (Thomassen, 
1994). Similarly, the role of party identification in explaining voters’ attachment has 
been applied to countries other than the U.S.A (Holmberg, 2007; Weisberg, 1999) 
(this topic will be discussed more extensively in Chapter Five). Addressing Lipset and 
Rokkan’s hypothesis specifically, Inglehart and Hochstein (1972:345) explained that 
mechanism of freezing is mass party identification; new voters must have a sense of 
party attachment, “otherwise they would have been free to shift to any new party 
which arose subsequently.” 
 
In the literature, however, the idea took root that the socio-psychological approach 
(i.e. party identification) could explain American voter behaviour, while the socio-
structural approach could explain voter behaviour in Western Europe. Wolinetz 
(1979:15) explained that as party identification in the U.S.A is an “artifact of the 
number of elected positions: voters are said to need an underlying predisposition to 
simplify the choices confronting them”, or to put it differently, voters require this 
simplification because so much is asked of them (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2009:88). 
In Western Europe, on the other hand, not only are the elections less frequent, but also 
                                                
18 According to Krichheimer (1966), other parties such as bourgeois parties (called the cadre parties by 
Duverger (1954), and the elite parties by Katz and Mair (1995) will also be transformed into ‘catch-all’ 
parties.   
! Chapter 2 
 
 26  
the “[p]arties are more closely tied to social groups” (Wolinetz, 1979:15). Shively 
(1972) presents a different explanation. He argues that when there is a match between 
strong social identities and party positions on cleavage issues, there is less need for 
voters to develop party identification. Other scholars have seen these two 
explanations as “complementary, not contradictory. The emphasis on social structure 
did not deny the existence of party identification. Similarly, the authors of the party 
identification model did not discount the importance of social structure” (Crewe, 
1985b:3). 
 
From the end of the Second World War onwards, patterns of voter behaviour changed 
and arguments of a change in alignments arose. Change in voter behaviour was 
triggered by socio-demographic, economic and technical changes such as 
secularisation, expansion of educational opportunities, rising living standards and 
increasing industrialisation (which changed the industrial sector, the context of the 
workplace and the residential neighbourhood), the growth of electronic media  
(Dalton, et al., 1984b), the rise of social policy, the welfare state, the collapse of the 
Communist bloc (Kitschelt, 1994:21) and finally the advent of globalisation, wherein 
national boundaries evaporated  (Kriesi, et al., 2008a). 
 
Two approaches were taken as the basis for two alternative explanations regarding 
new patterns of voter behaviour: the (new) social cleavage and the functional model.  
 
2.3 Two Alternative Explanations for Voter Behaviour 
 
Inglehart was the first to argue that a new cleavage – the Materialist/Post-Materialist – 
replaced traditional cleavages (such as class and religion) as a basis for alignment. 
This new divide concerns physical safety vs. the non-material quality of life. While 
the first emphasises economic gains and security (for example, the issues of law and 
order), the latter’s priorities are ‘a sense of community and the non-material quality of 
life’ (such as environmentalism, women’s rights, unilateral disarmament, opposition 
to nuclear power, etc.) (Inglehart, 1987:1296). This new divide, according to 
Inglehart, changed the historical socio-structural ties between voters and parties as 
described by Lipset and Rokkan. 
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Traditionally, political polarisation reflected conflicts between social classes: the 
support of Left parties came from the working class, and the middle class tended to 
support the Right parties (Inglehart, 1977:70; 1984:25). This situation has changed: 
Post-Materialist voters, despite their relatively high levels of income and their 
occupations, have became more likely to align with Left or Liberal positions and the 
Materialist (who are poorer) are more prone to support the Right; this trend has 
strengthened over time (Inglehart, 1977:70, 183, 230; 1987:1299). Put another way, 
Inglehart (1987:1296) claimed that the basis of alignment has changed “from class-
based to values-based.”  
 
What Inglehart identified as Post-Materialist, Flanagan (1987) termed ‘libertarian’ 
(and suggested that both labels include an emphasis on personal freedom, 
participation, equality and tolerance of minorities). According to Flanagan 
(1987:1305-6) this new value basis for alignment created two distinct cleavages. The 
first divides Materialists from non-Materialists, or Old Politics from New Politics. 
The second is a value-based cleavage within New Politics itself, and distinguishes 
between New Left and New Right. The New Left is composed of libertarians, who 
support moral issues such as liberalising abortion, gay rights, and other ‘quality of 
life’ issues. The New Right is composed of authoritarians, who endorse issues such 
anti-abortion, traditional moral and religious values, patriotism, law and order, etc. 
The two cleavages, emphasised Flanagan (1987:1306-7), are independent of each 
other He argued that a new pattern of alignment has appeared: middle-class people 
have crossed the line to support New-Left values, and the working-class has shifted to 
support Old Right interests. 
 
Kitschelt (1994) presented a very similar argument, claiming the change in alignment 
basis was stimulated by the appearance of a ‘libertarian vs. authoritarian’ divide19, 
wherein voter configuration shifted “from a simple alternative between socialist (left) 
and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-
libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives” (Kitschelt, 1994:30-1).  
 
                                                
19 Kitschelt (1994) defined this cleavage differently from Flanagan. He argued that libertarians 
advocate the realisation of equality and liberty in the community, while authoritarians see the 
community as structured in internally hierarchical units. 
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Stubager (2010a), who examined Flanagan and Kitschelt’s arguments regarding the 
new libertarian-authoritarian divide, demonstrated (at least in the Danish context) that 
voters’ length of education is the socio-structural basis for the new cleavage.  
   
All in all, these four scholars supported the identification of a new cleavage and 
argued that the basis of alignment changed, but they differed in their assessments of 
the new cleavage’s structure.  
Inglehart held (as was presented above) that the new cleavage replaced the old 
cleavage structure (and mainly replaced the dominant cleavage, the class cleavage). 
Flanagan stated that the new cleavage has appeared alongside the old division, but it 
divides only those who support ‘New Politics’ issues, while Kitschelt supported 
Flanagan’s argument but argued that the two cleavages (i.e. old and new) cut across 
each other and create a structure of two orthogonal axes. A similar argument can be 
found in Stubager’s (2010b) paper. 
 
More recently, additional arguments have appeared in the literature regarding the 
creation of yet another new socio-structural cleavage. Kriesi and his collaborators 
have argued that the globalisation process is a new junction (in Rokkan’s 
terminology), which has created a socio-structural cleavage cutting across the most 
important traditional cleavage – class cleavage. This new divide is between the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the globalisation process (Kriesi, et al., 2008a:4). The 
‘winners’ are those life chances have increased, as they benefit from the new 
opportunities brought by the globalisation process. The ‘losers’ are those whose life 
chances were formerly protected by national boundaries. With the weakening of these 
boundaries, they feel a threat to their social, economical status (Kriesi, et al., 2008a:4-
5). This cleavage, Kriesi et al., argued, has transformed the structure of the political 
space, as the voters’ distribution and parties’ locations have changed.  
 
As an alternative to the arguments regarding the appearance of new cleavages, 
Flanagan and Dalton (1984:13) stated that alignments diminish “as a product of the 
loss of functions by political parties and the declining functional value of party 
identification to large numbers of citizens”. This has occurred due to the process of 
what Dalton terms ‘cognitive mobilization’, when voters possess the political skills 
and resources necessary to deal with complexities of politics and make their own 
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political decisions without reliance on external cues  (Dalton 1996:213-4; 2006:194). 
According to Dalton, this cognitive mobilisation produced new typology of voters. 
Traditionally scholars who follow the Michigan School differentiate between 
partisans and independent voters (who do not have party identifications). By adding 
the cognitive mobilisation component, Dalton could identify four patterns of political 
mobilisation: ritual partisans (those who have party identification but low cognitive 
mobilisation and therefore who mobilise only on the basis of their party attachment), 
cognitive partisans (who rank high in these two components and therefore involve 
themselves in politics even when party cues are lacking), apolitical voters, who are 
attached neither to a party nor cognitively (this group is equivalent to the independent 
voters of Michigan School), and apartisan voters, who are the ‘new independents’. 
They have high cognitive mobilisation but no party attachment  (Dalton 1996:214-5; 
2006:195-6). Thus, these new independent voters are less consistent in their patterns 
of party support. Apartisans, Dalton (1996:214; 2006:195) states, are mainly 
“concentrated among the young, the better educated and postmaterialists”, but socio-
economic changes will gradually increase the number of apartisans (Dalton, 2006) . 
This means that evidence of broking ties between voters and parties is not a 
temporary situation, but a lasting trend.   
 
However, these two explanations - the (new) social cleavage and the functional 
model-- are sometimes presented in the literature simultaneously: (e.g. Dalton, et al., 
1984c; Flanagan & Dalton, 1984), as testament to the dispute about how best to 
define, describe and explain the nexus between voters and political parties. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The majority of electorates still had stable patterns of party support when research 
into voter behaviour began after the Second World War. Two alternative explanations 
were developed to explain the phenomena of voters aligned with political parties. The 
first was voter identification with the parties (the socio-psychological explanation). 
The second pertained to voters’ socio-structural characteristics and their identification 
with and loyalty to a group and its political institutions – in this case, political parties 
(the socio-structural explanation).  
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The two alternative explanations were examined over time and were criticised on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. In addition, regarding socio-demographic, 
economic and political developments, two alternative explanations for capturing voter 
behaviour were proposed. One, the (new) socio-structural, claimed the replacement of 
the dominant traditional cleavages with a new cleavage basis, suggesting realignment 
along this new cleavage. The second, the functional model, claimed the disappearance 
of voters’ long-term party allegiance and suggests dealignment.  
 
This study is motivated by this discussion: it concentrates on the phenomena of 
‘alignment’, ‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’. The goal of this dissertation is to 
investigate the discussion of these three phenomena, by capturing, understanding and 
elucidating this empirical debate. The empirical debate has its roots in a conceptual 
controversy, as there is no single agreed operational definition for either ‘realignment’ 
or ‘dealignment’. In order to put an end to this controversy, I propose to adopt a semi-
modular approach for studying the three phenomena. This approach encapsulates the 
major concepts, components and assumptions of the literature. 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
FINDING A WAY THROUGH THE DISORDER – THE 
PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFYING OF ALIGNMENT, 
REALIGNMENT AND DEALIGNMENT 
 
 
“The clarification and refinement of concepts is a fundamental task in political science.”  
Adcock and Collier (2001:529)  
 
 
 
Scholarly discussion of the mechanisms of alignment – party identification and socio-
structural cleavage(s), and more importantly about the relevance of these concepts for 
the period after the 1970s – created another debate in the literature of Political 
Science that follows either the socio-psychological or the socio-structural approach 
(both approaches are discussed in the previous chapter). This debate is focused on 
whether or not the connections between voters and political parties in the party 
systems of Western democratic states are still relatively stable and structured, whether 
or not these party systems have changed and, – if so – what kind of change has 
occurred. 
 
Three major empirical arguments dominate this debate. The first suggests that the 
relationship between voters and parties has hardly changed, that voters are still 
affiliated to the political parties in much the same way as they always have been, and 
that the connection between voters and parties is stable; as such the party systems are 
still in an alignment. The second argument suggests that since the 1970s, the 
connection between electorates and the parties has changed and has lead to a new 
alignment. In other words, we have witnessed wide-scale realignment at some point 
since the 1970s. The third argument suggests that the party systems of industrialised 
democracies have been experiencing a process of dealignment since the 1970s, with a 
diminishing connection between voters and political parties, and no new alternative 
connection asserting itself. 
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This empirical debate is a barrier obstructs our understanding of the current state of 
the party systems of the Western democratic states. This chapter addresses the 
dispute, exploring why we cannot tell which of these three situations (alignment, 
realignment, or dealignment) characterises industrialised democracies. The second 
part of this chapter examines the empirical and theoretical literature regarding the 
alignment-re/dealignment processes, and suggests that the empirical dispute has its 
roots in a conceptual problem.  
 
The conceptual problem is that there is neither a single agreed operational definition 
of either realignment or dealignment, nor what Adcock and Collier (2001) call 
‘systematized concepts’ (operational definitions that are adopted by a group of 
scholars). In order to contribute to the resolution of this empirical dispute, I propose 
to study the empirical situation from a new perspective – the semi-modular approach 
– in the last part of this chapter. This new approach will help us to develop a new 
model, which clarifies the positions of party systems regarding the alignment issue. 
 
3.1 The Empirical Dispute 
 
The literature mentions three different empirical research results that form the basis 
for the empirical dispute. It is necessary to emphasise that this dispute does not reflect 
different personal opinions on this controversy, as Dalton and his colleagues 
(2000:37) imply; scholars – however – may find contrasting evidence and, therefore, 
draw divergent conclusions, particularly when they examine different countries or 
different periods of time. 
 
The first type of research results indicated that the party systems of industrialised 
democracies have not changed, remaining stable and in alignment. Bartolini and Mair 
(1990:68) reported that the volatility index rates of thirteen European states1 between 
1885 and 1985 “reflect a fundamental bias towards stability”.2 Later, Mair (1997:78) 
argued that until the 1990s the “image of electoral change [wa]s largely mythical”. He 
claimed that the realignment and dealignment processes never occurred, and that 
                                                
1 The states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
2 The only exception to this conclusion is the party system of Denmark during the 1970s, as I will 
mention below. 
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instead, party systems continues to be frozen, since the old parties “adapt and modify 
their appeals and their methods of mobilizing support” (Mair, 1997:89).  
 
Only since the 1990s, when the volatility rate increased and the levels of voter turnout 
declined in fifteen European countries3, does Mair accept (2002b:138) that “the 
impression that comes across from these data is not one that points to realignment, but 
rather to increasing detachment and disengagement.” But these increasing trends did 
not infer that the party system was unstable, since the change has been only partial. 
As was concluded by Gallagher, et al., (2006:296), “we can see that contemporary 
Western European politics is characterized at least as much by continuity as it is by 
change.” According to these scholars, “if realignment is taken to mean the 
replacement by an alternative divide of the fundamental division between the right 
and the left, then the evidence in favor of realignment is far from convincing. If it is 
taken to mean a significant shift in party fortunes within both the left and right, on the 
other hand, then a limited realignment may well be taking place” (Gallagher, et al., 
2006:287). In addition, regarding the occurrence of dealignment, they claimed: “we 
see evidence that the period around the turn of new century is different from what has 
gone before. Here again, we may be witnessing real signs of dealignment” (Gallagher, 
et al., 2006:296) (italics added). 
 
The second type of research results suggested that since the 1970s, some of the party 
systems of industrialised democracies have changed and a new alignment has 
emerged. Namely, a realignment has occurred at some point since the 1970s. Dalton, 
et al., (1984c:451), for example, stated that “from the perspective of early 1980s [...] 
[p]rocesses of realignment have been highlighted in Japan, West Germany and Italy.” 
Realignment occurred during the 1970s and in Denmark (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:71-
2) and in Australia (Weaklien & Western, 1999) or more recently in Denmark 
(Stubager, 2010b). 
 
The third type of research results showed that since the 1970s, some of the party 
systems of industrialised democracies have weakened and that the party systems are 
now going through a process of dealignment. Dalton, et al., (1984c:451) argued again 
                                                
3 The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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that “from the perspective of early 1980s [...] [in] The Netherlands, Britain, 
Scandinavia, and Spain – party instability follows at least temporary electoral 
dealignment.” Later, Dalton, et al., (2000) found evidence of dealignment trends 
within eighteen advanced industrialised democracies.4 Borre (1984) also identified 
dealignment in three Scandinavian states – Sweden, Denmark and Norway – during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Klingemann (who examined Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K between 1944 and 2001) discovered that 
the “results do not support the stability hypothesis. Measures of fragmentation, 
polarization, and volatility – comes closer to the secular change hypothesis [i.e. 
dealignment]” (Klingemann, 2005:50). 
 
We may also find these various research results in country-specific analyses. 
Research into the Italian political system uncovered three different research results. 
Peripheral dealignment (where the proportion of weak identifiers declines and the 
non-attached grow accordingly, while the strong party identifiers do not follow any 
trend; (Schmitt, 1989; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995) was found between the mid 1970s 
and the late 1980s (Schmitt, 1989). In the same period - between the mid 1970s and 
1990s – a dealignment was also identified (Bardi, 1996a); see also (Bartolini & 
D’Alimonte, 1996). Later Bardi (2007:712) argued that a gradual dealignment has 
been observable in Italy from 1987, suggesting a “[s]izeable electoral dealigmnent in 
Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon, whose beginning barely preceded the huge 
transformations of the 1990s.” Researchers also found that between 1987 and 1996, 
Italian politics passed through a major partisan realignment (Wellhofer, 2001), or a 
party realignment (in the first half of the 1990s) (Bardi, 2007). Each of these studies 
reached a different conclusion concerning the question of the Italian party system’s 
alignment situation, despite the fact that they examined the same period of time 
(namely the mid 1970s to the late 1980s). This contrast in results for the same period 
can be found for other countries too. In research regarding the British party system, 
we find two different research results. Some research shows a partisan dealignment 
occurring from 1964 onwards (Alt, 1984), or beginning with the two elections of 1974 
(Crewe, 1983, 1985a); see also (Clarke & Stewart, 1998; Särlvik & Crewe, 1983). It 
has also been found that the change during this period was limited – a peripheral 
                                                
4 The states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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dealignment was identified in Britain between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s 
(Schmitt, 1989); see also (Clarke & Stewart, 1984), which continued until 1992 
(Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995). We also find two differing results from research into 
the Israeli party system. Realignment is seen both before the 1970s (Arian & Shamir, 
2001); see also (Arian, 1979), and since 1977 (Arian & Shamir, 2002), which has 
continued to the 1990s (Hazan, 1998:162). At the same time, it was also identified 
that as of 1992, Israel went through a dealignment (Arian & Shamir, 2001; 2002). 
Another case is the German party system, for which we also find two different results. 
Some research stated that the alignment of West Germany remained stable until the 
late 1980s (Klingemann, 1985; Schmitt, 1989). Other research, however, showed that 
between 1953-1983 the German party system experienced a secular realignment 
(Dalton, 1984), and that a new party realignment occurred during the 1980s 
(Rohrschneider, 1993). Others assert that initial signs of dealignment existed in the 
late 1980s (Dalton, 2004:33). The American political system is the fourth example for 
which two different research results are evident, but in this case some researchers held 
that the party system experienced realignment (Meffert, et al., 2001; Petrocik, 1981), 
or a “Republican realignment,” which began in the early 1980s (Campbell, 1997:845). 
Others, however, have disagreed that such realignment occurred in the American 
political system (Ladd & Hadley, 1975; MacKuen, et al., 1989), or have argued that 
the realignment that occurred during the 1980s remains incomplete (Shea, 1999), 
hollow (Wattenberg, 1998) or of a limited nature (Miller & Shanks, 1996:166). 
Furthermore, some researchers have argued that a dealignment process occurred in 
American politics between the 1960s and 1980s (Beck, 1984a) and continued 
throughout the 1980s (Clarke & Stewart, 1998; Flanigan & Zingale, 1985; Shea, 
1999). A similar dispute exists regarding the Netherlands. For the same period 
(between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s), it has been argued that the Netherlands 
went through either realignment (Schmitt, 1989) or dealignment (Irwin & Dittrich, 
1984).  
 
In addition, other scholars have concluded that alignment, realignment and 
dealignment processes can occur simultaneously within the same party system. 
Flanagan (1984), for example, discovered that between the 1950s and 1970s, Japan 
underwent two processes. The first was when the Liberal-Democrat party supporters 
changed from prealignment to alignment, and the second was when opposition 
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supporters shifted from being aligned to dealigned partisans. Ladd (1989) argued that 
due to the changes of the last quarter-century, the American political system has 
realigned – thus, the current system involves a new voting alignment and 
dealignment. Vowles (1997) also found that during the 1970s and 1980s, New 
Zealand went through realignment and dealignment simultaneously. 
 
Some more creative scholars use exclusive terms in order to describe or identify a 
realignment or dealignment. There is a large variety in concepts currently in vogue for 
each of these processes. For the dealignment process, the terms strong dealignment, 
peripheral dealignment (Schmitt, 1989; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995), ideological 
dealignment (Crewe, 1983), issue dealignment (Carmines, et al., 1987) and stable 
dealignment (LeDuc, 1984) are all used. For realignment, researchers use concepts 
such as post-realignment (Schmitt, 1989), an old Left realignment and a new party 
realignment (Rohrschneider, 1993), issue evolution realignment, secular and 
ideological realignment (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998, 2006), party realignment 
(Green, at al., 2002), and philosophical realignment (Ladd, 1997).  
 
These contradictory empirical arguments, I argue, have their roots in a conceptual 
problem, which will be presented in the next section of this chapter. 
 
3.2 The Conceptual Problem 
 
Key was the first scholar to discuss the occurrence of realignment. In 1955, he 
identified what he called a ‘critical election’ (Key, 1955:4). This is an election “in 
which voters are […] unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral 
involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting 
reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate.” This kind 
of election, according to Key, creates a new alignment, as the new voting pattern 
“persists for several succeeding elections.” Later, this will be termed ‘critical 
realignment’. While this kind of realignment is fast and happens in one election, a few 
years later Key argued for another model of realignment: the ‘secular realignment’. 
This is “[a] secular shift in party attachment [that] may be regarded as a movement of 
the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several 
presidential elections”. This type of realignment is created by processes that “operate 
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inexorably, and almost imperceptibly, election after election, to form new party 
alignment and to build new party grouping” (Key, 1959:198-9).    
 
Key’s work paved the way for identifying continuous patterns of voting behaviour – 
alignment or a change to a new durable pattern – after a realignment. In early research 
it was assumed that the transition from one alignment to another also causes a 
temporary period of instability (Dalton, et al., 1984b:14; McAllister & Studlar, 
1995:202). Yet, the significant decline of party identification in the U.S.A. and 
evidence that this process is likely to continue for the coming years, lead Inglehart 
and Hochstein (1972:345) to discuss the occurrence of a new phenomenon – a 
dealignment, so called because there are “declining rates of identification with any 
party.” (On this innovative argument; see also (Dalton, et al., 1984b:14). 
  
With equivalent social-demographic and economic developments occurring 
throughout the Western world, the two concepts became popular for defining new 
patterns of voting behavior. The concepts not only applied to American voting 
behaviour (the origin of the concepts), but were also applicable to research regarding 
countries with other political traditions, for example European countries, Israel, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Arian, 1979; Dalton, et al., 1984a; Vowles, 1997). 
The extensive research of these two phenomena has created a conceptual problem. 
There is no single agreed operational definition for either the realignment or the 
dealignment phenomenon. Indeed, there are too many operational definitions for 
realignment and too many indicators (which function as operational definitions) 
associated with dealignment. On the top of this, there are no ‘systematized concepts’ 
in place (those commonly accepted by groups of scholars) (Adcock & Collier, 2001). 
As consequence of this, scholars disagree over the manifestation of re/dealignment.  
 
In the section below, I will demonstrate this problem. My analysis is restricted to 
definitions of realignment and dealignment in the context of electorates and party 
systems. I will not address definitions of realignment and dealignment in other areas 
of the political system, like the legislative or the judicial branches, although some 
scholars associate electoral realignment with changes in government policy (e.g. 
(Mayhew, 2000). 
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3.2.1 The realignment process 
 
The absence of a single agreed operational definition of the realignment process is 
highlighted through analysis of the abundance of definitions found in Political 
Science literature. Some years ago, Sundquist (1983:4) articulated this nicely: “after a 
quarter century of study, the concept of party realignment is still far from clear. The 
writers all employ the same term – realignment – but it is difficult to find any two 
works that give it the same definition”. Yet, in my effort to organise these definitions, 
I discovered that they can be divided into different categories according to their 
reference to three levels of analysis: the electorate, the party system structure and the 
cleavage. 
 
Realignment as a process caused by a change within the electorate 
 
In the first category are definitions that describe “realignment” or “partisan 
realignment” as a change that occurs within the electorate. Namely, realignment 
emerges when the electorate changes its party loyalty and starts identifying itself as a 
partisan of another party.  
 
The electorate is, however, treated as either a collection of individuals or as members 
of various social groups. In the first meaning, realignment is a lasting change in which 
the individual voters switch their party loyalty and become partisans or loyalists of 
another political party (Beck, 1974; Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972; Johnston, 1987; 
Stanley, 1988); see also (Dalton, et al., 1984b:13) or when nonpartisans or new voters 
mobilise into the party system (Sundquist, 1983; Wanat & Durke, 1982). This is a 
conversion of individual voters (Sundquist, 1983:7).  
 
In the second meaning (the electorate as composed of various social groups), “[a] 
realignment occurs when the measurable party bias of identifiable segments of the 
population changes in such a way that the social group profile of the parties – the 
party coalitions – is altered” (Petrocik, 1981:15); see also (Dalton, et al., 1984b:13; 
Ladd, 1981:3; Petrocik, 1987; Sheingold, 1973; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983). 
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This is probably due to the influence of the so-called Columbia and Michigan Schools 
on the study of voting behaviour, as was discussed in the previous chapter. The first 
meaning of ‘electorate’ emphasises an individual’s party identification, a definition 
linked to the Michigan School. The second meaning assumes that voting must be seen 
as a group process in the tradition of the Columbia School, which focused on the 
sociological base of political predispositions and the reinforcing effect of information 
received during a campaign.  
 
A concept that combines these two meanings is that of ‘party realignment’, argued to 
occur when the social characteristics of the party identifiers of one party change 
(Green, et al., 2002). 
 
Besides these two meanings of ‘electorate’, there is also inconsistency in 
conceptualisations of the magnitude of electoral change necessary for realignment. 
Campbell and his collaborators (1980:83) stated that “any shift in the partisan 
identification” can be defined as realignment, while others insist that a realignment 
only occurs through a significant electoral change (Beck, 1974:203; Dalton, et al., 
1984b:13; McMichael & Trilling, 1980:25). Those who tread a path between the two 
points of view have invented new concepts to distinguish between these two types of 
change. Sundquist (1983), for example, calls the former ‘minor realignment’ and the 
latter ‘major realignment’; see also (Cavangh & Sundquist, 1985) and Burnham 
(1970) named the former “subrealigning”.  
 
Realignment as a process that includes a change in the structure of a party system 
 
The second category of definitions refers to the level of electorate, but also discusses 
the possible effect of a change in the electorate on the party system structure. The 
main difference of opinion among researchers pertains to the necessity of change in 
the party system structure. There are those who view realignment as a process that 
includes an alteration in the structure of the party system – a change of the major 
party in a two-party system (Shea, 1999) or as “substantially altering the format of 
party competition or redefining party alternatives” (Wolinetz, 1988:299) (a definition 
that can also be applied in a multi-party system). In contrast, others describe 
realignment as a process of change in partisans’ electoral support or in terms of voter 
! Chapter 3 
 
 40 
mobilisation, which may create a change in the structure of the party system. This 
could be the emergence of a new majority party. However, this change is optional and 
not necessary to the definition of realignment (Petrocik & Brown, 1999; Pinkney, 
1986; Trilling & Campbell, 1980). Clubb, et al., (1980:78) drew on this definition 
when they described two types of lasting rearrangements (i.e. realignments). In the 
first, there is a change in the party system structure caused by an increase (or 
decrease) in the total number of votes received by the parties. In the second type of 
realignment, the pattern of change involves shifts in the sources of electoral support, 
but its changes are counter-balancing: there is no change in the total support for the 
political parties, and the structure of the party system remains intact.  
 
Crewe (1985b) presented three types of the realignment process that differ from each 
other regarding change in the party system structure. The first type is a social or 
ideological realignment, wherein “[t]he social and ideological bases of party support 
change, but the number and strength of existing parties remains much the same” 
(Crewe, 1985b:17). This type of realignment is a change in the electorate, but not in 
the structure of the party system and, unlike the earlier definitions, it refers to the 
electorate as being composed of different social groups. The second definition is a 
two-party partisan realignment, wherein partisans change their political support from 
one to the other, and the party balance changes between the two parties. The third 
definition is a multi-party partisan realignment, wherein the electorate support 
changes in such a way that it influences the major parties as along with the minor or 
new parties. The difference between these last two types of realignment is the 
influence of the change on the different parties. While in a two-party system partisan 
realignment will affect the parties that structure the system, in a multi-party system, 
the change will also affect minor or new parties. Clubb, et al., (1980:77-83) also 
described two scenarios of lasting electoral change. The first is ‘Across-the-Board’ 
change and the second is ‘Differential-Electoral-Change.’ While in the first type of 
change, the balance of power between parties changes (as there is an increase or 
decrease in the vote received by the parties), in the second type of change the overall 
partisans’ support remains the same and therefore there are no shifts in the relative 
electoral strength of the parties. 
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The inconsistent attitude towards the necessity of change in the party system structure 
(for definitions of realignment) can also be found in the literature on specific types of 
realignment – critical realignment and secular realignment. Burnham (1975:6), for 
example, held that a critical realignment causes an alteration of the relative electoral 
support, wherein majority parties become minorities; see also (Carmines & Stimson, 
1984). Petrocik (1981) supported this view and claimed that a situation wherein 
balance is stable may be termed ‘noncritical realignment’. Other scholars argued that 
a critical election does not necessarily cause a change in the structure of the party 
system, but that a shift in the party balance is likely to occur (Campbell, et al., 
1960:534, 536) since “it is expected that the redistribution of party support will 
benefit one party more in relation to the other” (McMichael & Trilling, 1980:31). 
Pomper (1967) expanded on this possibility and argued that one should not confuse 
these two different effects (a change in partisan commitments, and a change in the 
party balance). He argued it is also possible for partisan commitments to change while 
the party balance does not: the party voters retain the same majority party, although 
different partisans now endorse it.5 In addition, Nexon (1980) claimed that critical 
realignment may include two scenarios. One possibility is that the party balance may 
change due to a change in the proportion of partisan support for each party. Another 
scenario is that the relative support given to each party by any group in the population 
may change, but these changes may cancel each other out, thus the proportional 
support for each party does not change and neither does the party balance. Ladd and 
Hadley (1975:26) also opposed the idea of the creation of a new majority party as the 
essential component of critical realignment, though they argued that “[w]hat really 
matters is that both the policy expectations and social group composition of electoral 
coalitions [are] transformed. It may or may not follow that there will be a new 
majority party”. 
 
We can also note a similar inconsistency in the literature regarding secular 
realignment. In his discussion of secular realignment Key (1959:199) focused on the 
change of the social base of the parties, arguing that this change does not necessarily 
hail a change in the electoral trends and certainly causes no change in the party 
                                                
5 This is, according to Pomper (1967), the main difference between “converting” and “realigning” 
elections; in the first, the party system structure does not change as the majority party wins, while in 
the second type of election, by contrast, the majority party is defeated.  
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system structure; see also (Dalton, 1984). Others have stated that secular realignment 
also creates a shift in the relative strength of political parties (Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 1998). Nexon (1980:62), however, took a different position by 
distinguishing between three types of secular realignment. According to him, the 
party balance shifts in two of these types of secular realignment, while in the third 
type the electoral change is slow and moves in different directions so that, over time, 
the elements making up each party coalition change.  
 
The confusion surrounding the necessity of change in (and its effects on) the party 
system structure is exacerbated in countries with presidential government. Here, it is 
unclear if it is necessary for a change of majority party to occur in both the legislative 
and the executive (the president) branches. Specifically to the American case, Ladd 
(1997:16) explained that during two eras of major realignment the government was 
divided and “neither of the major parties […] attained majority status”; see also 
(Ladd, 1989), Wolinetz (1988) called this a ‘split-level realignment’, while Shea 
(1999), on the other hand, claimed that this situation constitutes an incomplete 
realignment.  
 
Realignment as a process caused by a change of cleavage 
 
In the third category of definitions are those that define realignment as a change of 
alignment along a cleavage. Schattschneider (1960), for example, argued that a 
transition from one alignment to another is caused by a shift from one cleavage to 
another. Flanagan and Dalton (1984:8) explained that realignment occurs when 
“parties and their electorates adjust their position along a new cleavage dimension”; 
see also (Dalton 2009). Gallagher, et al., (2006:284) used a similar definition, noting 
that “as traditional cleavages wane in importance and new cleavages emerge, voters 
go through a process of ‘realignment’.” Lachat and Dolzal (2008:246) described 
realignment as a process wherein specific social groups develop attitudinal distances 
concerning a new cleavage: the political parties will articulate this cleavage, and this 
will transform the structure of the political space. Vowles (1997) defined realignment 
as a situation in which the influence of one cleavage overcomes another in the 
political competition between parties.  
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There is also disagreement regarding the implications of the realignment process on 
two levels of analysis – the electorate and the party system structure. The change of 
the cleavage occurs when electorates as individuals (Beck, 1979; Cavangh & 
Sundquist, 1985; Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1983) or as members of social or 
ideological groups (Flanagan & Dalton, 1984; Gallagher, et al., 2006; Lachat & 
Dolezal, 2008; Rohrschneider, 1993) change their party support. This alteration may 
cause a change in the party system structure (McAllister & Studlar, 1995; 
Schattschneider, 1960), but will not necessarily do so  (Beck, 1979; Cavangh & 
Sundquist, 1985; Flanagan & Dalton, 1984; Sundquist, 1983; Wolinetz, 1988).  
 
Some scholars have suggested that preventing such an electoral transition is the 
strategy of the established parties. Inglehart and Rabier (1986), for instance, argued 
that voting behaviour began to reflect a more value-based axis because of the 
realignment of established parties, and also partly through the emergence of new 
ones. The first scenario is elaborated by Inglehart (1984:68), who argued that in a 
process of realignment “existing parties may split, or be taken over by reorienting 
elites”. The emphasis here is on party strategy and mainly the role of party elite. 
Regarding this aspect, Rohrschneider (1993) differentiated between the two scenarios 
by using different names – “New party realignment” (when voters begin to support a 
new party due to a new cleavage, which creates party system change) and an “Old 
Left realignment” (which occurs when the old parties (in this case Left parties) adopt 
the cleavage’s issues: partisan choice is still made on the basis of the new cleavage, 
and therefore party system change is avoidable) (for a similar scenario, see 
(McAllister & Studlar, 1995).  
 
On top of the disagreement regarding the other two levels (the electorate and party 
system change), the basic concept of ‘cleavage’ has three different formalisations in 
realignment literature. The first meaning – an electoral cleavage deals with the 
electoral distribution of voters – was implied by Key (1955) in his discussion on 
‘critical realignment’; see also (McMichael & Trilling, 1980) and was also used by 
Pomper (1967).  
 
In the second definition, a cleavage is a major political conflict that functions as a 
base for political alignment. This meaning is related to that of political division or 
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conflict, which does not necessary relate to the socio-structural definition of 
cleavages; rather, any issue can divide the electorate into two antagonistic reference 
groups, with each reference group represented by one party or bloc of parties 
(Cavangh & Sundquist, 1985; McAllister & Studlar, 1995; Rohrschneider, 1993; 
Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1983). In Zuckerman’s words (1975:236), “the tie 
to social divisions is left to hypothesis.” The same meaning can be found in 
Macdonald and Rabinowitz’s definition (1987) of ‘structural realignment’. This is 
what Deegan-Krause (2006) termed an “issue divide”; Carmines (1994:77) explained 
realignment as the “introduction of a new dimension of conflict.”. The term 
‘cleavage’ is employed within the context of explaining durable party support in 
terms of ideological voting: voters identify their own ideological position with that of 
the parties, and vote accordingly (Oppenhuis, 1995). Layman (2001:292) (cited at  
(Carmines & Wagner, 2006:74) clarified that a realignment occurs when a large 
number of people feel strongly about political issues present on the political agenda 
over a long period of time, which provokes resistance and cuts across existing lines of 
cleavage.  
 
The third understanding of the term ‘cleavage’ is as a socio-structural division 
between people that underpins their interests and demands, and which will therefore 
be a site of political conflict. According to this definition, realignment occurs when a 
new socio-structural division appears and members of socio-structural groups who 
identify with this new cleavage change their patterns of party(ies) support 
accordingly, while parties adjust their positions along this new cleavage (Flanagan & 
Dalton, 1984; Lachat & Dolezal, 2008; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2009; Vowles, 
1997).  
 
Table 3.1 maps the three levels of definitions, conceptualisations and inconsistencies 
regarding the electorate, the party system structure and the cleavage. 
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Table 3.1: The different definitions of the realignment process 
 
The level of 
analysis 
The different meanings Additional concepts 
or inconsistencies 
 
The electorate In realignment, the electorate changes its party loyalty 
and begins to identify itself as a partisan of different 
party. 
Inconsistency about 
the magnitude of 
change necessary, 
whether any 
(Campbell 1980) or 
significant (Dalton, et 
al., 1984a; 
McMichael & Trilling 
1980); ‘minor 
realignment’ and 
‘major realignment’ 
(Sundquist 1973; 
Cavanagh & Sunquist 
1985); or 
‘subrealigning’ 
(Burnham 1970). 
The different 
meanings of ‘the 
electorate’ 
The electorate is 
composed of individual 
partisans. 
The electorate is compose of 
social or ideological groups. 
References *Beck 1974; Johnston 
1987; Stanley 1988. 
**Clubb, et al., 1980; 
Crewe 1985b; Pinkney 
1986; Trilling & 
Campbell 1980; 
Petrocik & Brown 
1999; Shea 1999. 
## Macdonald & 
Rabinowitz 1987 
structural realignment. 
***Beck 1979; 
Cavanagh & Sunquist 
1985; Schattschneider 
1960; Sundquist 1973. 
*Arian & Shamir 2001; 
Dalton 1984, 1988; Dalton, 
et al., 1984a; Ladd 1981; 
Petrocik 1981, 1987; 
Macdonald & Rabinowitz 
1993 (structural 
realignment). 
**Crewe 1985b. 
## Vowles 1997; Flanagan & 
Dalton 1984; Gallagher, et 
al., 2006; Lachat & Dolezal 
2008. 
*** Rohrschneider 1993. 
The party system 
structure 
The possible effect of the realignment process on a 
party system 
* It is unclear whether 
a change in the 
majority party of both 
branches is necessary 
in presidential 
government: yes it is 
necessary (Shea 
1999), not necessary 
(Ladd 1989, 1997). 
The different 
anticipated effects 
In realignment, the 
party system structure 
changes. 
It is not necessary that in 
realignment the party system 
structure will change. 
References **Shea 1999; ** 
Norpoth & Rusk 2007. 
**Clubb, et al., 1980; Crewe 
1985b; Pinkney 1986; 
Trilling & Campbell 1980; 
Petrocik & Brown 1999. 
***Beck 1979; Cavanagh & 
Sunquist 1985; Flanagan & 
Dalton 1984; Schattschneider 
1960; McAllister & Studlar 
1995; 
Sundquist 1973; Sundquist 
1973; Inglehart & Rabier 
1986; Rohrschneider 1993 
Old left realignment and 
New party realignment. 
 
  
The cleavage Realignment is a change of alignment along a cleavage.  
The different 
meanings of 
‘cleavage’ 
A cleavage is 
an electoral 
distribution. 
A cleavage is a 
major conflict. 
 
A cleavage is a 
socio-structural 
division. 
- ‘structural 
realignment’ 
(Macdonald & 
Rabinowitz 1987). 
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References Key 1955, 
McMichael & 
Trilling 1980. 
***Cavanagh & 
Sunquist 1985; 
Schattschneider 
1960; 
Sundquist 1973; 
McAllister & 
Studlar 1995; 
Carmines 1994; 
Rohrschneider 
1993 Old Left 
and New party 
realignment. 
 
## Vowles 
1997; Flanagan 
& Dalton 1984; 
Gallagher, et 
al., 2006; 
Lachat & 
Dolezal 2008. 
***Beck 1979. 
 
Index for signs of references: 
(*) Definitions that refer to the first level – the electorate. 
(**) Definitions that combine the two levels of the electorate and the party system structure. 
(##) Definitions that combine the two levels of the electorate and the cleavage. 
(***) Definitions that combine the three levels. 
  
Scholars who accept the socio-structural meanings of cleavage and are especially 
interested in class cleavage employ different terminology but similar concepts when 
they argue for the existence of new voting patterns within the working class. The first 
is of ‘class realignment’, which refers to a change in the pattern of class as the social 
basis for electoral support without any reduction in the overall strength of this 
association (Evans, 1999). The second concept is ‘class dealignment’, used to 
describe a change in the way the electorate votes by means of factors other than class 
association (Crewe, 1983; Evans, 1999; Knutsen, 2007). 
 
3.2.2 The dealignment process 
 
While an enormous number of definitions exist for the phenomenon of realignment, 
definitions of dealignment are rare. Beck defined ‘dealignment’ as “a decay in the 
preexisting mass bases of support for the political parties – that is, an erosion of the 
mass party coalitions.” (Beck, 1984b:233) and Ladd (1981:3) argue that “[i]n a 
dealignment, voters move away from parties altogether; loyalties to the parties, and to 
the parties’ candidates and programs weaken, and more and more of the electorate 
become ‘up for grabs’ each election.” 
 
The main conceptual problem of the dealignment process is rooted in the abundance 
of indicators that function as operational definitions associated with the concept. 
However, these indicators can be organised along the three levels of analysis – the 
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electorate, the party system structure and the cleavage, as was accomplished for the 
definitions of realignment, above.  
 
The indicators referring to the first level – the electorate – can also be split into two 
groups: one referring to the electorate as individual voters, and another referring to 
the electorate as social groups.  There are scholars who combine both these groups. 
Denver (1985:402), for instance, stated: “[b]oth of these features, then – weakening 
party identification and attenuation of social group/party link – would indicate a 
dealigning party system”.  
 
Concerning the party system level of analysis, very often scholars simultaneously 
employ different indicators testing the possibility of dealignment at the electorate and 
the party system level (e.g. (Dalton, et al., 1984a; Dalton, et al., 2000; Gallagher, et 
al., 2006; Pennings & Lane, 1998; Vowles, 1997). At first this might seem a 
reasonable method, since these indicators appear to be coherent with each other. 
However other scholars have questioned this method, on the grounds that changes in 
patterns of party support will not necessarily change the party system structure. Crewe 
(1983:211), for instance, presented a variety of scenarios that could occur in a two-
party system: frequent changes of party system (unstable dealignment); an enduring 
change, when one of the major parties grabs and maintains new supporters (two-party 
realignment); a change of the party system structure, either into a multi-party system 
(new party system) or a different two party system (when one of the major parties 
fades away); or a situation in which voters change their patterns of party support but 
the aggregate votes stays the same (stable dealignment). The last situation was 
identified by LeDuc (1984) in Canada, where the party identification of partisans has 
decreased but the party system remains stable, since electoral change rarely operates 
in one direction. However, most of the scholars who study patterns of dealignment 
have assumed that the party system structure will change, and have employed several 
indicators for capturing this transformation.  
 
We saw in the realignment literature a tendency to distinguish between old and new 
parties, especially in the context of party system change. The first type of parties is 
that which can prevent party system change, while the electoral success of the second 
type indicates the occurrence of party system change. In the dealignment literature, by 
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contrast, both types of parties are seen to contribute to change at the level of the party 
system, especially regarding indicators of increasing fragmentation and the increasing 
number of parties, as both types of parties can contribute to these increases.  
 
Three indicators can be ascribed to the third level of analysis – the cleavage: single 
issue voting, voting by candidate orientation, and voting by government performance. 
These three indicators imply that the electorate no longer votes according to its 
ideological position or socio-structural background, but based on other factors. The 
employment of the first indicator of single issue voting for identifying dealignment is 
particularly interesting due to its closeness to the ideological voting theory. The 
ideological theory explains voting according to voters’ position on one or other side 
of the dividing ideological line – the cleavage; single issue-voting means, by contrast, 
voting that occurs according to voters’ positions on one or more issues (Oppenhuis, 
1995). However, these issues are not integrated into one ideological dimension and 
hence the cleavage component is absent here. 
 
In addition, as in the case of the realignment process, there is no clarity with respect 
to what magnitude of change may be identified as a dealignment. On this problem, 
Schmitt (1989) preferred to differentiate between general change and limited change, 
and invented a new concept by defining limited change as a “peripheral dealignment”; 
see also (Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995).  
 
Table 3.2 maps the list of indicators based on the three levels of analysis used to 
identifying dealignment. 
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Table 3.2: The different indicators for identifying dealignment 
 
The level of analysis Indicators 
The electorate Composed of individual voters Composed of social or 
ideological groups 
 - a decrease in the party-
affiliated portion (or party 
identifiers) of the electorate 
- a decline in party membership 
rates 
- an increase in the number of 
people who define themselves 
as independent of parties, or as 
nonpartisans. 
- an increased tendency amongst 
voters who maintain strong 
party ties to vote contrary to 
their party identification 
- a decrease in the importance of 
the parties 
- an increase in levels of 
electoral volatility 
- an increase of volatility during 
election campaign 
- a decline in turn-out (so-called 
demobilisation). 
- an increase in split-ticket 
voting 
- voting decisions made 
increasingly late in the election 
campaign 
- an erosion of the partisan 
attachment of the various social 
groups 
- voting differentiation between 
social groups that does not 
persist 
(Modification) of party system 
structure 
- the disappearance of old parties 
- the entrance of new parties to the political arena 
- an increase in fragmentation 
- a growing number of parties 
- the rapid rise and then demise of new parties 
Factors other than cleavages 
that explain voter behavior 
- a rise in single issue voting 
- voting by candidate orientation 
- voting by government performance 
Sources: Alt, 1984; Arian & Shamir, 2001; Beck, 1979, 1984a, 1984b; Burnham, 1970; Carmines, et 
al., 1987; Clarke & Stewart, 1998; Crewe, 1983, 1985a; Dalton, 1996, 2006; Dalton, et al., 1984b; 
Dalton, et al., 2000; Denver, 1985; Flanagan & Dalton, 1984; Flanigan & Zingale, 1985; Gallagher, et 
al., 2006; Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972; Irwin & Dittrich, 1984; Klingemann, 2005; Knutsen & 
Scarbrough, 1995; Ladd, 1981; LeDuc, 1984; Mair, 1983; Pennings & Lane, 1998; Särlvik & Crewe, 
1983; Schmitt, 1989; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995; Shea, 1999; Vowles, 1997. 
 
On top of this, the third level of alignment along a cleavage and (specifically) the 
question of its persistence creates several distinguishable types of dealignment. Kriesi 
(2008:38) differentiated between two sorts of dealignment: structural dealignment 
(the weakening of voters’ attachment to the established parties), and functional 
dealignment (the greater detachment of the voters from the parties in general). While 
the first “is expected to be temporary and may give rise to a realignment under the 
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impact of the articulation of the new structural cleavage, the [concept of] functional 
dealignment [...] predicts a generally declining structuring capacity of parties”. 
Bonschier (2010:61) argued that the links between parties and social groups may 
became weaker due to what Martin (2000) and Lachat (2004) defined as structural 
and behavioural dealignment. The first occurs due to socio-demographic changes: 
‘modernisation leads to long-term change in the strength of […] social groups’. The 
second – behavioural dealignment – occurs when new political issues or a new 
dimension of political conflict become important and the political allegiance of a 
given social group is changed. This definition of behavioural dealignment is 
especially interesting, as some scholars (especially those who define a cleavage as a 
‘major conflict’) would describe this scenario as a realignment (!). 
 
3.3 Towards a New Approach – The Semi-Modular Approach 
 
In this section I present a new approach that seeks to resolve the conceptual problem 
of the realignment and dealignment phenomena, in order to clarify the connection 
between voters and political parties. Since this problem derives primarily from the 
existence of diversity in operational definitions (or indicators), the fundamental 
principle of the approach proposed here is to develop a core unifying definition, 
usable by most scholars in the field.  
 
I have demonstrated that this collection of definitions and indicators can be organised 
by their reference to three main levels of analysis: the electorate, the structure of the 
party system, and a cleavage. In addition, this categorisation of definitions and 
indicators demonstrates that the electorate is treated either as individual voters who 
have party allegiances, i.e. partisans, or as socio-demographic groups that share 
patterns of party choice. These two meanings derive from the socio-psychological and 
socio-structural approaches to the concept of alignment. Realignment literature has 
also raised three different meanings for concept of ‘cleavage’. A cleavage can 
manifest as an electoral distribution, a socio-structural cleavage, and as an issue 
causing major conflict.  
 
The distinction of different meanings (or treatments) for the main concepts here – 
‘electorate’ and ‘cleavage’ – is not affected by geographical location or by the 
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separate literature regarding the American two-party system and (European) multi-
party systems. Similarly, the selection of case stud(ies) has not affected the different 
meanings; this issue will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
However, not all these definitions tie in with all three levels of analysis. Some 
definitions include a reference only to one or two levels (demonstrated by the 
references in Table 3.1). On top of this, a change in the level of the electorate and the 
cleavage does not necessarily cause an effect at the level of party system structure, as 
some of the scenarios of realignment and the empirical results concerning 
dealignment demonstrate.   
 
All of this indicates that a semi-modular approach is required here. Therefore, I 
propose to study the phenomena of realignment and dealignment by exploring the 
question of stability and change at the different levels of electorate and cleavage 
separately and independently from each other – i.e. in modules.  
 
The separate examination of stability and change at the electorate and cleavage levels 
will also assist in exploring the possible occurrence of realignment or dealignment 
based on the socio-psychological and socio-structural approaches to the phenomena 
of alignment (presented in the previous chapter). Concerning the first definition of the 
electorate (the electorate as composed of individuals), I will examine patterns of 
partisanship. This will be done based on two meanings of the concept of partisanship 
or party attachment: party identifiers (the core concept of the socio-psychological 
approach) and stable and durable party support, presented in Chapter Five. The 
second treatment of the electorate concerns the voting behaviour of socio-
demographic groups, and is the main concern of the socio-structural approach. This 
articulates the assumption of voting according to a socio-structural cleavage. Voter 
alignments along the most salient socio-structural cleavages – class and religious 
cleavages – will be studied in Chapter Six.  
 
Through examining the two different definitions of the electorate, I will explore two 
separate manifestations of alignment: partisan alignment and voter alignment along a 
cleavage. In addition, I will determine for each of these manifestations the duration of 
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the alignment, the occurrence of realignment and the creation of a new alignment, 
and/or the occurrence of a dealignment (as Figure 3.1 shows).  
 
As I noted in the previous chapter and in this chapter, some scholars have argued for 
the identification of new cleavages. The first is the Materialist/Post-Materialist 
cleavage 6, which is value- or belief- based. However, I will not examine this cleavage 
due to the major scholarly theoretical and empirical criticism of its existence. Knutsen 
and Scarbrough (1995:497) argued that the Post-Materialist cleavage is not a cleavage 
since it is not based on social division. In addition, Bartolini and Mair (1990:214) 
criticised the argument of value as a new basis for an alignment. They argued the 
traditional cleavages (for example, the class cleavage) also have normative-
ideological components.  
 
A more recent argument for a new cleavage is the globalisation cleavage, argued to 
consist of “opposing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization within national political 
contexts” (Kriesi et al., 2008a:4). In their study of the possible occurrence of a 
realignment in six Western European polities (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland), Kriesi and his collaborators (2008b) examined this 
cleavage as is articulated by two issue dimensions: the economic and cultural 
dimensions. An issue dimension is an aggregation and clustering of positions 
concerning several related single issues (Morgan, 1976:421). In this sense, Kriesi, et 
al. (2008a:4), merged the two meanings of the term ‘cleavage’ in the realignment 
literature, as a socio-structural divide and as an issue causing major conflict. 
 
I decided, however, not to examine cleavage in terms of a major issue conflict for 
several reasons. Firstly, the class and religious cleavages articulate the issues of the 
most important dimensions. As Kriesi and his collaborators (2008a:11) explained, 
“the four Lipset and Rokkan cleavages – the centre/periphery, religious, rural/urban 
and owner/worker, boil down to two dimensions: a cultural (religion) and a social-
economic one (class)”. They suggested socio-economic and religious issues have 
remained salient over the years despite assuming different meanings in the 1970s, 
when new social movements appeared. Kriesi, et al., (2008a:13) explained that at this 
                                                
6 The Materialist/Post-Materialist cleavage has several names, such as ‘value cleavage’ (Flanagan, 
1987) and ‘new politics cleavage’ (Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990). 
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time, the Left reinforced its position regarding socio-economic issues and the cultural 
dimension became “one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian concerns, on the one 
side, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institutions, on the 
other.” A second transformation of the cultural dimension’s character occurred, 
according to Kriesi, et al., (2008b:257), in the 1990s. At this time “[t]he traditional 
moral or religious issues [...] bec[a]me less important than the new ‘globalization 
issues’, i.e. European integration and immigration.”; see also (Kriesi et al., 2006:943). 
 
Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009:310), who examined Kriesi and his colleagues’ 
argument by utilising different data sources (expert judgments of party positions and 
survey data of voters, rather than the newspaper sections used in the original 
research), found that parties and voters are not structured by the same two 
dimensions, but rather that “there is a substantial mismatch between party positions 
(which are structured by one dimension) and opinion of voters (which are structured 
by two dimension)”. These findings suggest that the study of dimensions in the 
context of realignment cannot be done, as there is no coherent structure of voters and 
parties in the political space, as is assumed in realignment literature. 
 
Theoretically, Van der Brug and Van Spanje’s results (2009:310) concerning party 
positions may have been a result of the data-set they used. Using expert surveys for 
measuring party positions is problematic, not only because it is subjective (reliant on 
expert’s perceptions), but also because it is static – the same survey results are 
employed over a long period,7 despite the fact that parties may change their position 
over the years. A good method of combating this deficiency would be to examine 
party positions across election years. This could be achieved by examining party 
positions as they are articulated in party manifestos. For example, The Comparative 
Manifesto Projects (CMP) (Budge, et al., 2001; Klingemann, et al., 2006) is a well-
known and used source. Still, this data source cannot be used for studying the issue of 
immigration, as there is no dedicated variable for this topic. Of course, one could 
develop different methods for establishing parties’ positions (see for example 
Pellikaan’s confrontational method; Pellikaan, et al., (2007); Pellikaan, et al., (2003). 
However, unravelling manifestos requires possession of all the relevant documents 
                                                
7 Theoretically one can use several similar expert surveys, but this then raises the question of matching 
a survey with specific election years, as setting cut-off points could influence the empirical results. 
! Chapter 3 
 
 54 
(and knowledge of relevant languages), which is impractical for the eleven cases 
examined in this research.   
 
My discussion of the definitions of re/dealignment also shows a lack of clarity 
concerning the effects of changes in partisans’ alignment and in voter alignment along 
a cleavage on the party system structure. Here the scholars are divided regarding the 
necessity of party system change as a consequence of realignment and dealignment. 
Moreover, realignment literature suggests that a change of party system structure is 
preventable, especially through old (or established) parties’ strategy.8 Thus, in a 
separate chapter I will explore the possible effects on the party system structure of the 
re/dealignment of partisans and of re/dealignment along cleavage(s). Put differently, 
the examination of change and stability at the level of the party system structure will 
not be done independently, as was the case in the other two chapters. Rather, I will 
examine this issue when realignment or dealignment is identified in one of the 
manifestations of alignment – partisans and along a cleavage – making the use of a 
semi-modular approach inevitable. In addition, I will take into account party identity 
as an important component for identifying the modification of the party system 
structure.  
                    
                                                
8 In a very recent piece, Deegan-Krause and Enyedi (2010) presented a typology of elite possible 
actions for creating, re-shaping or preventing shifts in alignment, not only concerning party 
positioning, but also in the society (for example, regarding objective socio-structural difference, or 
group consciousness) or of other socio-cultural aspects (such as national symbols). 
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Figure 3.1: The semi-modular approach: the study of Alignment, Realignment and 
Dealignment along the two manifestations of alignment, and their possible effect at the 
party system level 
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The semi-modular approach theoretically allows for the three phenomena of 
alignment, realignment (and the creation of a new alignment), and dealignment to be 
exhibited at each of the two manifestations of alignment. These manifestations 
include trends of partisanship (as measured by party identifiers and stable party 
support) and patterns of voter alignments along the class and religious cleavages. For 
each manifestation of alignment in each election year, I established whether the 
alignment between voters and parties shifted into a new alignment (after a 
realignment) or eroded and no new alignment was created (a dealignment). By 
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examining these empirical results across the two manifestations, I will identify the 
link and causality between the three phenomena. This will enable me to build 
coherent models of realignment and dealignment and to develop definitions for both 
phenomena. I will then examine the possible effects of the models of realignment and 
dealignment on patterns of stability and change of the party system structure.  
 
I aim to contribute to scholarly understanding of realignment and dealignment. I will 
do so by presenting: 
 
• up-to-date empirical evidence (collected for my research) for the ties between 
voters and parties, and the effects of such ties on the party system structure,  
• coherent models of the phenomena of realignment and dealignment, and 
• definitions associated with realignment and dealignment. 
 
 
 
 
!!
CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
My research aims to examine the citizen-parties nexus since the Second World War. 
The main subject is the stability and change of multi-party systems in Western 
democratic countries. It explores the question of whether the voters in established 
democracies have remained attached to political parties according to the same pattern 
as when these political systems were first institutionalised, or whether a changed has 
occurred at some point from the mid 1960s and caused the connection between 
electorate and parties to be restructured. One possible scenario is the phenomenon of 
realignment, in which a new alignment between voters and parties is generated; a 
second is dealignment, in which the link between voters and parties has been broken.  
 
As Chapter Three discusses, the term ‘realignment’ originated in the American two-
party system. The term ‘dealignment’ was also identified for the first time in a study 
of the party systems of the U.S.A. (Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972). This research, 
however, examines these phenomena in eleven cases of multi-party systems. 
Consequently, my research is challenged by the application of the definitions of 
re/alignment to a different type of party system. The main justification for doing so is 
found in the research design of this thesis. I decided to design my research as a 
comparison between “relatively similar” cases and to study ten European multi-party 
systems with an electoral system of proportional representation: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden.1 This research design “sets out to neutralize certain differences in order to 
permit a better analysis of others [i.e. the question or phenomena we are studying]” 
(Dogan & Pelasy, 1990:178). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Italy (only between 1994 and 2005) and Germany both have a mixed electoral system. However, I 
examined only the votes that were cast according to the proportional representation system, the so-
called ‘second vote’. 
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In the analysis presented in this thesis, however, eleven different party systems are 
distinguished as I studied the Belgian sub-national party systems – Flanders and 
Wallonia – separately. The creation of these two sub-national party systems occurred 
between 1968 and 1978 when the three major parties split one after another in a 
fashion that caused each splinter group to run as a separate party in two or three of the 
regions (Deschouwer, 2004). The first was the Catholic Party (CVP/PSC), which split 
into two separate parties – the Flemish Christian People’s Party (CVP) and the 
Walloon Christian People’s Party (PSC) in 1968. In the next election (1971) the 
Liberal party (PVV/PLP) split into the Party of Liberty and Progress (PVV) and the 
Party of Liberty and Progress (PLP), and in the 1978 election the Socialist party 
(BSP/PSB) followed the other parties and split into the Flemish Socialist Party (BSP) 
and the Francophone Socialist Party (PS). Although the party system of Flanders and 
Wallonia started to form its present structure in 1968, I analysed each of them 
separately from 1950 onwards. This was done in order to make their cases 
comparable to the other nine cases under investigation here.  
 
In my empirical analysis, I also distinguish between the so-called two Italian 
Republics. The second Republic in Italy began in 1993, with the first electoral reform 
for the legislative assemblies, as the electoral system for the Lower House (the 
Chamber) and the Upper House (the Senate) changed from proportional 
representation (PR) to a mixed electoral system.2 My analysis for these two separate 
periods, however, does not differ from the analysis of the other cases. Concerning 
Germany, my analysis until the 1990 election refers to Federal Republic of Germany 
(i.e. West Germany) and from 1990 onwards (with the reunification of Germany) also 
includes what was called the German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany). 
 
To give a complete picture, the analysis presented in this thesis encompasses 60 years !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 According to the mixed electoral system for the Lower House, 75 percent of the deputies are elected 
with the ‘single-member, single ballot’ plurality principle and the remaining 25 percent (with 4 percent 
threshold) are elected under the PR system. The PR was also addressed with a correction mechanism: 
in every region, the vote in the PR system for parties successfully elected according to the district 
system are reduced by an amount related to the number of votes which were actually required to win 
this district deputy (Ignazi, 1994). This electoral system was modified again in December 2005. Italy 
returned to the PR electoral system with a close party list vote in multi-member constituencies (26 
constituencies for the Lower House). The threshold for electoral coalitions was only 2 percent and for 
single parties 4 percent. On the top of this, a majority bonus is given to the wining coalition: in the 
Lower House the coalition wining the largest plurality of the votes (provided that it reaches a minimum 
of 10 percent of the votes), gets 54 percent of the seats (Ignazi, 2006). 
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of electoral history. It begins in 1950 and finishes in 2010. Its data has been gathered 
by studying the national elections for the legislature’s Lower House for each case. I 
consider national contests to be decisive for the structuring of the party system. They 
are more appropriate for my research’s purpose than other elections, such as sub-
national elections or European-parliament elections, which are considered second-
order elections. Besides this, the European parliament election results only became 
available after the first election in 1979. In addition, one of the countries included in 
this research – Norway – is not a member of the European Union. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Periods, number of cases based on individual-level and aggregate data,  
per case 
 
 Aggregate data (official election 
results) 
Individual-level data (national 
election surveys) 
 Period N (time-
points) 
Period N (time-
points) 
Austria 1953-2008 18 -  
Belgium (Flanders) 1968-2010 14 1991-2003 4 
Belgium (Wallonia) 1968-2010 14 1991-2003 4 
Denmark 1950-2007 23 1971-2005 14 
Finland 1951-2007 16 1991-2007 5 
Germany 1957-2009 15 1961-2009 13 
Italy – 1st Republic 1953-1992 10 -  
Italy – 2nd Republic 1994-2008 5 1994-2008 5 
Luxembourg 19513-2009 13 -  
the Netherlands 1952-2010 18 1967-2006 13 
Norway 1953-2009 15 1965-2005 9 
Sweden 1952-2010 19 1960-2006 15 
 
In total, 161 national elections are examined.4 Table 4.1 specifies the number of time-
points for each case. One of the assumptions of my research is that between 1950 and 
1964 the party systems are in a situation of alignment and therefore the volatility is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The 1951 election in Luxembourg was not a national election but was held only in the North and 
Centre constituencies. The elections in the South and East constituencies were held in 1948 (Mackie & 
Rose, 1991).  
4 If one counts the elections in Flanders and Wallonia separately,179 elections are investigated in total. 
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low. However, the 1953 election in Germany has been considered highly volatile for 
this period (Pedersen, 1979:11). Therefore, I excluded this election from my research; 
this election is considered a deviant case.  
 
As I explained in the third chapter, empirical research into the patterns of connection 
between voters and parties finds that the definitions of realignment and dealignment 
differ from each with respect to three levels of analysis – the electorate, the party 
system and the cleavage. Therefore, I decided to use a semi-modular approach for 
examining separately the possibility of a shift into realignment (and the creation of a 
new alignment) or dealignment. These are considered for two manifestations of 
alignment – partisan and voter alignment along a cleavage. This will also aid in 
establishing the (possible) effect of a change in both alignment manifestations on the 
party system structure.  
 
The main question of this research addresses the occurrence of these changes in both 
alignment manifestations and in the party system, per case and over time. It is not in 
my intension to provide an explanation(s) for evidence of stability or change. 
Therefore time is the independent variable for the major part of this research.5  
 
4.1 The Study of the Two Alignment Manifestations and the Party System 
Structure 
 
4.1.1 The first manifestation of alignment: partisan alignment 
 
The first manifestation of alignment represents the socio-psychological approach. It is 
based on two understandings of the concept of partisanship. The first pertains to party 
identifiers, the second to durable and stable patterns of party support. Addressing the 
first definition, I examined levels of party identification (and those voters who have 
strong party identification) over the years under study. For all the countries studied, 
the data is based on individual-level data, but there are two types of surveys 
employed. For some cases, I utilised data from national election surveys. For others, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Overall in my empirical research, I applied a condition if a new pattern is identified and when this 
new trend is sustained for at least 10 years in at least three successive elections, as Smith (1989a:166) 
suggested: “[a] run of perhaps three elections will be needed to see whether a trend is under way.”  
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the data source was Eurobarometer and the European Election Study 1999 surveys, as 
presented in Dalton (2004) (Appendix C specifies the file numbers and Appendix D 
the name of variables). The second definition of partisanship was examined based on 
patterns of stable party support. To this end, I studied the level of voters who support 
the same party in two successive elections, while taking into account both those 
moving to support another party and all other electorate groups, including voters 
casting invalid votes and those who did not cast a ballot.  
 
This is achieved by examining the levels of two indicators of stable party supporters. 
The first indicator is the proportion of those within the electorate who reported voting 
for the same party in two successive elections, based on individual-level data. The 
second is its equivalent estimation based on aggregate data (which I estimated): the 
Electoral Total Partisans index (ETP), based on measurement of (the complementary 
number) of the Total Volatility (TV) index, ()*(+*),-.!/0!1+/,2)(,345!,6-!78!34.-9!*-:-*! ;2<=! ,6-! >-2(-4,)5-1! <;! ,6-! :)*3.! :<,-1! 34! ,6-! (+22-4,! -*-(,3<4 (for more 
information on these indices, see Appendix A). 
 
I used indices based on calculations of volatility in two chapters of my research - 
Chapter Five (partisan alignment) and Chapter Six (voter alignment along the class 
and religious cleavages). I differentiated between forced and voluntary change of 
party support. Forced change of party support occurs when parties merge, and is not 
considered as a change in this research. Therefore, if two or more parties merged I 
compared their (separate) shares in election T1 with their (collective) share in election 
T2. Regarding splits of parties, I assumed that when an individual moves to support 
the smaller fraction, this is a voluntary change of party support and treated the change 
accordingly: I compare the party share in election T1 with its largest splinter in 
election T2 and treat the smaller new splinter party as if it had no votes in election T1. 
This method differs from the volatility calculations of other scholars. Mainwaring and 
Torcal (2006) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), for example, assumed that if two or 
more parties merged, the party(ies) with fewer votes disappeared in election T2; thus, 
they gave zero value to this party in election T2. In Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) 
research, when a party split into two or more parties, the volatility is computed by 
subtracting the combined vote of the new parties from that of the original party in 
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election T1.  
 
In the case of a mixed electoral system, such as Italy (between 1994 and 2005) and 
Germany, the volatility is measured for the votes that were cast according to the 
proportional representation system, the so-called ‘second vote’.  
 
Since I am examining the (changes in) electoral behaviour within the whole 
electorate, I also used data regarding levels of turnout and invalid votes in this 
chapter. I measured turnout levels as the proportion of those who are entitled to vote 
(so called the electorate), regardless of their residence status.6  
 
4.1.2 The second manifestation of alignment: voter alignments along class and 
religious cleavages 
 
In this research I studied voter alignments, realignments and dealignments along the 
two most important socio-structural cleavages in West European politics – the class 
and religious cleavages. This was achieved by examining the strength of voter 
alignment with each of these cleavages over the time period selected, as is articulated 
by cleavage closure. Voter alignment strength was measured by estimating the 
proportion of voters who cross the line of the cleavage and vote for a party that does 
not represent the cleavage against the total number of voters who changed their party 
support in two successive elections. In other words, when only a small number of 
voters who change their party support cross the cleavage line, this indicates that the 
cleavage remains important and salient to the voters.  
 
To measure the volatility across the cleavage line, I used the Bloc-Weighted Cleavage 
Salience (WCS) index. Bartolini and Mair invented the original Cleavage Salience 
(CS) index. It combines the level of Bloc Volatility (BV) – the number of people who 
cross the cleavage line to support the parties of the other side – with the Total 
Volatility, or Net Volatility (the aggregate volatility that is measured in a party system 
in one election year in comparison to the proceeding election year). This is done in 
order to make the trends comparable over the years and between cases. Dr. Meffert !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This is especially important as in some of the countries, voters who live abroad are entitle to vote, as 
is the case in Finland, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
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and I modified the CS index by controlling for electoral support of the blocs of parties 
that represent the cleavage, as we discovered that the CS index is sensitive to this 
component (as will be explained further in Chapter Six) (For theoretical and empirical 
demonstration, see (Federer-Shtayer & Meffert, Forthcoming). 
 
The WCS was calculated based on two types of datasets: individual-level datasets and 
aggregate data. While the former comes from national election surveys, the latter is 
based on official election results. A comment must be made regarding these two 
datasets. Unlike the empirical chapter (Chapter Five) on the partisan alignment where 
I examined the electoral behaviour of the whole electorate, in Chapter Six I take into 
account only those voters casting a valid vote. Put differently, the framework in each 
of these chapters is different. While in the chapter on the partisan alignment, the 
entire electorate is summed up to 100%, in the chapter on the voter alignment along 
cleavage(s), the total of valid votes is summed up to 100%.7 There are two reasons for 
doing that. Firstly, I modified the original CS index by adding another component – 
the electoral support for the blocs of parties that represent the cleavage. Thus, it is 
preferable to have only one change at a time and to preserve comparability with the 
original CS index. Secondly, and more importantly, according to Bartolini and Mair 
the CS index can be calculated based on more than two blocs. However, it is not clear 
how the addition of a third bloc that includes data regarding de-mobilisation and 
abstentionism would affect the index’s accuracy. 
 
For calculation the WCS in each election year for each case, I identified two blocs of 
parties for each party system: parties that represent the class cleavage and parties that 
represent the religious cleavage. I assigned the parties to blocs on the basis of an 
ordinal ranking according to each party’s core identity or genetic origin, as was done 
by Bartolini and Mair. All parties included in Bartolini and Mair’s research (1990), 
along with those defined as “communist”, “independent socialist”, “socialist” or 
“social democratic” in Smith (1976; 1989b) and/or those which are members of the 
Socialist International organisation were assigned to the class bloc. To the religious 
bloc I assigned all parties defined as “Christian” in Smith (1976; 1989b) and/or 
parties that are members of the Centrist Democrat International. The parties’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The Pearson correlation between TV and party support volatility (PS) (its equivalent at the individual-
level data) is 0.79 and is statistically significant (at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed), N=86. 
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assignment to blocs along the two cleavages is specified in Appendix B.  
 
4.1.3 The party system structure 
 
As stated earlier, I examine the possible effects of realignment and dealignment along 
two manifestations of alignment. This is achieved by examining (possible) changes to 
the electoral party system structure. Two aspects of possible changes were taken into 
account: the supply aspect – parties’ constellation and cooperation before national 
elections (such as alliances, cartels, etc.), and the demand aspect –voters’ party 
support. To this end, I analysed election results and took into consideration parties 
which received at least 3 percent of the votes. Several components are studied: 
number of parties, relative electoral strength of the first two parties and (changes) in 
the identity of the dominant parties (the first two largest parties). Based on the first 
two criteria, I developed a typology for identifying the electoral party system structure 
after every national election. Combining this analysis with a close examination of the 
identity of the largest two parties provides an indication of the stability and change of 
the electoral party system structure. The empirical research includes all the cases 
where a realignment or dealignment was identified.  
 
Two assumptions guide my analysis: 
• First, I consider the period between 1950 and 1964 to be a period of alignment: 
voters were aligned to their parties along the most salient cleavages, and the party 
system structure was stable (for a similar argument, see Sartori (1994), Franklin, et al. 
(1992). This assumption is in line with Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis, 
according to which the party system was frozen until the 1960s. Consequently, I 
suspect that if a change occurred in either the alignment manifestation or the party 
system, it happened at some point in the period from 1965 onwards. This expectation 
is in line with most of the arguments regarding realignment and dealignment, which I 
presented in Chapter Three. It also follows Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) argument that 
the freezing process ended in the postwar period, as they discovered that the Total 
Volatility from the 1950s to the late 1960s was much lower than in previous periods. 
 
• In two empirical chapters – Chapters Five and Six – I used national election surveys 
to measure trends of electoral behaviour at the individual level. I treat each election 
Data and methodology 
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survey as a source of data for studying individuals’ patterns of electoral behaviour 
between two adjacent elections. By presenting the trends of all the independent 
national surveys over the years, I used the surveys as if they were cohort study. This 
was based on the assumption that the surveys represent the trends well, although in 
each surveys different people were interviewed. 
 
4.2 The Combination of Two Sorts of Datasets 
 
 In this research, I examined trends produced by individual-level and aggregate 
datasets: national election surveys and official election results.  
 
There are practical reasons to combine these two sorts of datasets. Firstly, national 
election surveys are not available for all the countries included in this research (i.e. 
Austria and Luxembourg), and for most of the countries the national election survey 
has been conducted only since the 1960s or 1970s, or even later (for example in 
Finland since the 1990s). My research, however, begins in 1950.  
 
Secondly, my main interest is to identify patterns of party support and I wish to 
examine these patterns for all the parties that participated in the elections. Sometimes, 
the national election surveys do not provide a breakdown of support for the very small 
parties. The official election results data, by contrast, covers all periods under 
investigation in this thesis, and incorporates data regarding electoral support for very 
small parties. Therefore, I decided to include in my research all the parties receiving 
at least 0.01 percentages of the valid votes. Thirdly, sometimes in survey data there is 
an under-representation of groups in the electorate that are excluded from the political 
arena, for example, those not casting ballots in elections. The official election results, 
however, give a good estimation of these groups and include information on turnout 
levels. 
 
Appendix C specifies the different file numbers and sources of the surveys. The 
source for aggregate data over the period 1950-1989 is Mackie and Rose (1991, 
1997); the remaining sources consist of official election results and the European 
Journal of Political Research. For the two sub-national regions in Belgium – Flanders 
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and Wallonia – I used Kris Deschouwer’s database,8 except for the 2010 election 
(which I calculated with Deschouwer’s guidance). Table 4.1 displays the time span 
for each case. The same database was used for calculating turnout and invalid vote 
rates. For the two Belgian regions – Flanders and Wallonia – as turnout and invalid 
vote data is not available, I used self-calculated data (see Appendix E).   
 
Yet as studies have already shown, examination of electoral behavior on the basis of 
respondents’ reports may be problematic: people over-report of electoral participation 
because they either want to comply with the social norm or minimise cognitive 
dissonance or because of a result of short memory span of respondents (Belli, et al., 
1999; 2001). In addition, voting choice is often misreported, with respondents 
reporting support for the winning party (the so-called post-election “bandwagon”) 
(Traugott & Katosh, 1979; Weir, 1975; Wright, 1993).  
 
Czesnik and Kotnarowsk (2011) who examined the problem of voters’ over report of 
election participation for the CSES dataset, demonstrated that “[v]oter turnout 
weighting […] is a possible solution of voter turnout over-reporting problem”. !
 
Therefore, I improved my individual-level database by increasing the quality of 
representation of the different patterns of electoral behaviour. This was achieved by 
using political weight variables (for specification on these variables, see Appendix D). 
While in the Belgian, German and Danish surveys, the political weight variables 
already existed, I computed a new political weight variable for Finland, the 
Netherlands and for the last three German elections surveys, which was computed 
according to the official election results (including participation in the election, voters 
casting invalid votes and levels of party support).9 Regarding the Italian, Norwegian 
and Swedish surveys, no political weight variable was used as those conducting the 
surveys discouraged their use. 
 
Austria is the only case for which I used aggregate data in my analysis of partisan 
alignment. This data was produced from sub-national election results of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I am grateful to Kris Deschouwer for generously making his data available to me. 
9 I used probability weights. These weights are calculated by taking the inverse of the sampling 
fraction. 
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municipalities, communities, wards, etc. as a supplement for the missing individual-
level data. This data was calculated by Plasser and Ulram (2000). The idea of 
calculation is based on volatility between parties: if a party gains more votes in those 
constituencies in which another party lost votes at the previous election, it is 
interpreted as a vote transition between those parties. Following this logic, the 
scholars trace the results of the current election back to the results of the previous 
election and relate the party’s current election result to the results of all parties of the 
comparable election.10 (For more details on the voter transition data, see SORA’s site: 
www.sora.at/en/topics/electoral-behavior/election-analyses/voter-transition-analysis). 
 
Analysis of patterns of party volatility requires historical knowledge of all the party 
changes over the whole period under investigation (such as mergers, splits, electoral 
alliance, etc.). This information was collected from the sources of election results 
specified above, but was also based on other sources such as The Political Parties of 
the World books (Day, 2002; Day, et al., 1996; Szajkowski, 2005) and McHale’s 
(1983) Political Parties of Europe. 
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
This research is comparative, and prompts new empirical and conceptual conclusions 
regarding the realignment and dealignment processes in a multi-party system. It is 
based on repeated observations over long periods of time (or so-called longitudinal 
analysis), and examines individual-level and aggregate data in eleven European multi-
party systems between 1950 and 2010.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The equation of voter transition analysis is: 
ÖVP t=B1*SPÖB t-1+B2*ÖVP t-1+B3FPÖ t-1+B4Ni t-1+B5non voters t-1, where Ni is any other 
party. For more details on the voter transition data, see website of the Institute for Social Research and 
Consulting (SORA) (http://www.sora.at/en/topics/electoral-behavior/election-analyses.html). 
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PARTISAN ALIGNMENT, REALIGNMENT OR DEALIGNMENT 
 
 
“The importance of stable partisan loyalties has been universally recognized in electoral studies, but  
the manner in which they should be defined and measured has been a subject of some disagreement.” 
(Campbell, et al., 1960:122) 
“Partisanship and vote are very close in parliamentary systems.” (Dalton & Weldon, 2007:181) 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the affiliation of voters to political parties as partisans. It 
discusses and evaluates the approach of what is called the Michigan School, 
according to which voters-parties’ ties should be studied based on voters’ party 
identification. Due to the major criticism presented by different scholars on the 
applicability of party identification for European and other multi-party systems, I will 
also based my study on patterns of long-term party support. This support is expressed 
by two indicators that measure stable party support in two successive elections. The 
first indicator is the proportion of those from the electorate who reported voting for 
the same party, based on individual-level data. The second is its equivalent 
estimation, the Electoral Total Partisans index (ETP) (which I invented), which is 
based on measurement of (the complementary number) of the Total Volatility index 
(TV), based on aggregate data.  
 
This chapter is structured around discussion of partisanship in its two meanings, and 
the arguments for the decline of partisanship and partisan dealignment. It begins by 
discussing the interpretation of partisans as party identifiers and presents updated 
trends of party identifiers. This chapter proves there is no general trend of a decrease 
in partisans in the ten polities studied in this thesis, and then discusses criticism of the 
‘party identification’ phenomena in multi-party systems. Therefore, it argues for the 
study of partisanship as durable party support and presents the empirical trends for 
both indicators of partisanship. 
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5.1 Dominance and Influence in the Study of Partisanship 
 
The study of the ties between voters and parties is probably one of the most prominent 
examples of the influence of dominant schools in Political Science literature. In Key’s 
two classic works (1955, 1959), he described changes in the connection between 
voters and political parties, stating that these shifts occurred as the electorate changed 
its voting behaviour. Key dealt with the categorisation of elections based on election 
results as indicators for shifts in voting behavior. Immediately after the publication of 
Key’s articles, Campbell and his colleagues (while following this categorisation) 
differentiated between elections based on a change in party identifiers (Campbell, et 
al., 1960:90) (for more on this topic, see (Pomper, 1967). Party identification is a 
“long-term, affective, psychological identification with one’s preferred political 
party” (Dalton, 2006:179). This different view is based on the Michigan School’s 
emphasis on the function of the concept of party identification. According to the 
Michigan School, “many people associate themselves psychologically with one or the 
other of the parties, and that this identification has predictable relationship with their 
perception, evaluation and actions” (Campbell, et al., 1960:90). They contend that 
once an individual becomes psychologically attached to a party, he or she will tend to 
support this party, implying that individuals’ psychological party identification is the 
most important factor for explaining voting behavior (Campbell, et al., 1960:142); see 
also  (Berglund, et al., 2005:107).  
 
The dominance of the Michigan School’s explanation of voting behaviour since the 
1960s has not only articulated the transmission of the concept ‘party identification’ to 
other democratic countries (Borre & Katz, 1973; Butler & Stokes, 1969; Holmberg, 
2007), but has also triggered a significant change in the way the phenomena of 
partisanship is studied.  
 
Up to the publication of Campbell and his colleagues’ book – The American Voter – 
the study of (stable) partisanship had been conducted in terms of an individual’s past 
voting record. In their seminal book, Campbell and his colleagues critiqued this 
assumption, arguing that “such a definition blurs the distinction between the 
psychological state and its behavioural consequences” (Campbell, et al., 1960:122). 
The introduction and identification of party identifiers also influenced the way 
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scholars have defined and studied stability and change in the connection between 
voters and parties. It is assumed that when a high portion of the electorate changes its 
party identification and begins to identify with other parties following a stable period, 
this marks the occurrence of a realignment (Beck, 1974; Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972; 
Johnston, 1987; Stanley, 1988). Other scholars have followed the same logic, 
contending that a shrinking party-affiliated portion of voters is empirical evidence for 
dealignment (Dalton, 2004:32; Inglehart & Hochstein, 1972). Dalton and his 
colleagues even went one step further and declared that ‘dealignment is difficult to 
detect without measures of partisanship at the individual level’ (Dalton, et al., 
1984b:14)1. 
 
5.2 Strong Evidence for Partisan Dealignment? 
 
Numerous studies show changes of party identifiers (in percentages) for individual 
countries over the years, yet only a few studies have compared the trends in the ten 
countries examined in this study – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. These are: Dalton, 2000, 
2004; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995. They all concluded similarly: the level of 
partisanship has decreased in many European countries, but ‘the depth and spread of 
this development are quite different in different countries and for different periods of 
time” (Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995:101); see also (Dalton, 2000:25-9; 2004:32). 
Dalton (who reached similar findings) argued: “[o]ur broader base of empirical 
evidence now presents a clear picture of partisan dealignment”  (Dalton, 2004:32-3); 
see also (Dalton, 2000:26). 
 
The question remains: is there consensus that all the ten polities under study in this 
thesis went through partisan dealignment and, if so, when it started? 
 
Firstly, I examine this question using commonly cited indicators – percentages of 
(strong) party identifiers. Whenever possible, I updated and extended the latest study 
on this subject (Dalton, 2004), which ended in 1998; this has been done for Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The results for the other countries 
                                                
1 In the same book, Beck (1984b) restricted this argument and stated that this is true only for cases 
where partisanship reflects a long-standing decision to support a party.  
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(Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, and Luxembourg) were taken from Dalton’s book 
(Table 5.2, p. 33) that presents the longest longitudinal and most up-to-date research 
available for these polities. I used national election study data whenever available, 
because they represent the most valid data source for each case  (Dalton, 2000:24). In 
addition, I used socio-demographic weights, if available.    
 
Table 5.1 presents the OLS regression coefficient of percentages of party 
identification over time (the dependent variable is the percentage of the population 
having (strong) party identifiers, and the independent variable is the election year as a 
continuous variable). The use of OLS regression analysis for identifying stability and 
change in levels of party identifiers is common (see for example, Dalton, 2000; 
Dalton, et al., 1984a). Using this model, however, has a drawback: the regression 
coefficients only provide an indication of the existence of a trend (i.e. when the 
coefficients are different from zero and statistically significant) and the direction of 
such a trend – increase or decrease (i.e. as the coefficients are negative or positive). 
Therefore, I could only use the results for measuring whether the level of party 
identifiers has decreased over time, proving the occurrence of partisan dealignment. 
In a new partisan alignment, after the voters realign themselves and identify with 
another party, I would expect the level of party identifiers to be high again. However, 
the regression coefficients may show there is no trend-shift but a persistent level of 
party identifiers, therefore not providing information about whether voters switch the 
party with which they identify. Put differently, running OLS regression analysis 
prevents the revelation of the beginning of a new partisan alignment. This problem is 
even more manifest in this dataset as for most of the cases, the time series is very 
short and begins in the middle of the 1970s, a period in which many scholars suspect 
that changes in voting behaviour had already started  (Dalton, et al., 1984a).  
 
Firstly, I analysed the OLS regression test results to see whether I could identify a 
decrease in the level of party identifiers over the years, as an indicator of partisan 
dealignment. Of the ten regression coefficients for the percentage of party identifiers, 
eight are negative and only five are statistically significant (Austria, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Norway). All the ten regression coefficients for the percentage 
of strong party identifiers are negative, but only seven are statistically significant 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden). When 
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examining each country, only Austria, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands show 
statistically significant decreases in the levels of both indicators – weak and strong 
identifiers. However, the period examined for two of the polities – Austria and Italy – 
is short compared to the other cases, and ends in 1999. I used the Eurobarometer 
surveys and the 1999 European Election Study as a data source for these two polities 
in lieu of the national election surveys. However, when running the same regression 
model based on a different data source – the Austrian exit poll – I receive non-
significant coefficients for the series of strong identifiers.2  
 
Table 5.1: OLS regression for (strong) party identifiers over time 
 
 % with 
PID 
% identifiers per 
annum (sig) 
% strong identifiers 
per annum (sig) 
Period Time-
points 
(N) 
Austria* 67 -0.916*** -0.663*** 1969-1999 7 
Belgium* 50 0.09  -0.285** 1975-1999 22 
Denmark 51.8 .281 -.04 1973-2005 10 
Finland* 57 -0.293  -0.147 1975-1991 4 
Germany 78.6 -.46** -.81*** 1961-2009 11 
Italy* 78 -0.979*** -0.770*** 1978-1999 19 
Luxembourg* 61 -0.317 -0.316*** 1975-1999 22 
the 
Netherlands 
73.9 -.26** -.24** 1971-2006 10 
Norway 71.9 -.47** -.12 1965-2005 10 
Sweden 45.4 -.21 -.60*** 1964-1998 13 
*p!0.1, ** p!0.05, *** p!0.01 (in two-tailed) 
Note: The % with party identification in the first column is the average of the % expressing 
identification in the first two surveys in each series. The per annum change is the unstandardized 
regression coefficient. 
Nations marked with an asterisk (*) are based on the Eurobarometer surveys and 1999 European 
Election Study. Other nations are based on their respective national election studies. 
 
For the second group of countries - Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, I found that 
the two indicators – possessing party identification at all or possessing strong party 
identification – have decreased (as the regression coefficients are negative), but the 
trend of only one of the categories is statistically significant (see Table 5.1). For 
Belgium, the regression coefficient of the weak party identifiers showed no trend (as 
the value approximates zero), but since the coefficient of the second indicator – strong 
                                                
2 Based on data that is presented by Plasser and Ulram (2000), I could run the same regression model 
on party identifiers in Austria. Of those possessing strong party identification between 1974 and 1999 
(9 time-points) b=0.21 (p=0.37), 30 percent of the respondents reported on strong party identification 
in 1974; for party identifiers between 1954 and 1999 (13 time points) b=-0.70 (p=0.00), 73 percent 
respondents reported on having party identification in 1954. 
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party identifiers – is statistically significantly negative, I include Belgium in this 
group.  
 
For Finland, the regression coefficients of the two indicators showed negative values. 
Neither of them is statistically significant, however, probably due to the small number 
of time-points (only four). In Denmark, the picture is even more blurred as one 
indicator has a negative coefficient and the other has a positive one. The two, 
however, are not statistically significant.  
 
The results of the OLS regression analysis are intriguing. For the first group of 
countries, evidence of partisan dealignment is strong. For the majority of the countries 
in the second group, however, empirical evidence of partisan dealignment is only 
found if we accept a ‘weak’ version of expectations, according to which party 
identifiers or having strong party identification has eroded over time. Doubts about 
the reliability of this evidence arise if one takes into account criticism of the 
application of the ‘party identification’ model for multi-party systems. 
 
5.3 Some Problems and Criticism of the Application of the Concept of ‘Party 
Identification’ to Multi-Party Systems 
 
Campbell and his colleagues’ original research (1960:142) posed the concept of party 
identification, and convincingly explained voting behaviour only for the American 
two-party system case. The application of this concept in other types of party systems, 
i.e. European and multi-party systems is not without its difficulties. 
 
The first problem appeared in one of the first research projects conducted on party 
identification in Denmark, aimed at rendering the directional components of party 
identification in a multi-party system (Holmberg, 1994:94). In the American case, 
people may consider themselves as either Republicans or Democrats (Weisberg, 
1999:683). For a multi-party system, however, there are two main approaches for 
measuring the direction of party identification: it can be based on party blocs (for 
example, party families, cleavage, left-right, etc.) or on individual parties. Borre and 
Katz (1973) studied the main thesis of the Michigan School regarding party 
identification and voting choice based on these two approaches. In line with the first 
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approach, they divided the voters along the most important line of conflict in 
Denmark – that between the Socialists and Non-Socialists – showing that “party 
identification predicts voting behaviour better than in the United States” (Borre & 
Katz, 1973:108). Their study of party identifiers and voting behaviour across 
individual parties gives a much more fluid picture (Borre & Katz, 1973:77). 
Holmberg (1994) who only uses the first approach, divided the Swedish parties on a 
Left-Right scale. He found that for Sweden, the correlation between the direction of 
party identification (i.e. Left or Right) and party support was not only higher than for 
the United States, but also too high (ranging between 0.92 and 0.96!). This high 
correlation may indicate that party identification and party support along the Left-
Right axis are not two separate phenomena (Holmberg, 1994:96-6).  
 
More troubling, however, are two objections raised against the Michigan School’s 
model of party identification. The first objection is based on what Schmitt (2002:3-4) 
called the ‘stability assumption.’ The first to identify this was Thomassen, who 
studied 1970 Dutch provincial elections and the 1971 and 1972 Dutch parliamentary 
elections. He discovered that party identification is less stable than voter preference 
and suggested a reverse casual relation. He argued: “party identification is not a 
psychological attachment, but simply a reflection of the vote preference” (Thomassen, 
1976:77); see also (Thomassen & Rosema, 2009:52). In much more recent research, 
Thomassen and Rosema (2009:49) repeated the same research and studied the period 
between 1971 and 2006, discovering that in the Netherlands the pattern of party 
identification as less stable than party support has persisted. 
 
Borre and Katz made a similar observation when they discovered that party 
identification and party preference tended to coincide in the 1971 Danish elections 
(Borre & Katz, 1973:78). Beck concluded that “[p]arty loyalties are more 
instrumental elsewhere [besides the U.S.A.] and tend to be less distinguishable from 
vote choice at any particular time” (Beck, 1984b:234). Put differently, the first 
objection relates to the concept of ‘party identification’ as tautological: many people 
will identify with a party simply because they vote for it (Evans, 2004:25). 
 
The second objection became evident in another study that also examined the Dutch 
electorate. It is critiques the assumption that voters identify with only one party, or 
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what Schmitt (2009:137) termed the ‘uniqueness assumption’. Van der Eijk and 
Niemöller (1983:338) were the first to find that more than a third of the Dutch 
respondents admitted to having multiple party identifications. Schmitt (who 
conducted the most recent research into this subject) showed that this is true not only 
in the Netherlands, but in fourteen countries (between 1996 and 2000) where an 
average of 10.2 percent of the respondents identified with more than one party 
(Schmitt, 2009:145).3 These results are even more intriguing in the light of findings 
showing that voters identify with groups of parties (Ventura, 2001), or only exhibit 
Left-Right orientations (Percheron & Jennings, 1981).  
 
These strong arguments show the problematic nature of the party identification model 
for multi-party and European countries. As Thomassen (1976:77) argued, “the 
concept of party identification has no real meaning in the Netherlands”, and as Van 
der Eijk and Niemöller (1983:339) concluded, “the application of the concept of party 
identification in relation to voting behaviour in the Netherlands is extremely 
doubtful”. Beck (1984b:234) even argued that the Michigan School party 
identification measurement “does not seem as appropriate outside of the United 
States.”  
 
In order to tackle the validity issues of ‘partisanship’, I examine partisan dealignment 
at the electorate level, focusing on the decline in partisanship, by studying the patterns 
of partisanship in its alternative meaning as well: the electoral support of the same 
party over long-term period. This is not to say that the two are interchangeable, in 
contrast to what Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009:87) contended, but is included as an 
additional or supplementary element in the analysis of patterns of partisanship. 
Therefore, I examine partisanship by employing two additional indicators.     
 
5.4 Two Additional Indicators 
 
Durable party support is usually contrasted with the unstable or volatile voting 
behavior of so-called ‘apartisans’ (voters who are involved in politics, but remain 
unattached to a political party)  (Dalton, 1996:213-6; 2006:195-6).  
                                                
3 This is true not only for multi-party systems, but also for two-party systems, as the U.S.A (Schmitt, 
2009; Weisberg, 1999). 
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In the electorate, however, we can find two additional patterns of electoral behavior 
related to those not participating in elections, and those voting but casting a blank or 
invalid vote. These two patterns of electoral behaviour, which are considered as 
indicators of a dealignment, are examined separately by most scholars, e.g. by 
measuring turnout rates.  
 
Taking into account these two groups within the electorate is crucial, and studying the 
electorate as a whole should (in my view) be the leading paradigm for examining 
patterns of party support. By neglecting to consider these two groups, we are likely to 
get an incomplete (or even misleading) picture of what happens in the entire 
electorate. This is even more important as scholars who study political participation 
(and more specifically electoral behaviour) have already found that the level of 
participation in elections has decreased over the years (Franklin, 2004; IDEA, 2002). 
As is depicted in Figure 5.1 while in some countries (Denmark, Belgium with the 
exception of 2010 election, Luxembourg and Sweden), the turnout level has been 
stable (or even increased) over the whole period, in other countries it has been 
decreased. In the Netherlands lower turnout levels were identified already in early 
1970s and in Finland since mid 1970s; in Austria, Germany, Italy and Norway, on the 
other hand, only since early 1990s onwards.  
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Figure 5.1: Turnout and Invalid votes per country 1950-2010 
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Graph 4.1: Turnout and Invalid votes per country 1950-2010
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That being said, the fraction of invalid votes (not including invalid votes due to 
technical problems) is another pattern of electoral behaviour especially important in 
my research. Scholars have showed that in countries with compulsory voting, not only 
the turnout is higher by between 6 and 20 per cent, than in countries in which voting 
is not compulsory (Birch, 2009a) (for an opposite argument, see for example (Blais, 
2009), but also that the proportion of invalid or spoiled votes is large (Birch, 2009b; 
Mackerras & McAllister, 1999). 
 
Several polities under investigation here have compulsory voting. These include 
Belgium and Luxembourg. In two other polities there was compulsory voting until 
recently: Austria until 1992 (when it was abolished in all regions except for Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg) and in Italy until 1993 (when it was removed during reform of the 
electoral system). In addition, the Dutch electorate was obliged to vote until the 1967 
election.4 On top of this, the levels of invalid votes have increased over time, 
especially since 1990, in all ten countries under investigation here, as Figure 5.1 
demonstrates. 
 
Therefore, I return to my proposal that the study of stable party support should 
examine the electorate as whole, combining those who do not vote, or who cast 
invalid or blank ballots. I suggest studying stable party support based on two 
indicators.  
 
The first indicator is the proportion of those who reported voting for the same party in 
two successive elections from the whole electorate, including those who cast invalid 
ballots and those who did not participate in one of these elections, based on 
individual-level data (i.e. national election surveys). 
 
As I specified in Chapter Four, my survey dataset is based on recall questions 
concerning patterns of electoral behaviour. It includes Denmark (between 1971 and 
2005), Flanders and Wallonia (1991-2003), Finland (1991-2007), Germany (1961-
2009), Italy (1994-2008), Norway (1965-2005), Sweden (1960-2006) and the 
Netherlands (1967-2006). 
                                                
4 For more on this topic, see IDEA’s report (2009) 
Partisan alignment, realignment or dealignment 
 79 
 
The study of electoral behaviour based on surveys and especially the validity of 
electoral behaviour for each election is questionable, as it is well known that surveys 
experience difficulty in tracing the non-voting electorate. Since this group within the 
electorate is an important factor in my study, I corrected the representation of those 
who did not vote and those who cast spoiled ballots by employing a political 
probability weight variable, computed according to the official election results (for 
more on this procedure, see Chapter Four).  
 
The second indicator I included in my analysis is an equivalent estimation to the 
indicator of stable party support but that measures these patterns based on aggregate 
data. A well-known index for measuring a change of party support or volatility based 
on aggregate data is Pedersen’s Total Volatility index (TV) (Pedersen, 1979). It 
measures the total changes of party support between two sequential elections (for 
index calculation, see Appendix A). This index mathematically represents “the 
minimal proportion of the electorate that must have shifted their vote given the 
observed aggregate change” (Przeworski, 1975); see also (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). 
Therefore, I argue the index’s complementary number can give us an estimation of 
the maximum electors who voted for the same party between two consecutive 
elections. The calculation of this number is straightforward: as the highest number of 
the TV index’s range is 100, it can easily be calculated as 100-TV. 
 
In addition, the TV index calculates the aggregate volatility based on the percentages 
of valid votes that each party receives in the two elections. However by doing so, it 
does not take into account two other important metrics: level of turnout and 
proportion of invalid votes.  
 
In order to be able to measure patterns of stable party support and to consider these 
metrics, I changed the TV index and introduced an advanced index – the Electoral 
Total Partisans (ETP). This index gives an estimation of stable party supporters from 
the whole electorate in two consecutive elections. The TV index was modified in two 
ways. Firstly, it measures changes in the level of those who change their party support 
– total volatility – and is not based on the number of valid votes, but rather on 
reference to the electorate in the current election. To put it differently, the TV index 
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calculates the party support share against the total number of people who are 
franchised.5 The electorate in each election is regarded as 100 percent, regardless of 
changes in the number of people who can cast their vote, i.e. enfranchisement of 
certain group due to electoral system reforms. Secondly, I calculated the index’s 
complementary number by subtracting the index level from the percentages of the 
valid votes in the current election. This share is the maximum estimation of electors 
who voted for the same party in the present and the previous election.     
 
As the electorate is the reference framework, all the values are comparable over time. 
In addition, the ETP index, as with the TV index, can range between 0 (no stable 
party supporters) to 100 (maximum stable party supporters). The formula below 
captures the ETP index: 
 
* Change in the electoral strength of party ‘I’ (as measured by its proportion of valid 
votes from the whole electorate in the current election) since the previous election 
(!EPi,t) is calculated as: EPi,t – EPi, t-1. 
 * This is divided by two, in order to account for the fact that when one party “wins”, 
the other party “loses”. 
* Subtracting the index score from the fraction of valid votes in the current election 
(VVi,t).  
 
The estimation of stable party supporters is calculated as:  
 
!!!"#! !!!"!"#! !!"!"#!!!!!!!  
                                                                                                                                             
  
The indicators co-vary to a certain extent. The Pearson correlation between the two 
indicators of stable party supporters is 0.74 and is statistically significant (at the 0.01 
level, 2-tailed, N=65). 
                                                
5 The measurement is based on the respective number of votes. In two cases – Luxembourg and the 
second Italian Republic – I calculated the component of parties support based on their respective 
electoral support in percentages, as the exact number of votes was not available. In Luxembourg this 
lack is due to the electoral system: because the number of votes for each elector varies with the number 
of deputies in a constituency, it is not possible to measure a national party vote by combining the four 
constituency-level votes (Mackie & Rose, 1991). 
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There are three scenarios of stability and change in partisanship – alignment, 
realignment and dealignment. A period of partisan alignment is identified when the 
electorate is aligned with its party and changes in party support are low. Partisan 
realignment is identified when the electorate changes its political allegiance. Partisan 
dealignment is identified when the long-term party support disappears.  
 
Patterns of party allegiance or partisanship are evaluated by the two stated indicators 
for each election year. While high levels of stable party supporters can be an indicator 
for partisanship, low levels point to a shift. As I suggested in the previous chapters, 
most scholars agree that the postwar period was stable and the change occurred at 
some point between the mid 1960s and the 1970s; therefore I assume that from the 
1950s to the mid 1960s, the polities were still in a situation of partisan alignment.  
 
These three rival scenarios can be translated into three hypotheses: 
 
H1 During the period between the mid 1960s to the 2000s, no change occurred and 
the electorate remains aligned with the political parties. 
A partisan alignment is identified when the electorate is aligned with its party and 
changes of party support are low. This is found when the level of stable party 
supporters is high in general. 
 
H2 During the period between the mid 1960s to the 2000s, an electoral change 
occurred: the electorate realigned itself with the political parties. 
A partisan realignment occurs when the electorate changes its political allegiance and 
moves to support another party over long-term period, indicating that a new partisan 
alignment has been created. As I discussed in the third chapter, the literature on 
realignment presents three types of realignment. Firstly, a critical realignment: a 
quick change, which occurs in the course of one election. The second is a secular 
realignment. This is a gradual, incremental shift and therefore occurs over a long 
period. Another model of realignment was later proposed by Carmines and Stimson 
(1984) – the ‘dynamic growth model’ or ‘issue evolution’, which is a combination of 
these two types of realignment: an electoral shock followed by incremental change. 
Thus, I expect to identify a critical realignment when a very short period with a low 
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level of stable party support is followed by a long-term period of high level of party 
support elections. The continuity of the new patterns over a long-term period is 
identified when the new patterns are sustained for at least ten years and in at least 
three successive elections. A secular realignment is identified when the level of stable 
party supporters is slightly lower than in the partisan alignment period, and this 
persists over a long-term period (for at least ten years and in at least three successive 
elections). A dynamic growth model of realignment is identified when a short period 
with a very low level of stable party supporters is followed by a long-term period with 
somewhat higher level of stable party supporters.  
 
H3 During the period between the mid 1960s and the 2000s, an electoral change 
occurred: the electorate dealigned itself from the political parties. 
A period of partisan dealignment is identified when the indicators demonstrate that 
the level of stable party supporters went down and remained lower over the given 
period when compared to the partisan alignment period, persisting for more than ten 
years and in at least three successive elections.  
 
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the different five hypothetical scenarios nested in these three 
hypotheses. 
 
Figure 5.2: The different hypothetical scenarios 
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5.5 The empirical results of the indicators of the level of partisanship 
 
My aim is to test if any change in partisanship measured by the two indicators of 
stable party supporters has occurred. Therefore, I ran a regression test on the data to 
see whether a statistically significant trend exists from 1950 onwards.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the regression coefficients for each of the indicators over time (the 
dependent variable is the party support indicator for each election year and the 
independent variable is the time, i.e. election year as a continuous variable) 6.  
 
For all of the cases under investigation here, I ran an OLS regression model: 
 !"#!$%&'( !"#$%&!!"#$%!!"##$%&'%! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! 
 
If a change has occurred and voters are no longer committed to the political parties, I 
expect to find a decrease of the indicator level over the years, thus the regression 
coefficient should be negative and statistically significant.  
 
For Austria, since this case is missing the individual-level dataset, I decided to 
examine the data presented in Plasser and Ulram’s (2008:7) report. This is aggregate 
data from the sub-national election results7 and includes estimation of Party Volatility 
(PV) rather than voting. Based on this index I could calculate the level of Gross 
Volatility (GV).8 Therefore, if a decreasing level of partisanship is manifested in 
Austria, I expect the level of party switchers and those not participating in the election 
to increase over the years, and the GV regression coefficient should be positive and 
statistically significant. 
 
                                                
6 For ETP: time was set to 0 for 1950, going up by increments of 1 for each additional year, and by a 
fraction for each additional month. For the proportion of stable party supporters: time was set to 0 for 
1950, going up by increments of 1 for each additional year. 
7 These are election results of municipalities, communities, wards, etc. For more information on the 
data calculation, see Chapter Four. 
8 The Gross Volatility (GV) index measures at individual level those who change their party support – 
in Ersson and Lane’s words (1998:25) ‘party switching’ (PS) – and also “takes into account all the 
eligible voters over the two elections and defining those changing between voting and non-voting as 
volatile voters.” 
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I excluded Finland, the second Italian Republic, Flanders and Wallonia from the 
regression model for the indicator of proportion of stable party support, and the 
second Italian Republic for ETP, because these datasets include only a small number 
of cases (only 4 or 5 time-points).  
 
Table 5.2 reveals that in all the cases apart from Denmark, Flanders and Luxembourg, 
the regression coefficients of the proportion of stable party supporters (where 
regression tests for this indicator were feasible) and the ETP coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant. In Austria, the coefficient of the GV is positive and 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.2: OLS regression coefficients for proportions of stable party supporters (or 
GV) and Electorate Total Partisans (ETP), 1950 – 2010 
 
 Dependent variable: proportions of stable 
party supporters 
ETP 
Denmark % 77.51 78.33 
 change per annum -.13 (.12) -.05 (.05) 
 period (time-points) 1971-2005 (14) 1953-2007 (22) 
 R" .09 .05 
 Durbin-Watson 1.89 1.59 
Finland %  75.73 
 change per annum  -.38 (.07)*** 
 period (time-points)  1954-2007 (15) 
 R"  .72 
 Durbin-Watson  2.22 
Flanders %  80.91 
 change per annum  -.08 (.05) 
 period (time-points)  1954-2010 (18) 
 R"  .14 
 Durbin-Watson  1.16 
Germany % 74.85 72.27 
 change per annum -.51 (.26)* -.30 (.11)** 
 period (time-points) 1965-2009 (13) 1961-2009 (14) 
 R" .26 .38 
 Durbin-Watson 1.44 0.74 
Italy (1st republic) %  82.85 
 change per annum  -.40 (.09)** 
 period (time-points)  1958-1992 (9) 
 R"  .74 
 Durbin-Watson  2.02 
Italy (1st & 2nd 
Republics) 
%  82.85 
change per annum  -.50 (.14)** 
 period (time-points)  1958-2008 (14) 
 R"  .47 
 Durbin-Watson  1.65 
Luxembourg %  73.74 
 change per annum  .09 (.12) 
 period (time-points)  1954-2009 (12) 
 R"  .06 
 Durbin-Watson  0.96 
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the Netherlands % 62.91 89.52 
 change per annum -.33 (.16)* -.54 (.09)*** 
 period (time-points) 1971-2006 (12) 1956-2010 (17) 
 R" .28 .73 
 Durbin-Watson 2.59 1.54 
Norway % 78.13 74.65 
 change per annum -.67 (.09)*** -.21 (.09)** 
 period (time-points) 1965-2005 (10) 1957-2009 (14) 
 R" .87 .32 
 Durbin-Watson 2.01 2.00 
Sweden % 76.60 76.57 
 change per annum -.59 (.09)*** -.18 (.09)** 
 period (time-points) 1960-2006 (15) 1956-2010 (18) 
 R" .77 .22 
 Durbin-Watson 0.68 0.87 
Wallonia %  84.11 
 change per annum  -.16 (.06)** 
 period (time-points)  1954-2010 (18) 
 R"  .32 
 Durbin-Watson  1.21 
  
 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
GV 
 
 
ETP 
Austria % 3 88.94 
 Change per annum .70 (.06)*** -.60 (.08)*** 
 period (time-points) 1975-2008 (11) 1956-2008 (17) 
 R" .93 .78 
 Durbin-Watson 2.08 1.16 
*p#0.1, ** p#0.05, *** p#0.01 (in two-tailed) 
Note: The % stable party supporters (or GV) or ETP in the first line for each case is the measurement 
level in the first year in each series. The per annum change is the unstandardized regression coefficient 
(s.e.). 
The GV is based on the sum of shares of non-voters and party volatility as are reported in Plasser and 
Ulram (2008:7). 
 
In Denmark, Flanders and Luxembourg, on the other hand, the ETP coefficients are 
approaching zero and are therefore statistically insignificant. The OLS coefficient for 
the proportion of party supporters in Denmark was slightly higher and negative, but 
was not statistically significant, thus signaling the absence of a trend. 
 
Overall, the OLS regression test results demonstrate that in most of the party systems, 
the figures of stable party support have decreased since 1950, as the coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant. 
 
Yet the Durbin-Watson values for some of the OLS models indicate a problem of 
first-order autocorrelation (a “correlation between values of the same time series” 
(Makridakis, et al., 1998) for the ETP time series for Austria, Flanders, Germany, 
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Luxembourg, Sweden and Wallonia and the same problem for the Swedish time series 
of proportions of stable party supporters. 
 
Therefore for those cases with a problem of autocorrelation I fitted a Regression 
model with Autocorrelated Errors (autoregressive error model) for each of these 
cases, specified in Table 5.3. The autoregressive error model solves the problem of 
aurocorrealtion by augmenting the regression model with an autoregressive model for 
the random error, thereby accounting for the autocorrelation of the errors (SAS). 
 
Table 5.3: Autoregressive error model coefficients for proportions of stable party 
supporters and Electorate Total Partisans (ETP), 1950 – 2010 
 
INDICATOR: ETP 
Austria Intercept 99.39 (5.00)*** 
 Time -0.61 (0.14)*** 
 Lagged 1 time -0.40 (0.32) 
 Lagged 2 time -0.09 (0.33) 
 Period (N) 1956-2008 (17) 
 R-Square 0.80 
 Root MSE 5.66 
 AIC 110.81 
 MAE 4.23 
 Durbin-Watson         1.74 
Flanders Intercept 83.34 (1.98)*** 
 Time -0.12 (0.06)* 
 Lagged 1 time -0.13 (0.30) 
 Lagged 2 time 0.12 (0.31) 
 Period (N) 1954-2010 (18) 
 R-Square 0.29 
 Root MSE 3.71 
 AIC 101.78 
 MAE 2.70 
 Durbin-Watson         1.80 
Germany Intercept 87.97 (4.94)*** 
 Time -0.36 (0.14)** 
 Lagged 1 time -1.04 (0.29)*** 
 Lagged 2 time 0.67 (0.26)** 
 Period (N) 1961-2009 (14) 
 R-Square 0.71 
 Root MSE 4.31 
 AIC 91.41 
 MAE 3.23 
 Durbin-Watson         1.65 
Luxembourg Intercept 68.68 (7.82)*** 
 Time 0.09 (0.23) 
 Lagged 1 time -0.43 (0.37) 
 Lagged 2 time -0.15 (0.41) 
 Period (N) 1954-2009 (12) 
 R-Square 0.28 
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 Root MSE 6.75 
 AIC 83.36 
 MAE 4.91 
 Durbin-Watson         1.74 
Sweden Intercept 80.22 (95.58)*** 
 Time -0.10 (0.15) 
 Lagged 1 time -0.47 (0.29) 
 Lagged 2 time -0.16 (0.29) 
 Period (N) 1956-2010 (18) 
 R-Square 0.47 
 Root MSE 5.56 
 AIC 114.05 
 MAE 3.60 
 Durbin-Watson         1.70 
Wallonia Intercept 81.31 (2.90)*** 
 Time -0.17 (0.08)** 
 Lagged 1 time -0.41 (0.27) 
 Lagged 2 time 0.10 (0.28) 
 Period (N) 1954-2010 (18) 
 R-Square 0.42 
 Root MSE 4.09 
 AIC 105.40 
 MAE 2.51 
 Durbin-Watson         1.94 
INDICATOR: PROPORTIONS OF PARTY SUPPORTERS 
Sweden Intercept 86.87 (5.97)*** 
 Time -0.56 (0.17)*** 
 Lagged 1 time -0.62 (0.30)* 
 Lagged 2 time -0.04 (0.34) 
 Period (N) 1960-2006 (15) 
 R-Square 0.86 
 Root MSE 4.00 
 AIC 88.05 
 MAE 2.66 
 Durbin-Watson         1.88 
*p#0.1, ** p#0.05, *** p#0.01 (in two-tailed) 
 
The autoregressive error models confirm the OLS regression analysis, the ETP 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant in Austria, Germany, Sweden 
(for the indicator of proportion of party supporters) and Wallonia and approaching 
zero and not significant in Luxembourg and Sweden (for the indicator of ETP). In 
addition, contrary to the OLS analysis, the autoregressive error model suggests on 
significant decreasing ETP trend in Flanders. 
 
The OLS regression and the autoregressive error models provides an indication of a 
linear shift of the indices’ values from one year to another, but is not capable of 
rendering the exact point in time when the change began. Furthermore, these models 
does not have the ability to detect cases of temporary increase or small changes of 
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index level that are idiosyncratic of critical realignment; instead, the coefficients in 
these cases allude to no change.  
 
Therefore, I turned to examine the trends of stable party support since 1965, by 
comparing them to the alignment period (i.e. 1950-4) using two methods. 
 
I compared the level of ETP for each election year to the level of the ETP over the 
partisan alignment period, employing a comparison test. For Sweden, I ran an 
additional comparison test on the data about the proportion of stable party supporters, 
due to the unavailability of data for the 1950-60s period for the other cases. The 
reference line was the indicator average level minus one standard deviation over the 
1950-64 period. I classify those elections in which the indicator level is equal or 
higher than the reference line as having high level of partisans. Likewise, elections 
with indicator levels lower than the reference line are labeled as having low levels of 
partisanship.  
 
Figures 5.3-5.4 present the results of this comparison for the post-1965 period. If the 
electorate moves away from the parties and partisan dealignment occurs, the values of 
partisans’ indicators should be located below the reference line. In a critical 
realignment, one or some of the indicators’ values are much lower than the reference 
line, with subsequent values rising above the reference line. When the indicators’ 
values are scattered around the line, this points to secular realignment. Dynamic 
growth realignment is a combination of the two previous scenarios. 
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Figure 5.3: Electoral Total Partisans (ETP) between 1950-2010 per case, in comparison to the reference line 
 
Note: the reference line is the average level of the ETP between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard deviation 
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Figure 5.4: Proportion of party supporters in Sweden between 1950-2010,                         
in comparison to the reference line 
 
Note: the reference line is the average proportion level between 1950 and 1964  
minus one standard deviation 
 
 
The second method incorporates an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for each case, in 
which the ETP (or in the case of Sweden, the proportions of stable party supporters) 
are the dependent variable and the independent categorical variable is a dummy 
variable of two periods of ‘stability’ and ‘change’. For each election year from 1965 
onwards, the time variable scored 0 for all values up to this election, 1 for that and all 
subsequent elections, (model of moving time frames or a moving t-test, which is 
commonly employed in disciplines with repeated measurement over time such as 
meteorology or geology). Since the observations are not independent from each other, 
I used an ANOVA model, which assumes repeated measurements and does not 
assume that all the treatment populations have the same variance (homogeneity of 
variance). 
 
A decreasing indicator level during the post-1965 period points to a significant 
smaller index average than the average index scores over earlier period. Along with 
this, a significant smaller average score in at least two consecutive elections typically 
shows low values for the indicator over a long period and signifies a period of 
partisan dealignment. Table 5.4 displays the ANOVA results, where they are 
significant in at least one election year. 
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Table 5.4: ANOVA models for indicators of partisanship: Electorate Total Partisans 
(ETP) and proportions of stable party supporters, in periods of  
‘stability’ and ‘change’ 
 
 Indicator    
Austria ETP election year 1966 1970 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
90.10 (1.12) 89.31 (1.80) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
77.71 (11.56) 77.00 (11.71) 
  ANOVA F(1,14)=15.40**     F(1,13.6)= 
13.38**     
  AIC 114.4 113.1 
  BIC 116.1 114.8 
  period (time-points)          1956-2008 (17)  
Denmark ETP election year 1966 1968 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
78.73 (2.75) 79.06 (2.59) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
75.08 (4.11) 74.73 (3.97) 
  ANOVA F(1,18.5)=53.62*** F(1,19)=51.66*** 
  AIC 159.3 157.5 
  BIC 161.5 159.7 
  period (time-points) 1953-2007 (22)  
Finland ETP election year 1966 1970 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
74.59 (5.03) 75.46 (4.46) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
65.80 (7.12) 64.68 (6.28) 
  ANOVA F(1 ,4.31)=6.11*     F(1,7.69)=13.58**     
  AIC 94.1 90.4 
  BIC 95.5 91.8 
  period (time-points) 1954-2007 (15)  
Flanders ETP election year 1991 1995 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
 81.17 (3.14) 80.80 (3.28) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
76.44 (3.85) 76.44 (4.30) 
  ANOVA F(1,8.45)=6.79**     F(1,5.89)=4.20     
  AIC 92.3 93.8 
  BIC 94.1 95.5 
  period (time-points) 1954-2010 (18)  
Germany ETP election year 1980 1983 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
79.59 (4.96) 80.10 (4.73) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
73.29 (7.36) 72.06 (6.80) 
  ANOVA F(1,13)= 3.91*     F(1,12.4)= 7.19**     
  AIC 92.8 90.4 
  BIC 94.3 91.8 
  period (time-points) 1961-2009 (14)  
Italy (1st & 2nd  ETP election year 1968 1972 
Republics)  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
82.27 (.81) 82.39 (.61) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
70.31 (10.24) 69.19 (9.95) 
  ANOVA F(1,11.7)=15.78**     F(1,10.3)=19.09**     
  AIC 92.0 85.5 
  BIC 93.3 86.8 
  period (time-points) 1958-2008 (14)  
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the Netherlands ETP election year 1967 1971 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
88.46 (.95) 89.92 (3.18) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
68.93 (8.38) 67.65 (7.71) 
  ANOVA F(1,14.3)=73.56***     F(1,13)=52.28***     
  AIC 105.3 106.5 
  BIC 107.0 108.2 
  period (time-points) 1956-2010 (17)  
Norway ETP election year 1965 1969 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
73.94 (1.00) 75.08 (2.10) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
69.01 (6.59) 68.25 (6.34) 
  ANOVA F(1,11.8)=5.89**     F(,10.9)=9.10     
  AIC 82.7 81.5 
  BIC 84.0 82.7 
  period (time-points) 1957-2009 (14)  
Sweden ETP election year 1979 1982 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
80.34 (5.02) 80.80 (4.89) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
75.22 (6.77) 74.19 (6.30) 
  ANOVA F(1, 15.9)=3.40*      
  AIC 108.7  
  BIC 110.4  
  period (time-points)                1956-2010 (18) 
 Partisans election year 1968 1970 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
76.05 (.78) 75.93 (.59) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
68.26 (9.85) 76.64 (10.02) 
  ANOVA F(1,12.7)=7.82**        F(1,11.3)=8.10**     
  AIC 98.5 93.0 
  BIC 99.9 94.5 
  period (time-points) 1960-2006 (15)  
Wallonia ETP election year 1965 1968 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
82.79 (2.15) 78.96 (7.84) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
74.49 (4.01) 74.98 (3.64) 
  ANOVA F(1,1.74)=13.31*     F(1,2.15)=0.20     
  AIC 90.7 92.5 
  BIC 92.4 94.2 
  period (time-points) 1954-2010 (18)  
*p!0.1, ** p!0.05, *** p!0.01 
Note: The time variable was scored 0 for all time points up to this election, 1 for that election and for 
all time points afterward. This table presents only the results for the first two elections, which are 
statistically significant in each case. 
 
 
I began by analysing those cases in which the OLS regression and autoregressive 
error models of the partisanship indicators signify decreasing trends: that is, all the 
cases except Denmark and Luxembourg. 
 
In all of these cases, the comparison test and the ANOVA test (on periods of 
‘stability’ and ‘change’) showed trends of decreasing stable party supporters 
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compared to the period of alignment. Interestingly, although the two methods measure 
the trends differently, for half of the cases these declining trends commenced almost 
at the same points in time. 
 
In Finland, the comparison test indicates that from 1970 onwards, the ETP values are 
much lower than the reference line, with the exception of the 1972 and 1979 election. 
The difference ranges between 0.44 (in the 1970 election) and 11.97 (in the 1999 
election) below the reference line. The ANOVA model confirms these lower values of 
ETP in comparison to the previous elections, as in the 1966 and 1970 elections the 
average score for the period of ‘change’ is lower than the average score for the period 
of ‘stability’ and the ANOVA coefficient in both election years is statistically 
significant. 
 
Similarly, in Flanders the ANOVA model suggests that the mean score of ETP for the 
period since the 1991 election onwards is significantly lower than the mean ETP score 
for the earlier period. The comparison test also shows that until the 1987 election, the 
ETP values in most of the election years had been above the reference line (although 
there are three exceptions: the 1965 and 1968 elections (in which the ETP is 4.59 and 
1.57 points respectively below the line), and the 1981 election (in which it was 2.58 
points lower than the reference line). Since the 1991 election, in all the election years 
(apart from the 1995 election) the ETP scores are below the reference line. The values 
range between 1.66 (in the 1999 election) and 9.51 (in the 2010 election) points below 
the line. The results for the 1995 deviant election can be attributed to institutional 
change: this was the first general election under a revised constitution’s new federal 
structure, the voters supported the coalition’s parties (Downs, 1995), and the level of 
TV decreased from 13.27 in 1991 election to 5.41 in 1995 (my calculations).  
 
For Italy I discovered that from 1972 onwards, all ETP-values assume below-
reference-line-levels. The distance-to-the reference line is between 0.99 (in the 1972 
election) and 35.56 (in the 1994 election). The ANOVA test complies with these 
results, as the average score for the period of ‘change’ is significantly lower than the 
average score for the period of ‘stability’ in the 1968 and 1972 elections. 
 
In the Netherlands too both tests have the same outcome, and mark the 1967 election 
as the kick-off for declining ETP values. The average ETP score for the period of 
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‘change’ is lower than the average score for the period of ‘stability’ in the 1967 and 
1971 elections, and the ANOVA coefficient in both elections is statistically 
significant. Further, Figure 5.3 reveals that in the Netherlands from the 1967 election 
onwards, the ETP levels are below the reference line. Not only is the level of 
volatility quite high, I also found that the distance-to-base-line of the ETP scores 
ranges between 5.22 (in the 1967 election) and 31.29 (in the 2002 election). 
 
In Wallonia the comparison test suggests that from 1965 onwards, the ETP values in 
almost all election years are lower than the reference line: between 2.37 (in the 1985 
election) and 13.14 (in the 1965 election). However, there are a few exceptions: the 
ETP values for the 1978 and 1987 elections (with only 0.43 and 0.52 points above the 
line). The ETP mean score for the period of ‘change’ is lower than the mean for the 
previous period (i.e. the period of ‘stability’) in the elections of 1965 and 1968 but is 
statistically significant only for the first election. A possible explanation for the non-
significant results for the later election is the very low ETP value in the 1965 election. 
 
As far as differences in timing of trend shifts between the two statistical tests, in 
Austria, Germany, Norway and Sweden these differences are substantial.  
 
In Austria, statistically significant coefficients for the ANOVA model in the 1966 and 
1970 elections indicate that the average score of the ETP values for the period since 
1966 election onwards is significantly lower than the average score for the earlier 
period. The comparison test showed that between 1966 and 1970 are lower than the 
reference line, by 1.98, 4.06 points respectively. Yet in the following elections 
(between 1975 and 1979), the ETP values are a bit higher than the reference line (2.52 
and 1.08 points respectively). However, from the 1983 election onwards the ETP 
values are again much lower than the reference line, ranging between 2.03 points of 
difference (in the 1983 election) and 33.90 points (in the 2008 election). 
 
Similarly in Germany, the average ETP score for the period of ‘change’ is lower than 
the average score for the period of ‘stability’ already in 1980 and 1983 elections and 
the ANOVA coefficient for both elections is significant. However, the comparison 
test indicates that only in the 1990-1994 and 2005-2009 elections are ETP levels 
lower than the reference line (!). 
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Also for Norway the two methods indicate different starting point. The ANOVA 
models point out that the average ETP scores for the period since the 1965 election 
onwards is significantly lower than the average score for the earlier period. The 
comparison test shows ETP values that are much lower than the reference line only 
since 1973, with the distance to the reference line ranging between 0.57 (in the 1981 
election) and 11.75 (in the 1973 election). 
 
In Sweden, the two methods were employed for the two indicators, producing 
differences in timing of trend shifts between the two indicators and the two statistical 
tests. The ANOVA model coefficient for the ETP in the 1979 is significant, 
suggesting on significantly lower average indicator than those in the earlier elections. 
The comparison test for values of proportion of stable party supporters confirms this, 
as the indicator values since 1982 are lower than the reference line, ranging between 
0.88 (in 1985) and 23.31 (in 2004) points of difference. However, the ANOVA model 
for this indicator suggests earlier shifts when it produces significant results for the 
1968 and 1970 elections. A bigger difference is found for the comparison test of the 
ETP values. It shows that ETP levels are lower than the reference line only in the 
1991 election and again between 1998 and 2006 elections. 
 
I will now turn to examine those cases in which the OLS regression and 
autoregressive error models (presented at Tables 5.2-5.3) suggest on no-tend – 
Denmark and Luxembourg. Two different scenarios are found: while for the Danish 
case, both methods indicate on a temporary shift and for the case of Luxembourg, the 
two methods indicate no change. 
 
The absence of a trend in the ETP values over the years in Luxembourg, as presented 
in Tables 5.2-5.3, is confirmed by both methods. Only two out of nine ETP values are 
much lower than the reference line, with distances of 4.80 points difference (in the 
1979 election) and 9.44 points difference (in the 1989 election). Nevertheless, none of 
the ANOVA models indicates on significant difference in mean ETP between the two 
periods. All in all, both methods demonstrate that the level of ETP did not change 
much over the entire period. 
 
Likewise, the first OLS regressions (presented in Table 5.2) suggest the absence of a 
trend for the last case, Denmark. In the 1966 and 1968 elections the average score for 
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the period of ‘change’ is lower than the average score for the period of ‘stability’ and 
the ANOVA coefficient in both election years is statistically significant. Yet, the 
comparison test draws a different picture. According to this test, the ETP values in the 
first three elections – 1966, 1968 and 1971 – are above the reference line, with 4.71, 
2.55 and 2.19 points difference respectively. On top of this, the test demonstrates that 
in the following election – the 1973 election – the ETP value is lower than the 
reference line by 12.59 points (!), and then in the successive election years the ETP 
values fluctuate around the reference line. In almost half of these elections – seven 
elections – the ETP score is below this line, with a maximum of 4.64 points difference 
(in the 1990 election). In the other six elections the ETP is above the reference line, 
with maximum of 1.92 points difference (in the 1988 election). In order to validate 
the 1973 election as a critical election, I compared the indicators’ scores for the 
successive election years and found that all are lower than the respective indicator 
level in the 1973 election. 
 
5.6 Partisan Alignment, Realignment and Dealignment: Discussion 
 
This chapter examines the argument of partisan dealignment. It began by examining 
trends of party identification over the years.  
 
Evidence in favour of partisan dealignment, as is measured by trends of Party 
Identification, is not very strong: only in four countries – Austria, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands – did the levels of people with party identification and those with 
strong party identifiers erode significantly over time. Due to these findings and, more 
importantly, due to a major critique of the application of the phenomenon of ‘party 
identification’ to a multi-party system, I also examined the phenomenon of 
‘partisanship’ based on patterns of electoral behaviour, and argued that partisans are 
those who support the same party for a long-term period. 
 
I studied this by examining patterns of electoral behaviour within the entire electorate 
(comprising of party supporters, voters casting an invalid vote and people not 
participating in elections) by employing two indicators: the proportion of those who 
reported voting for the same party in two succeeding elections, and its equivalent 
estimation – the ETP index – based on aggregate data.  
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Table 5.5 summarises the empirical periods of partisan alignment, realignment and 
dealignment as found within the differing definitions of partisanship: trends of Party 
Identification (PI) (and having a strong party identification), ETP and proportion of 
durable party supporters. These last two are also measured by the comparison test (the 
distance-to-reference-line of) per election year and an ANOVA analysis of different 
splits between periods of ‘stability’ and ‘change’, in order to identify an abrupt 
change (in case of no trend) and to render the exact point in time when the change 
began (in case of a trend is identified). These two methods – the comparison test and 
the ANOVA– measure the trends differently, and in case the methods demonstrate 
that these declining trends commence at different time-points, I accept the latest time 
point.  
 
Evidence of change into a partisan dealignment is found when party identification (or 
those who have strong party identification), ETP and proportion of durable party 
supporters lowers over the years (as when the models coefficients were significantly 
negative), and when the ETP, along with the proportion of durable party support 
(when this is available) indicate that the level of partisans is fairly low over long-term 
periods (based on the comparison test and the ANOVA models of the different 
periods).  
 
Critical realignment is identified when there is no evidence of a lessening of party 
identification or ETP, and with accordant trend of ETP: a critical moment (a critical 
election in which the ETP was very low and is followed by a long-term period of high 
level of party support).  
 
In five cases, the (OLS and autoregressive error) coefficients of PI, ETP and 
proportion of party supporters together with the comparison test and the ANOVA 
analysis indicate that a partisan dealignment is occurring. This occurred in Austria (in 
1983), Italy (1972), the Netherlands (1967), Norway (1973), and Sweden (1982). 
 
(Separate) PI trends for the two Belgian regions are not available; the OLS and 
autoregressive error models point out on declining trend and the comparison tests and 
the ANOVA models of the ETP values suggest that since 1965 in Wallonia and from 
1991 in Flanders, the level of party allegiance has been in decline. Based on this 
evidence, I conclude that both regions are in a state of partisan dealignment. 
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Likewise, in Finland the regression coefficients of both PI measurements are not 
significant, while ETP regression coefficient and both tests demonstrate that the ETP 
values decline as of 1970, indicating the beginnings of a partisan dealignment period. 
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Table 5.5: Evidence of partisan alignment, realignment or dealignment, per case over mid 1960s-2000s,  
based on trends of partisanship indicators 
 
Evidence of partisan dealignment 
 PI Strong PI OLS model for ETP 
or proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
Autoregressive 
error model for 
ETP or 
proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
Comparison test 
for ETP or 
proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
ANOVA model for 
ETP or proportion 
of durable party 
supporters, in 
periods of stability 
and change 
Partisan 
dealignment 
since 
Austria negative (sig.) negative (sig.) ETP negative (sig.) ETP negative 
(sig.) 
ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1983 
Finland negative negative ETP negative (sig.)  ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1970 
Flanders    ETP negative 
(sig.) 
ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1991 
Germany negative (sig.) negative (sig.) ETP negative (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
ETP negative 
(sig.) 
 ETP negative (sig.) 1990 
Italy (1st & 2nd 
republics) 
negative (sig.) negative (sig.) ETP negative (sig.) 
 
 ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1972 
the Netherlands negative (sig.) negative (sig.) ETP negative (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
 ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1967 
Norway negative (sig.) negative ETP negative (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
 ETP low ETP positive (sig.) 1973 
Sweden negative negative (sig.) ETP negative (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
ETP low; Party 
supporters low 
ETP positive (sig.) 
Party supporters 
negative (sig.) 
1982 
Wallonia   ETP negative (sig.) ETP negative 
(sig.) 
ETP low ETP negative (sig.) 1965 
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Evidence of partisan critical realignment and an alignment 
 PI Strong PI OLS model for ETP 
or proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
 Comparison test 
for ETP 
 Partisan 
realignment 
in 
Denmark positive negative -  ETP low in 1973 
follows with 
higher ETP values 
 1973 
Evidence of continues partisan alignment 
 PI Strong PI OLS model for ETP 
or proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
Autoregressive 
error model for 
ETP or 
proportion of 
durable party 
supporters 
Comparison test 
for ETP 
ANOVA model for 
ETP in periods of 
stability and 
change 
 
Luxembourg negative negative (sig.) - - ETP high -  
Index: (sig.) stands for statically significant results; ‘low’ stands for long period of lower levels of indicator in comparison to the reference line (the indicator mean 
between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard deviation); ‘high’ stands for long period of higher levels of indicator in comparison to the reference line (the indicator 
mean between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard deviation). 
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For Germany, the comparison analysis of ETP showed no clear trend, with fairly low 
ETP values in some of the elections since 1990. However, the OLS regression 
analysis of the both PI measurements, ETP and proportion of party supporters, as well 
as the autoregressive error model for ETP indicated that partisanship dropped over 
time. The ANOVA models of the two periods also indicate that the ETP values from 
the 1990 election onwards are lower than those in the previous years. Therefore, I 
follow the comparison test and contend that since 1990 a partisan dealignment has 
been occurring in Germany.  
 
Only in Luxembourg were the ETP values at the same level over the whole period, as 
is suggested by both methods and no trend of ETP over time is identified by the OLS 
or autoregressive error models. Although significant declining trends of strong PI are 
found, I conclude that Luxembourg is still in a situation of partisan alignment. 
 
In Denmark the PI regression coefficients for both analyses show no significant and 
contrasting trends. No significant declining trend of ETP is found by the OLS model. 
In addition, the comparative analysis elicits a peak or critical moment (the 1973 
election) followed by high levels of partisanship, as measured by ETP.  
 
Up to this point, I have examined the trends of partisanship in its two definitions 
parallel to each other. To strengthen my empirical conclusions, I now examine 
whether the same results emerge when I analyse the combined definitions of 
partisanship at the individual-level. Put differently, I wish to test the trends in 
partisanship as articulated by respondents who admitted party identification and 
reported voting for the same party in two successive elections. 
 
Since my dataset only covers the period from 1973, I am not able to analyse the level 
of partisanship prior to the election in this year (the critical election, as captured by 
the ETP index). I can only examine the levels of partisanship in comparison to the 
1973 election. To this end, I ran a binary logistic regression test with partisanship as 
the dependent variable (partisanship coded 0=respondents who do not have party 
identification and/or changed their party support in two succeeding elections and 1= 
respondents who have party identification and voted for the same party in two 
successive elections). The independent variable is again time, but in this model each 
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election year after the 1973 election was coded as a dummy variable, and the 1973 
election year is the reference group. 
 
Table 5.6 shows the logistic regression model for Denmark. The model suggests that 
between 1975 and 2005, the odds of being a partisan are higher than those for 1973 
election. Only for the 2001 election is this trend not statistically significant, with the 
confidence interval ranges between minus and plus alluding to the absence of a clear 
trend. This indicates that apart from the 2001 election, from 1973 onwards the odds of 
being a partisan have been higher than they were for the 1973 election. This cements 
support for the trends found by both indicators: the 1973 election has the lowest level 
of partisans and in the subsequent period, the level of partisans increased again. In 
addition, the logistical model also gives us a good illustration of the process of critical 
realignment and a new alignment. In the elections until 1984, immediately after the 
critical 1973 realignment election, the odds of being a partisan are much smaller than 
the odds between 1990 and 1998.9 The logistical model confirms the identification of 
critical realignment with its idiosyncratic peak in 1973, the election with the lowest 
odds of partisanship. The odds went up slightly in the following years (until 1984), 
and in 1990 rose again.  
 
Table 5.6: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis: prediction of party identifiers and stable 
party supporters in Denmark, 1973-2005 
 
Predictor Variable B (S.E.) Exp(B) 95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Constant -.42 (.09)*** .66   
1975 election .45 (.11)*** 1.572 1.27 1.95 
1977 election .74 (.11)*** 2.09 1.69 2.60 
1984 election .49 (.12)*** 1.63 1.30 2.05 
1990 election 2.28 (.16)*** 9.78 7.09 13.48 
1994 election 2.61 (.15)*** 13.63 10.25 18.13 
1998 election 1.30 (.12)*** 3.68 2.92 4.63 
2001 election .15 (.10) 1.16 .95 1.43 
2005 election .24 (.10)** 1.27 1.04 1.55 
Chi-squared 1047.645 
(p=0.00) 
Nagelkerke R Square .14 
Log Liklihood 11984.06 
N 9500 
    
*p<=0.05, ** p<=0.01, *** p<=0.001 
Note: The dependent variable is coded 0 if voters who do not have party identification and/or changed 
their party support in two succeeding elections and 1 if the respondent has party identification and 
voted for the same party in two succeeding elections. 
                                                
9 The logistical model does not include the 1987 and 1988 elections as data about party identification in 
these election years are missing. 
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Put differently, the logit model confirms that 1973 election is a critical election in the 
Danish political system.  
 
All in all, Tables 5.5-5.6 demonstrate that only in one case – Luxembourg – are the 
voters still aligned with the political parties. A partisan critical realignment is found 
only in Denmark, which occurred in the 1973 election and since then a new alignment 
has been created. All other cases imply a state of partisan dealignment.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter deals with change and stability in the relationship between parties and 
voters as partisans. More specifically, it studies whether we can identify signs of 
partisan dealignment as partisanship has shrunk over time. Due to major criticism of 
the party identification model, this chapter has suggested studying this topic based on 
two aspects – party identification and durable party support. Moreover, it suggests 
doing so using three indicators. The first is the well-studied PI, and the other two 
indicators measure stable party support in two consecutive elections. 
 
This study of electoral behaviour includes not only those who support a political party 
(i.e. valid votes), but also takes into account all of those who are franchised, i.e. the 
whole electorate. For the individual-level data, I measured the proportion of voters 
who reported voting for the same party in two succeeding elections. An equivalent 
estimation was calculated based on the ETP index (after modifying the TV index), 
based on aggregate data.  
 
Unifying the results of these three indicators (PI, proportion of stable party 
supporters, and ETP) provides a much more reliable and comprehensive 
understanding of the patterns underlying partisan alignment. 
 
The combined results of PI, ETP and the proportion of stable party supporters 
uncover a period of partisan dealignment in most of the party systems studied. On top 
of this, I prove that the shifts to partisan dealignment occurred in two waves. One 
wave happened between the mid 1960s and the early 1970s and includes Finland, 
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Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Wallonia. The second wave stretches between the 
early 1980s to the early 1990s in Austria, Flanders, Germany and Sweden. 
 
Only in two cases were no signs of partisan dealignment found. In Luxembourg, the 
low ETP scores together with the absence of a trend in the ETP suggest ongoing 
partisan alignment. Denmark is the only case for which the three indicators confirm 
signs of partisan critical realignment and the creation of a new alignment. 
 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
VOTER ALIGNMENTS ALONG THE CLASS AND RELIGIOUS 
CLEAVAGES 
 
 
“Electoral alignments reflect socioeconomic and cultural division, and political cleavages translate 
into party organizations.” (Caramani, 2004:9) 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with voter alignments along cleavages. It studies the most 
prominent socio-structural cleavages – those of class and religion. Namely, it examines 
the persistence of voter alignments along these two cleavages and attempts to identify 
whether these alignments have changed, causing realignments (and new alignments) or 
dealignments along these cleavages to occur.  
 
The term ‘cleavage’ has been assigned different meanings in Political Science 
literature, as was described in the third chapter. In this chapter, I examine the concept 
of ‘cleavage’ as defined by the socio-structural approach. According to this approach, 
a cleavage is a socio-structural division between people. It underpins voters’ interests 
and demands, and therefore is a site of political conflict. The clearest and most 
inclusive definition can be found in Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) discussion, which 
argues that a cleavage has three aspects. Firstly, it involves a social division that 
separates people who can be distinguished from each other through key social-
structural characteristics. Secondly, the group involved in this division must be aware 
of its collective identity and be willing to act on its basis. Thirdly, every cleavage is 
expressed by particular institutions and organisations. Only when these three divides 
– structural, attitudinal and institutional – exist can one speak of what Deegan-Krause 
(2006:540) called a “full cleavage”. (For similar definitions, see (Elff, 2007:278; 
Franklin, et al., 1992:5; Knutsen, 2004:2); for a discussion of the necessity of each of 
the three conditions, the reader is referred to (Deegan-Krause, 2006; Zuckerman, 
1975:237-8). 
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This chapter focuses on the status of the two most dominant cleavages – those of class 
and religion – and poses two questions:  
 
• Which cleavage has shown stronger voter alignment? And  
• Has the voter alignment with either of these cleavages persisted over time?  
 
Most other research on voter alignments along class and religious cleavages has used 
survey data, neglecting the usage of aggregate data. This study addresses this 
deficiency by discussing patterns of party support based on individual-level data, and 
by scrutinising the election results for party families or blocs of parties that represent 
these cleavages.  
 
The use of election results facilitates the recognition and examination of cross-
national patterns of voter alignments along cleavages over long periods of time, which 
research based on survey data is not always capable of doing. The strength of 
cleavages is tested by measuring the proportion of Bloc Volatility (BV) in the Total 
Volatility (TV), or the Cleavage Salience (CS) index (for an explanation of the index, 
see Appendix A). In this chapter, I examine the cleavages’ strength by employing a 
modified index – the Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience Index (WCS) – that controls 
for electoral support of the blocs of parties that represent each cleavage in the political 
system (BES). In this way, this study extends, updates and amends Bartolini and 
Mair’s (1990) study, which securitised the existence of an alignment along the class 
cleavage by employing the Cleavage Salience index (CS).  
 
Last but not least, this chapter includes the empirical results of voter alignments along 
the class and religious cleavages. It does so for the eleven party systems under 
investigation in this research, over the alignment period (1950-mid 1960s), and 
considers the persistence of these alignments from mid 1960 until 2010. The 
empirical research is based on individual-level data (i.e. national election surveys) and 
aggregate data (i.e. official national election results). 
 
This chapter begins by outlining the empirical debate over class and religion as salient 
cleavages and the later debate over the persistence of voter alignments along these 
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two cleavages. It then discusses the drawbacks of existing approaches in the literature 
for studying class- and religiously-driven voting. It concludes by recommending the 
use of a modified index in the study of cleavages (the WCS), and publishes and 
discusses the results of this thesis’s empirical study. 
 
6.1 Debates over Cleavage Salience and the Stability of Voter Alignments along 
the Class and Religious Cleavages 
 
After the identification of the crucial role of socio-structural cleavages in explaining 
stable patterns of party choice and party system structure, a discussion arose about 
which cleavage is the most influential in this respect. While scholars such as Lipset 
(1981) and Alford (1963) asserted that the owner-industrial (class) cleavage is the 
most important, others found that the state-church (religious) division, rather than 
class, is “the main social basis of parties in the Western world today” (Rose & Urwin, 
1969:12). This dispute was well summed up in Lijphart’s (1979:443) article: 
“[r]eligion and social class have been recognized as prime determinants of party 
choice from the very beginning of comparative voting behaviour research, but no 
consensus has emerged about which of the two variables is the better predictor” 
(italics in original). 
 
In both early (Dogan, 1995:526-7; Rose, 1974:14) and more recent research (Dalton, 
1996; Evans, 2000:404; Knutsen, 2004:82, 232), scholars have found that the 
predominant religion in each country is a crucial factor in identifying the cleavage 
most influential on voting behaviour. While the class cleavage is found to be more 
important in predominantly Protestant countries (such as Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries), in predominantly Catholic and in mixed countries (such as France, Italy, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland), the influence of 
religion on voting behaviour is much stronger. A somewhat different conclusion was 
presented by Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999:147-8), who showed that in countries with 
high religious and ethnic diversity the level of class voting is low, but that a high 
density of union members in a country is accompanied by a high level of class voting. 
 
Since the 1970s, however, new arguments have been put forward suggesting that the 
role of both these cleavages is in decline. Clark and Lipset (1991:404), who used the 
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Alford index1 to study five Western democratic countries over the period 1947-1986, 
claimed that “the Alford index has declined in every country.” Ingelhart (1977:216) 
stated that “religious issues have faded in intensity during the twentieth century.” 
Dogan (1995:536) argued that since the 1960s the importance of the two cleavages 
has been in parallel decline, and Gallagher, et al., (2006:283), who studied the issue 
for the period 1950-1990s, found that “class and religion may now have less impact 
on voting behaviour.” Dalton (1996:171, 181), who examined the same period, 
identified a decline in class differences and predicted that although the religious 
cleavage is strongly related to partisan preferences, this division is expected to follow 
the same pattern of decline. According to Knutsen (2004:233), who investigated a 
more recent period (i.e. 1970-1997), “[t]he impact of the religious and class cleavages 
are, however, approaching each other in most countries because the cleavages that 
traditionally had the largest impact demonstrate the clearest sign of decline”; see also 
(Knutsen, 2006:182). On the basis of their research of twenty Western industrialised 
countries in the period 1945-1990, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999:147) argued that the 
decline of class voting is substantial and “the countries slowly converged into a 
situation where class was relatively unimportant to voting behaviour.” Evans 
(2000:412), however, held that it was only in Scandinavian countries during the 1960s 
that high levels of class voting declined to a level “more like those of other Western 
European societies.” In a similar fashion, Brooks, et al., (2006:110), who tested three 
cleavages (those of class, religion and gender) in five different Western democratic 
countries for the period 1970-1990s, showed that “[p]atterns of cleavage change tend 
to […] be specific to countries.” They found evidence of a decrease in class voting in 
Britain and Germany, and some indication of a similar decrease in the Netherlands 
and Australia. Further, they found evidence of a downturn in religious voting only in 
the Netherlands, while in the other countries, no monotonic patterns could be 
identified. 
 
As a result of these findings, two different scenarios of change have been proposed in 
the literature. The first assumes that since the 1970s, a realignment has occurred – i.e., 
that there has been a shift in the basis of party support away from the traditional 
cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, and towards new cleavages. As I 
                                                
1 Alford index measures the difference between the percentage of manual workers that voted for Left 
parties and percentage of non-manual workers that voted for these parties (Alford 1963:79-80). 
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discussed in Chapter Two, over the years several new cleavages have been proposed: 
the Materialist/Post-Materialist cleavage (Inglehart, 1977, 1987), the libertarian vs. 
authoritarian cleavage and the globalisation cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2008a). 
 
The second scenario proposed to explain voting patterns focuses on dealignment, 
suggesting that since the 1970s the connections between voters and political parties 
have diminished, but no alternative connections have formed (Curtice, 2002; Dalton, 
2000; Dalton, et al., 1984c; Dalton, et al., 2000; Dogan, 1995). Instead, this argument 
goes, voters began to vote according to other factors, such as issue voting or voting 
for a specific candidate (Dalton, 1996; Dalton, et al., 2000). In Manin’s words 
(1997:219), “[v]oters tend increasingly to vote for a person and no longer for a party 
or a platform”. 
 
Others, however, insist that the two cleavages of class and religion remain influential. 
On the basis of empirical research into the class cleavage between 1885 and 1985, 
Bartolini and Mair (1990:105) stated that this cleavage was, and still is, the most 
salient. Elff (2007:280-1), on the other hand, who examined seven European 
countries2 between 1975 and 2000, discovered that between 1995 and 2002 class 
impact on electoral behaviour has been in decline in some countries (France, Great 
Britain and Denmark), while the impact of church attendance has been almost stable. 
Only in France did Elff identify an unambiguous downward trend. 
 
6.2 Pitfalls in the Study of Voter Alignments Along the Class and Religious 
Cleavages: Its Drawbacks and an Alternative Approach 
 
There are two main traditions in the study of the class and religious cleavages and 
particularly their impact on voting behaviour, which focus on the voter alignment of 
different social groups. The first involves examining the association between voters’ 
socio-structural characteristics and their electoral behaviour based on individual-level 
data, i.e. surveys. This is the most common method of studying this subject, but it has 
several drawbacks. 
 
                                                
2 The countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and West 
Germany. 
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The main drawback of studying the influence of the class and religious cleavages is 
the fact that social-demographic and economic changes (such as socio-economic 
mobilisation, the development of the welfare state and the secularisation process) 
necessitate the use of different operational definitions for each of the cleavages over 
the years. Thus, for the religious cleavage several subdivisions are applied. The first is 
between different religious groups, for example between Catholic and Protestants, and 
the second is between religious and secular people (Knutsen, 2004:44; Lybeck, 
1985:107). The study of the class cleavage has seen more diverse subdivisions. Early 
research used a two-class schema between manual workers and all other classes, using 
the Alford index. Later research used the so-called Erikson/Goldthorpe’s class 
schema. This differentiates between several employee classes: those who are involved 
in a service relationship with their employers, and those whose employment 
relationships are essentially regulated by a labour contract. A service relationship is 
recognised for employees required to exercise delegated authority or specialised 
knowledge and expertise. All in all, the Erikson/Goldthorpe’s class schema 
distinguishes between six classes: the higher-level service class, the lower-level 
service class, routine non-manual workers, petty bourgeoisie, farmers and the working 
class (Knutsen, 2006:14-5).  
 
More recent research has identified a new middle class or what is called a “salatariat”, 
which consists primarily of salaried white-collar employees (Dalton, 1996:168-70). 
These important changes in the class structure have triggered a debate about patterns 
of political orientation and party support amongst the service class.  
 
Goldthorpe (1982:180) held that the service class constitutes “an essentially 
conservative element within modern society”, while others argued that the service 
class is divided. The ‘new class’ approach divides this class between the managers in 
administrative hierarchies, and professionals who exercise specialised knowledge, the 
latter being divided into technical experts (‘technocrats’) and social and cultural 
specialists (Kriesi, 1998; Kriesi, et al., 2008a :12-3). Knutsen (2005), for example, 
who studied eight West European countries,3 showed that public sector employees are 
more likely to support Left-wing parties and Greens than private sector employees, 
                                                
3 These are Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
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who tend to support non-Socialist parties, apart from the Christian Democrats; see 
also (Knutsen, 2001). Other scholars have stated that public sector workers (Kitschelt, 
1994:26-30) or socio-cultural service professionals (Kriesi, 1998) tend to be 
libertarians and support New-Left and Green parties. This, they argue, suggests that 
this last segment constitutes “a possible structural foundation” for new value 
cleavages – the Post-Materialist vs. Materialist cleavage, or the libertarian vs. 
authoritarian cleavage (Kriesi, 1998:171). It remains unclear if the study of class and 
sector voting supports traditional arguments of voter alignment along the class 
cleavage, or whether it indicates the decline of class voting and a realignment along a 
(new) cleavage. 
 
The second drawback of this tradition is the interpretation of indicators. As explained 
by Lane and Ersson (1999:63): “[c]hurch attendance is a sign of religious devoutness, 
but devoutness may imply different patterns of attendance in different churches.” 
Esmer and Pettersson (2007:492) even proposed that in many places, this can be 
interpreted as a social rather than a religious commitment.  Hence to interpret all 
indicators in the same way, without any differentiation, allows potential 
misinterpretation of voters’ religious commitment. For this reason, Manza and Wright 
(2003) distinguished between four separate religious cleavages: church attendance, 
doctrinal beliefs, denominational groups, and the local/contextual aspect of 
congregational membership.  
 
Yet another problem is this tradition’s reliance on surveys. Studying political 
behaviour on the basis of surveys means studying voting behaviour on the basis of 
respondents’ reports of their party support. This, however, is problematic, as studies 
have already shown: voting choice is often misreported, with respondents reporting 
support for the winning party (the so-called post-election “bandwagon”) (Traugott & 
Katosh, 1979; Weir, 1975; Wright, 1993).  
 
Moreover, there is a problem with availability of data. No survey data exist that 
covering the period before the 1960s, a period considered to have been less stable 
than the 1960s onwards. As a result, the study of patterns of voting behaviour along 
cleavages begins in a period that is also assumed to be the period of change. 
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In this investigation, I examine the influence of voter alignments along cleavages on 
party choice by studying this subject not the association between social-group 
affiliation and party vote, but rather this association’s “importance and weight within 
the general context of electoral behaviour of a given country and/or period” (Bartolini 
& Mair, 1990: 44-5).  
 
To this end, I have examined the electoral support for the party families or blocs of 
parties that represent the chosen cleavages. The study of party families – Social 
Democrats and Communist parties, and Christian Democratic parties – that represent 
the class and religious cleavages respectively, is based on an extensive number of 
criteria. In this way, I addressed the problem of using several different categories that 
require adaptation to accommodate socio-economic changes. In addition, the use of 
official election results assists in solving two additional issues related to the study of 
surveys. Firstly, as explained in Chapter Four, the patterns of party support were 
corrected by using political probability weight variables (computed according to the 
official election results) to ‘correct’ the patterns of (frequencies of) party support. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, this study makes use of two types of datasets: surveys 
and official election results. The latter functions as the reference line for a period not 
covered by the survey datasets, and also as the main data source for cases for which 
national data surveys are not available. 
 
This study of alignment along cleavage based on patterns of electoral support for 
blocs or groups of parties based on aggregate data, i.e. election results, is not new in 
the literature. Rose and Urwin (1970) conducted similar research when they tested the 
change of electoral support for party families (the working class and middle class 
parties). In more recent research, Bartolini and Mair (1990) examined the strength of 
alignment along the class cleavage regarding the cleavage’s closure of electoral 
mobility. They suggested that the cleavage’s strength can be measured by “the 
amount of electoral interchange occurring across the line which divides parties which 
represent the opposite side of a cleavage” (Bartolini & Mair, 1990:41) (italics in 
original). This is achieved by using the Cleavage Salience index (CS), obtained by 
measuring the proportion of Bloc Volatility index (BV) (which measures volatility 
between blocs of parties instead of between individual parties) of the Total Volatility 
(TV) (BV/TV*100) (see Appendix A for supplementary explanations of these 
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indices). According to Bartolini and Mair, using the CS index as an index for the 
strength of alignment facilitates the estimation of the proportion of electoral 
interchange across the cleavage line from within the amount of interchange in the 
system as a whole, at any point in time. 
 
6.3 Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
This research uses the CS index to study the subject of voter alignments along the 
class and religious cleavages. It is novel in four respects. Firstly, this study examines 
both the class and the religious cleavages, while Bartolini and Mair studied only one 
cleavage type (class). It is not sufficient to study cleavage relevance by analysing only 
one cleavage, making no comparison to any other cleavages, especially not in the 
context of the discussion of the dominance of the class and religious cleavages 
(mentioned above). Secondly, this investigation extends and updates Bartolini and 
Mair’s study, which covers a period ending in 1985. Thirdly, the data used to 
calculate CS values for each election year is not only based on election results (as in 
Bartolini and Mair’s research), but also on individual-level data (where available). 
Fourthly, and most importantly, this research employs a modified index by adding 
another component – the electoral success of the various party blocs – to Bartolini and 
Mair’s CS index. 
 
Another component has been added to the CS index to address its shortcoming. 
Bartolini and Mair (1990:41) assumed that “[t]he stronger the cleavage, therefore, the 
less frequent is the exchange of votes across the dividing line.” Following this logic, 
the most salient cleavage is the cleavage with the lowest CS values. The weakness of 
the CS index is that it entirely based on TV and BV measures that do not take into 
account the actual, absolute level of electoral support for the cleavage bloc parties. 
Consequently, when a bloc of parties representing one side of a cleavage is composed 
of only marginal or small parties, the CS values of this cleavage may be low, not only 
due to the low proportion of voters who cross the cleavage line but also because of the 
low electoral support for these parties in the first place. Likewise, when the bloc 
includes parties that gain a high proportion of electoral support, the value of the CS 
index might be high. The explanation for this problem is the BV values’ variance 
range. When marginal or small parties represent the cleavage in question the range of 
! Chapter 6 
 
 114
variance of BV values is also small. The range of variance of BV values is large when 
a cleavage is represented by a bloc of parties that received high electoral support.  
 
Table 6.1 demonstrates this problem. In the first case, the cleavage parties are large 
and the increase in support for this cleavage will lead to a CS value of 20, suggesting 
a fairly strong cleavage. In the second case, the cleavage is represented only by small 
parties, but the CS index again reaches 20, indicating a cleavage of similar strength to 
the first example, even though the already low electoral support for these parties 
decreased further to half of its previous size! Intuitively, it is obvious that the first 
cleavage should have much more salience or strength than the second cleavage. 
 
Table 6.1: Calculation of Cleavage Salience measures 
  Election 1 Election 2 Index 
     
Cleavage 1 Cleavage Party Bloc 1 (A) 30 32 +2 
 Opposite Party Bloc 1 (B) 70 68 -2 
    
 Bloc Volatility (BV) (|!A|+|!B|)/2 2 
 Total Volatility (TV)   10 
 Cleavage Salience (CS) (BV/TV)*100 20 
     
 Bloc Electoral Support (BES)   32 
 Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience (WCS) (1-[BV/TV])*BES 25.6 
     
     
Cleavage 2 Cleavage Party Bloc 2 (A) 4 2 +2 
 Opposite Party Bloc 2 (B) 96 98 -2 
    
 Bloc Volatility (BV) (|!A|+|!B|)/2 2 
 Total Volatility (TV)   10 
 Cleavage Salience (CS) (BV/TV)*100 20 
     
 Bloc Electoral Support (BES)   2 
 Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience (WCS) (1-[BV/TV])*BES 1.6 
     
Note: Lower CS values and higher WCS values indicate higher cleavage salience. 
 
This problem has its roots in an oversight of the CS index regarding parties’ electoral 
support. It is now clear that the CS index is missing an essential component – the 
proportional electoral support of the cleavage (Bloc Electoral Support, BES) that was 
gained by parties that represent this cleavage.  
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To solve this problem, I modified the CS index and together with Dr. Michael F. 
Meffert, I developed a modified index. First, we weight (or ‘correct’) the CS index 
values by the relevant Bloc Electoral Support (BES) for the cleavage parties, defined 
as the electoral support for the cleavage bloc parties in the election of interest. For 
each time-point or election year, the original CS index is simply multiplied by the 
BES of the respective bloc of parties in that election. Because the directions (of 
‘strength’) of the CS and the BES are opposite, a second adjustment is necessary. The 
second modification is a reversal of the original CS scale in order to make the 
interpretation of the CS values more intuitive: higher values should reflect a higher 
salience or strength. Formally, we simply subtract the CS score (BV divided by TV) 
as a fraction from 1. The latter value is then multiplied by the BES value. The WCS 
index can range between 0 (low cleavage strength) to 100 (high cleavage salience).  
The formula of the Bloc -Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) is: 
 
 
 
Low values of WCS indicate low cleavage strength, that is, high volatility across the 
cleavage line and/or low electoral support for the cleavage parties. High values, on the 
other hand, indicate high cleavage salience due to low volatility across the cleavage 
line and/or high electoral support for the cleavage parties. When we employed the 
WCS for the theoretical example, we received better results: the WCS for the first 
cleavage is 25.6 and for the second cleavage only 1.6, suggesting that the first 
cleavage is more salient than the second cleavage. 
  
The empirical study of this research consists of two stages. For the period 1950-1964 
(a period which is generally agreed to have been a stable period), I test which of the 
two cleavages – class or religion – influenced voters the most; that is, I seek to 
identify the cleavage with the strongest voter alignment. On the basis of the earlier 
findings mentioned above, I expect the alignment along the class cleavage to have 
more influence and to be stronger in the predominantly Protestant countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), and the alignment along the religious 
cleavage to have more influence and to be stronger in predominantly Catholic or 
mixed countries (Austria, Belgium – in this research, Flanders and Wallonia, Italy, 
100BES
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Germany, Luxemburg, 4  and the Netherlands), thus leading to the following 
hypotheses:  
 
H1: For the predominantly Protestant countries during the period 1950-64, voter 
alignment along the class cleavage will be found to be stronger than voter alignment 
along the religious cleavage. 
 
H2: For predominantly Catholic or mixed countries during the period 1950-64, voter 
alignment along the religious cleavage will be found to be stronger than voter 
alignment along the class cleavage. 
 
The strength of voter alignment is determined by the WCS index: the bigger its value, 
the stronger the alignment along a specified cleavage. 
 
In the second stage, I test the persistence of voter alignment along the dominant 
cleavage over time. A change of voter alignments along these two cleavages can take 
several forms. The first scenario is a switch between the dominant and the weaker 
cleavage, or, a realignment along the dominant [class or religious] cleavage. This 
scenario was described as follows in Schattschneider’s volume (1960:65):  
 
“A shift from the alignment AB [the old cleavage] to alignment CD [the new 
cleavage] means that old cleavage must be played down if the new conflict is to be 
exploited. […] The new conflict can become dominant only if the old one is 
subordinated, or obscured, or forgotten, or loses its capacity to excite the contestants, 
or becomes irrelevant.” (italics added). 
 
When expressing cleavage salience in terms of WCS, I expect to identify a new voter 
alignment when the cleavage that was less important in the previous period (that with 
lower WCS values) has become the dominant cleavage (that with higher WCS values) 
over this period (a period of at least ten years and over at least three successive 
elections). Alternatively, a new voter alignment can be created when the alignment 
                                                
4 Luxemburg is not explicitly studied in either of these investigations, but is assigned to this group 
since it is a pre-dominantly Catholic country (International Religious Freedom Report (2004) 
(www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35469.htm). 
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along the less important cleavage also becomes strong. In this scenario, the WCS 
values for the two cleavages will be found to be equal, if the WCS values of the 
dominant cleavage are not lower than those measured in the previous period and this 
situation remains durable and persistent for a period of at least ten years and over at 
least three successive elections. 
 
H3: A voter realignment occurred and a new alignment appeared during the period 
1965-2010: the voter alignment along the cleavage found to be weaker in the first 
period will strengthen so as to become more dominant than the other cleavage, or at 
least at the same level as it for a substantial period.  
 
The second scenario is a weakening voter alignment along the dominant cleavage; 
this is considered to be a dealignment along either the class or religious cleavage. In 
this scenario I expect that the voter alignment along the dominant cleavage will 
become weaker than in the first period, and that no strong alternative voter alignment 
will emerge.  
 
H4: A voter dealignment occurred during the period 1965-2010, where the dominant 
voter alignment loses its strength and the voter alignment along the other cleavage is 
not found to be dominant. 
 
A period of voter dealignment is identified when the WCS values of the dominant 
cleavage drop below those measured in the first period; the WCS values may even be 
equal for the two cleavages. This situation should remain for at least ten years and 
over at least three successive elections. 
 
In the final scenario, the voter alignment along the cleavage that was found to be 
dominant in the first period continues its dominance; no changes occur. 
 
H5: No change occurred during the period 1965-2010: the voter alignment of the 
cleavage found to be stronger in the first period holds its dominance for the entire 
period.  
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A persistence of voter alignment is identified when the cleavage with high WCS 
values displays equally high or higher values than in the first period.  
 
These five different theoretical scenarios are presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The five different theoretical scenarios of voter alignment along a cleavage 
 
 
 
The dominance of a cleavage and the scenario involving a switch or shift (i.e. 
realignment) are tested by comparing the WCS values of both cleavages.  
  
The scenario involving the erosion of voter alignment along a cleavage (i.e. 
dealignment) is examined by employing two methods. One is a comparison test, in 
which I consider the WCS levels of the dominant cleavage over the first period as a 
reference line, equal to the average score minus one standard deviation. The WCS 
value for each cleavage in each election year is compared to this reference line. If a 
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weakening of the voter alignment along this cleavage occurs during the period after 
1965, the WCS values should be lower than this reference line.  
 
The second method incorporates an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for each case, in 
which the WCS values for the dominant cleavage are the dependent variable and the 
independent variable is a dummy variable of two periods of ‘stability’ and ‘change’. 
For each election year from 1965 onwards, the time variable was assigned score 0 for 
all time-points up to this election, and 1 for that election and for all time-points 
afterward. For each election year from 1965 onwards, the time variable scored 0 for 
all values up to this election, 1 for that and all subsequent elections, (model of moving 
time frames or a moving t-test, which is commonly employed in disciplines with 
repeated measurement over time such as meteorology or geology). Since the 
observations are not independent from each other, I used an ANOVA model, which 
assumes repeated measurements and does not assume that all the treatment 
populations have the same variance (homogeneity of variance). 
 
If a weakening of the voter alignment along this cleavage occurs during the time 
period since 1965, the ANOVA coefficient should be negative and statistically 
significant. This should be found in at least two successive elections. 
 
I emphasise, however, that since the subject of this research is cleavages as reflected 
by electoral support for different party families, conclusions can be drawn only about 
voter alignment along the class and religious cleavages, and not regarding changes 
relating to any other cleavage. In addition, the different scenarios of voter 
re/dealignments along cleavages are not equivalent to the terms ‘class realignment’ or 
‘class dealignment’ (Evans, 1999); see also (Crewe, 1983; Knutsen, 2007); both these 
concepts imply a change in the socio-structural characteristics of those voting for 
class parties with no necessary implications in electoral terms (i.e. party support).  
 
6.4 Results 
 
Strength of voter alignments along cleavages: Hypotheses 1 and 2 
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The first aim was to identify which cleavage had more influence on the electorate in 
each country between 1950 and 1964. According to Hypothesis 1, I expected that in 
the predominantly Protestant countries, the levels of WCS for the class cleavage 
would be higher than those for the religious cleavage. 
 
Table 6.2 presents a comparison of the WCS values of the two cleavages in three 
Scandinavian countries, based on official election results. Survey data for this period 
is available only for Sweden.  
 
In Denmark between 1950 and 1969, no religious party participated in elections. 
Therefore, a comparison of the two cleavages is irrelevant, as no party represents the 
religious cleavage in this time period.  
 
Table 6.2: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the 
class and religious cleavages in the predominantly Protestant 
countries, 1950–64 
 
 WCS Mean s.d. period (N) 
Denmark class 27.88 14.97 1953-64 
(5) 
 
(aggregate 
data) 
 
religious - - 
Finland class 40.08 9.36 1954-62 
(3) (aggregate 
data) 
 
religious 0.30 0.37 
Norway class 50.01 0.65 1957-61 
(2) (aggregate 
data) 
 
religious 8.77 0.99 
Sweden  class 37.84 16.60 1956-64 
(4) (aggregate 
data) 
 
religious 0.26 0.52 
Sweden  
(individual-
level  data) 
class 34.12 1.13 1960-64 
(2) 
religious 1.39 - 1964 (1) 
 
Table 6.2 reveals that during the period between the mid 1950s and the mid 1960s, the 
average of the WCS values for the class cleavage is higher than for the religious 
cleavage in all three predominantly Protestant countries. Figures 6.2 and 6.3, which 
depict the WCS values based on official election results and survey data 
(respectively) for both cleavages, confirm these trends. They show that in the three 
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predominantly Protestant countries, the WCS values for the class cleavage were 
higher than those for the religious cleavage in all time-points between 1950 and 1964. 
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                               Figure 6.2: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) in Protestant countries, based on aggregate data 
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Figure 6.3: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) in Protestant countries, based on individual-level data 
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With regards to H2, I expected that in predominantly Catholic or mixed countries the 
WCS average values for the religious cleavage would be higher than those for the 
class cleavage. The WCS mean values for the two cleavages in predominantly 
Catholic or mixed countries between 1950 and 1964 (based on official election 
results) are compared in Table 6.3. Individual-level data is not available. 
 
Table 6.3: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the 
class and religious cleavages in predominantly Catholic or mixed 
countries, 1950–64, based on aggregate data 
 
 WCS mean  s.d. period 
(N) 
Austria class 34.75 14.23 1956-
62 (3) 
 
 religious 11.52 4.60 
Flanders class 18.82 8.14 1954-
61 (3) 
 
 religious 3.25 3.11 
Germany class 21.20 - 1961 
(1) 
 
 religious 30.05 - 
Italy class 29.24 5.45 1958-
63 (2) 
 
 religious 25.13 7.73 
Luxembourg class 29.76 9.06 1954-
64 (3) 
 
 religious 22.38 10.29 
the Netherlands class 20.90 6.77 1956-
63 (3) 
 
 religious 41.24 9.45 
Wallonia class 26.64 13.83 1954-
61 (3)  religious 3.98 3.58 
 
I received mixed results for the first period. Only in two countries – Germany and the 
Netherlands – was the data consistent with my expectations, namely the WCS mean 
values for the religious cleavage were higher than that for class. Figure 6.4 (which 
presents the WCS values in Catholic and mixed countries based on aggregate data) 
shows that the WCS values for the religious cleavage were higher than for class in the 
1961 German election (the only election in this period, as I excluded the 1953 election 
from my dataset: see Chapter Four on data and methodology) and in all three Dutch 
elections during this period.  
 
Austria, and the two sub-national Belgian party systems – Flanders and Wallonia – 
reveal an opposite pattern. In these three cases, the WCS values for the class cleavage 
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were higher than the values for the religious cleavage over all periods, as is shown in 
Figure 6.4. The differences between the average values, listed in Table 6.3, are high – 
23.23, 15.57 and 22.66 points difference respectively.  
 
In Italy the WCS values for the class cleavage were higher than those for the religious 
cleavage, but there is only 4.11 points difference between the mean values, indicating 
that the WCS values for the two cleavages were very close. 
 
In Luxembourg, too, I found an interesting situation. In the first and the third elections 
(1954 and 1964) the WCS values for the religious cleavage were a bit higher than 
those for the class cleavage. However, in the 1959 election, the WCS score for the 
class cleavage was much higher than for the religious cleavage. Moreover, the 
average of WCS levels for the two cleavages is close, (7.38 point of difference 
respectively). 
 
Overall, then, in the predominantly Protestant countries as well in three 
predominantly Catholic party systems – Austria, Flanders and Wallonia – the WCS 
values for the class cleavage were much higher than those for the religious cleavage. 
This indicates that between 1950 and 1964 voter alignment along the class cleavage 
was stronger than voter alignment along the religious cleavage. Voter alignment along 
the religious cleavage was stronger during this period in the Netherlands and in the 
1961 German election, as the WCS values for the religious cleavage were higher than 
those for the class cleavage. For the other two predominantly Catholic countries, Italy 
and Luxembourg, the WCS values for the two cleavages were very close, suggesting 
that voter alignments along the two cleavages were equally strong for both divisions 
from 1950 to 1964. 
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                  Figure 6.4: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) in Catholic and mixed countries, based on aggregate data 
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                    Figure 6.5: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) in Catholic and mixed countries, based on individual-level data 
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Persistence of voter alignments along the class and religious cleavages within 
countries over time: Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 
  
The next question is: are we able to identify a realignment and a new voter alignment 
or a voter dealignments along the cleavages from 1965? 
 
I begin my analysis by comparing the WCS values for the two cleavages in 
predominantly Catholic and mixed countries, for which I found mixed results in the 
first period. In three cases – Austria, Flanders and Wallonia – the WCS values for the 
class cleavage were higher than for the religious cleavage. In two cases  – Italy and 
Luxembourg – the WCS values for the two cleavages were found to be at the same 
levels: no statistically significant difference between them was found. Germany and 
the Netherlands were the only cases for which the WCS values for the religious 
cleavage were higher than for class over the first period. 
 
Figures 6.4 & 6.5 present the WCS values over the selected years, based on aggregate 
and individual-level data respectively. They indicate that in none of the three polities 
in which one cleavage (class or religious) was found to be dominant over the first 
period – Austria, Flanders, Germany, the Netherlands and Wallonia – did the less 
important cleavage have higher WCS values than the other cleavage in the previous 
period. On the contrary, the two figures show fluctuation in the cleavage with the 
highest WCS. This fluctuation began in Austria with the 1975 election, in the 
Netherlands with the 1977 election (based on aggregate data) or with the 1986 
election (based on individual-level data), in Germany with the 1976 election (based 
on aggregate data) or with the 1987 election (based on individual-level data) and in 
Flanders between the 1965 and 1987 elections. In Wallonia the WCS values for the 
religious cleavage were slightly higher than for the class cleavage in the 1968 and 
1974 elections; the differences are only 3.18 and 3.78 points. Nevertheless, the 
fluctuation period began with the 1987 election. 
 
For all these cases except Flanders, this fluctuation, however, does not indicate that 
voter alignment along the less important cleavage became stronger, as the scenario of 
realignment suggests. Rather, the comparison test (presented in Figures 6.6-6.8) and 
the ANOVA model results (presented in Table 6.4) demonstrate that during or slightly 
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before this period of fluctuation, the WCS values of the dominant cleavage lowered 
from those measured in the first period, as is expected in period of voter dealignment.  
 
Table 6.4: ANOVA models for Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the 
dominant cleavage, in periods of ‘stability’ and ‘change’ 
 
 Dominant 
cleavage 
 1st election year 2nd election year 
Austria Class election year 1970 1971 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
36.23 (11.98)       33.58(11.95) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
21.07 (10.08)     20.91 (10.51)      
  ANOVA F(1,4.4)=5.26*    F(1,6.74)=4.25*       
  AIC 120.9 122.3 
  BIC 122.5 123.9 
  period (time-points)          1956-2008 (17) 
Denmark Class election year 2001 2005 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
31.91 (10.84)      31.01 (11.28) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
18.90 (4.67) 21.35 (2.78) 
  ANOVA F( 1,6.34)=12.57**       F(1,6.12)=9.12** 
  AIC 156.8 158.6 
  BIC 158.9 160.8 
  period (time-points)          1953-2007 (22) 
Finland Class election year 1966 1970 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
40.08 (9.35) 34.44 (13.61) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
23.21 (10.46)    23.73 (10.81)   
  ANOVA F(1,3.39)=7.43*        F(1,4.46)=2.02       
  AIC 105.1 108.0 
  BIC 106.5 109.4 
  period (time-points)          1954-2007 (15) 
Flanders Class election year 1985 1987 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
18.40 (5.02)   18.33 (4.77) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
13.28 (5.50)  12.67 (5.64) 
  ANOVA F(1,14.4)=4.16* F(1,11.3)=4.85**      
  AIC 106.7 105.7 
  BIC 108.5 107.5 
  period (time-points)          1954-2010 (18) 
Italy (1st & 2nd 
republics) 
Religious election year 1976 1979 
 stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
30.46 (7.66)  29.08 (7.32)  
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
14.88 (11.46) 13.91 (11.72) 
  ANOVA F(1,8.5)=8.73**    F(1,11.7)=8.86**       
  AIC 97.9 97.2 
  BIC 99.1 98.4 
  period (time-points)          1958-2008 (14) 
Italy (1st & 2nd 
republics) 
Class election year 1983 1987 
 stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
  35.34 (6.79) 36.17 (6.57) 
  change period Mean 25.73 (11.63) 23.53 (10.61) 
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(s.d.) 
  ANOVA F(1,11.5)=3.76*  F(1,10)=7.18** 
  AIC 95.4 92.9 
  BIC 96.7 94.2 
  period (time-points)          1958-2008 (14) 
Luxembourg Class election year 1979 1984 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
32.97 (8.07)  29.17 (11.77) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
21.07 (7.41)  22.88 (6.18) 
  ANOVA F(1,8.27)=6.79**    F(1,7.57)=1.34        
  AIC 76.7 78.8 
  BIC 77.6 79.8 
  period (time-points)          1954-2009 (12) 
the Netherlands Religious election year 1967 1971 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
41.24 (9.45)   37.43 (10.84) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
24.76 (7.99)    24.66 (8.31) 
  ANOVA F(1,2.65)=7.91*      F(1,4.15)=4.71*       
  AIC 113.3 115.6 
  BIC 115.0 117.3 
  period (time-points)          1956-2010 (17) 
Norway Class election year 1965 1969 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
50.01 (0.65) 47.63 (4.15) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
36.43 (9.12) 35.84 (9.33) 
  ANOVA F(1,11.6)=25.84***       F(1,8.19)=10.18**    
  AIC 89.0 91.9 
  BIC 90.3 93.2 
  period (time-points)          1957-2009 (14) 
Sweden 
(based on  
aggregate data) 
Class election year 1991 1994 
 stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
38.33 (10.36) 36.62 (11.68) 
 change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
25.75 (13.84) 27.68 (14.54)  
  ANOVA F(1,7.91)=3.87*    F(1,6.1)=1.51     
  AIC 131.4 134.0 
  BIC 133.2 135.8 
  period (time-points)          1956-2010 (18) 
Wallonia Class election year 1987 1991 
  stability period Mean 
(s.d.) 
25.52 (9.66)  24.90 (9.47) 
  change period Mean 
(s.d.) 
14.26 (4.83)  13.51 (5.00) 
  ANOVA F(1,15)=10.26** F(1,13.7)=10.39**      
  AIC 119.9 113.0 
  BIC 113.5 114.7 
  period (time-points)          1954-2010 (18) 
*p!0.1, ** p!0.05, *** p!0.01 (in two-tailed) 
Note: The time variable was scored 0 for all time points up to this election, 1 for that election and for 
all time-points afterward. This table presents only the results for the first two elections, which are 
statistically significant in each case. 
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  Figure 6.6: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the class cleavage in comparison to the reference line, based on aggregate data 
 
Note: the reference line is the average WCS level between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard deviation 
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Figure 6.7: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the religious cleavage in comparison to the reference line, based on aggregate data 
 
Note: the reference line is the average WCS level between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard deviation 
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Figure 6.8: Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) for the class cleavage in 
comparison to the reference line, for Sweden, based on individual-level data 
 
Note: the reference line is the average WCS level between 1950 and 1964 minus one standard 
deviation 
 
In Austria, WCS values for the dominant cleavage – the class cleavage – were lower 
than those found in the alignment period. This includes the first period (1950-1964) 
and the period from the 1970 election onwards, with some exceptions – the 1975, 
1983-1986 and 1995-1999 elections (see in Figure 6.6). However, Figure 6.4 indicates 
that at these exact time-points, the religious cleavage had higher WCS values than the 
class cleavage, which suggests that at these time-points, voter alignment along the 
religious cleavage was stronger than voter alignment along the class cleavage. Table 
6.4, which presents the ANOVA coefficients for the two periods of ‘stability’ and 
‘change’, provides statistical support for this change. The ANOVA model coefficient 
for the WCS of class cleavage in the 1970 and 1971 elections is statistically 
significant, indicating that the average WCS value for the period from the 1970 
election onwards is significantly lower than the average for the previous elections. In 
summary, there was a decrease in the WCS values for the class cleavage from 1970 
onwards. 
 
In the case of Wallonia, the ANOVA model suggests that the average WCS value for 
the period from 1987 onwards are significantly lower than the average value for the 
earlier period, as the ANOVA coefficient in the 1987 and 1991 elections are 
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statistically significant. The comparison test, however, indicates that the WCS values 
are below the reference line only in the last two elections (2007 and 2010). However, 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates that based on the aggregate data, in the 1987-1995 elections 
the WCS values for the class cleavage were already much lower than those for the 
religious cleavage. 
 
Weakening of voter alignment along the strongest cleavage also occurred in the 
Netherlands, where the religious cleavage is found to be dominant during the first 
period. Figure 6.7 reveals that the WCS values for the religious cleavage were below 
the reference line from the 1967 election onwards, apart from the 1977 and 1981 
elections. Even for these two elections, the two datasets suggest that the WCS levels 
for both cleavages were at almost the same level (as can be seen in Figures 6.4 & 6.5): 
the individual-level dataset indicates that in the 1977 election the difference between 
the two WCS values is only 0.47 point difference, and the aggregate dataset 
demonstrates that in the 1981 election the difference is only 1.26 point difference.   
 
The second method – the ANOVA model – supports this finding, as the model 
coefficient in the 1967 election and in the following election of 1971 is statistically 
significant. This suggests that in average the WCS values for the religious cleavage 
have been lower from 1967 onwards than those for the period 1950-1964.  
 
For Germany, I uncovered intriguing results.5 The comparison test indicates that the 
WCS values for the religious cleavage only in some of the elections – 1976, 1980, 
1987, 1998 and 2002 – were much smaller than the WCS value in the 1961 election. 
The smallest difference with the reference line is 10.66 points difference (in the 2002 
election), and the biggest difference is 28.8 points difference (in the 1976 election).  
 
In addition, the official election results dataset suggests that the religious cleavage lost 
its dominant position in the 1976 and 1980 elections and again in the 1987 and 1998-
2005 elections, when the WCS values for the class cleavage were found to be higher 
than those for the religious cleavage. The national survey dataset, by contrast, 
indicates that for the period between 1976 and 1983 the WCS values for the religious 
                                                
5 I did not run an ANOVA model on the German dataset, due to a very short period of ‘stability’ (i.e. 
one election year). 
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cleavage were higher than those for the class cleavage. This datasets indicates that 
only from the 1987 election onwards did a fluctuation in the cleavage with the highest 
WCS value begin. This is confirmed by the almost identical mean values (class 
Mean=19.45, religious Mean=19.88), and Sign test (N=7, p=1.00). These last findings 
demonstrate that from 1987 onwards the WCS values of the religious cleavage 
decreased, according to both datasets. 
 
Flanders is an exception, however. In this case I found that the WCS values for the 
religious cleavage have increased from 1965 onwards. Between 1965 and 1987 there 
was a fluctuation in the cleavage with the highest WCS and then, from the 1991 
election until the 2007 election, the WCS values for the religious cleavage were much 
higher than those for the class cleavage (based on both sorts of data, as is shown by 
Figures 6.4 & 6.5). The comparison test for the religious cleavage demonstrates that 
over the whole period, the WCS values for this cleavage are much higher than the 
reference line, with the exception of the last election (2010). In addition, none of the 
ANOVA coefficients indicate that the WCS values were significantly lower in any 
split between two periods. On the other hand, the ANOVA model affirms the decrease 
of the WCS values for the class cleavage. In the 1985 and 1987 elections the average 
WCS score for the period of ‘change’ is lower than for the period of ‘stability’ and the 
ANOVA model coefficient is statistically significant. All of this demonstrates that 
between 1965 and 1981, the WCS of the religious cleavage increased to the same 
level of the class cleavage, and from 1985 onwards the WCS values for the class 
cleavage declined while the WCS values for the religious cleavage remained high. 
 
I then examined the two cases wherein both cleavages were found to be equally 
salient over the first period – Luxembourg and Italy. In both polities, voter alignments 
along both cleavages eroded over time. 
 
In Luxembourg, the erosion of voter alignment along the class cleavage began with 
the 1979 election. The comparison test shows that in the 1979, 1989 and 1994 
elections the WCS values for the class cleavage were lower than the reference line. 
The ANOVA model suggests that since the 1979 election were the WCS values 
significantly lower than those of the previous years. In addition, when I compared the 
WCS values for both cleavages in each election year, I discovered that for the period 
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between 1979 and 1999, the WCS values for the religious cleavage were much higher 
than those for the class cleavage. Concerning voter alignment along the religious 
cleavage, the comparison test demonstrates that the WCS values for the religious 
cleavage were never lower than those of the first period, as all the values are above 
the reference line. Yet, as Figure 6.4 shows, in the 2004-2009 elections the WCS 
values for the religious cleavage were lower than those for the class cleavage, 
indicating that the religious cleavage lost its dominancy over the class cleavage from 
the 2004 election onwards.  
 
In the Italian case, the aggregate dataset and the individual-level data (with the 
exception of the last election) indicate that the WCS values for the class cleavage 
were continually higher than those for the religious cleavage over the whole period, in 
both the first and the second Italian Republics. However, the comparison test and the 
ANOVA model indicate that voter alignments along both cleavages – class and 
religious – weakened over time. 
 
As Figure 6.7 shows, the WCS values for the religious cleavage are below the 
reference line in the 1983 election and then from the 1994 election onwards (with the 
exception of the 2006 election). The ANOVA model indicates that from the election 
of 1976 onwards, the mean WCS values for the religious cleavage were significantly 
lower than those in the earlier years.  
 
Concerning the class cleavage, in the 1983 and 1987 elections the ANOVA 
coefficient for the class cleavage are statistically significant, yet the comparison test 
demonstrates that only from the 1994 election are the WCS values lower than the 
reference line. This indicates that only in the second Italian Republic did more voters 
cross the line of the class cleavage; from this point, Italian voter alignment along this 
cleavage erodes. 
 
I now turn to my analysis of the results for the predominantly Protestant countries, 
where the level of WCS values for the class cleavage were found to be lower than 
those for the religious cleavage during the first period. 
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The results for the four Scandinavian predominantly Protestant countries – Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden – are clear: over the entire period, the WCS values for 
the class cleavage were higher than those for the religious cleavage. This is true for all 
the time-points based on both datasets, as can be seen in Figures 6.2 & 6.3.  
 
The comparison test and the ANOVA model demonstrate that the erosion of voter 
alignment along the class cleavage had already begun in Finland and Norway in the 
mid 1960s. 
 
In both countries, the WCS values for the class cleavage are lower than the reference 
line in most of the election years since 1965. In Finland, there are a few exceptions, in 
which the WCS value is higher than the reference line. This is the case in the 1975 
and 1983 elections. Nevertheless, the ANOVA model confirms that the WCS values 
from the 1965 election onwards were lower than those in previous elections, as the 
model coefficient for the first two Norwegian elections is statistically significant. 
Concerning the Finnish case, the ANOVA coefficient is statistically significant only 
for the first election. This is probably due to the three deviate elections, which were 
identified by the comparison test. 
 
Concerning the Swedish case, the ANOVA coefficient only for the 1991 election 
(based on aggregate data) is statistically significant. The comparison test, however, 
suggests that the WCS values were lower than those measured in the first period. The 
timing is different between the two datasets. The WCS values produced by individual-
level data are already lower than the reference line in the elections between 1970-
1976, and then again in the 1994 and 2006 elections. However, for the test based on 
the aggregate data, the WCS values dip below the reference line slightly later, in the 
1991, 1994 and 2010 elections. All in all, the comparison test (based on the two types 
of datasets) together with the ANOVA model of the aggregate data suggest that the 
WCS values were lower than those in the previous elections from 1991 onwards. 
 
With regard to Denmark, Figure 6.6 shows that the WCS values for the class cleavage 
in Denmark over the second period are much higher than the reference line. In 
addition, none of the ANOVA models indicates on significant difference in mean ETP 
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between the two periods. Together with the results of the comparison test, this 
demonstrates that the WCS values did not decrease over the entire period. 
 
6.5 Voter Alignment, Realignment and Dealignment along the Class and 
Religious Cleavages: Discussion  
 
This chapter has examined stability and change of voter alignments along the class 
and religious cleavages, as measured by the Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index 
(WCS). The index computes Bloc Volatility as a fraction of Total Volatility (i.e. the 
Cleavage Salience index (CS) and also controls for the size of the bloc of parties. This 
facilitates the WCS to neutralise sensitivity to this component, which the original CS 
index fails to do. The WCS index is constructed in such a way that it renders high 
values if the alignment of a cleavage is strong. These high values are drawn from that 
fact that of all the voters who change their party support between two successive 
elections, few will choose to cross the dividing cleavage line and switch their support 
to a party on the other side of this line.  
 
This empirical research supports Hypothesis 1. Between 1950 and the mid 1960s in 
the predominantly Protestant countries, the WCS values for the class cleavage were 
much higher than those for the religious cleavage. This indicates that fewer voters 
crossed the divide between the class parties and the non-class parties, when compared 
with the estimation of voters who changed their electoral support between religious 
parties and non-religious parties or the other way around. This means that voter 
alignment along the class cleavage was stronger than alignment along the religious 
cleavage.  
 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that during the period between 1950 and the mid 1960s in 
predominantly Catholic or mixed countries, voter alignment along the religious 
cleavage was more dominant than alignment along the class cleavage. This hypothesis 
was verified only in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. In both cases, I found 
that the WCS values for the religious cleavage were higher than those for the class 
cleavage. For the other two cases – Italy and Luxembourg – the WCS values for the 
two cleavages the same, suggesting that voter alignments along both cleavages were 
equally strong. In the other three cases – Austria, Flanders and Wallonia – the results 
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contradicted my expectations. Surprisingly, I discovered that the WCS values for the 
class cleavage were higher than those for the religious cleavage. Based on this, I 
conclude that voter alignment along the class cleavage was stronger than alignment 
along the religious cleavage during this period.  
 
Examining the levels of WCS values for the class cleavage (between 1950 and 1964) 
in countries where this cleavage was the salient cleavage, reveals that the average 
values for predominantly Protestant countries are higher than those for predominantly 
Catholic and mixed countries. For the first group it ranges between 27.88 (in 
Denmark) and 50.01 (in Norway) and for the latter group only between 18.82 (in 
Flanders) and 34.75 (in Austria).  
 
Three rival hypotheses were tested using data from 1965 onwards. The first 
hypothesis posited a realignment: a switch of or a change in the dominant cleavage. 
The second hypothesis posited a dealignment: an erosion (or weakening) of the 
dominant cleavage without voter alignment along the other cleavage becoming 
stronger. The third hypothesis posited continuous voter alignment along the dominant 
cleavage. 
 
The data regarding the stability and change of voter alignments along the class and 
religious cleavages were fed to three tests – a comparison of the WCS values between 
the two cleavages in each election year, a comparison test of the WCS values in each 
election year against a reference line, and an ANOVA model (of WCS values split 
into two periods of ‘stability’ and ‘change’). The results are summarised in Table 6.5. 
This Table shows that a difference in the strength of voter alignment between the two 
groups of countries did not influence the persistence or change of alignments. In two 
predominantly Protestant countries – Finland and Norway –strong voter alignment 
along the class cleavage diminished from the mid 1960s onwards. In most of the 
predominantly Catholic and mixed countries, this alignment began to erode slightly 
later, in the 1970s-1980s. Yet, in two cases – Italy (a predominantly Catholic country) 
and Sweden (a predominantly Protestant country) – this erosion commenced only in 
the early 1990s. Interestingly, with the exception of the Netherlands, the weakening of 
voter alignment along the religious cleavage only began in the mid 1980s – much 
later than the class cleavage’s weakening. 
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Table 6.5: Stability and change of voter alignments along the class and 
religious cleavages 
 
Voter alignment along class or religious cleavage, in the period 1950-1964 
 Class Religious Class & 
Religious 
 Austria 
Denmark  
Finland 
Flanders 
Norway 
Sweden 
Wallonia 
Germany 
the Netherlands  
 
Italy 
Luxembourg  
 
Voter alignment, realignment (and a new alignment) or dealignment from 
1965 onwards 
 Class Religious Class & 
Religious 
 
 
Alignment 
 
Austria (until 
1970) 
Denmark (until 
2007) 
Flanders (until 
1985) 
Italy (until 1994)  
Sweden (until 
1991) 
Wallonia (until 
1987) 
Germany (until 
1987) 
Luxembourg 
(1979-2004) 
 
Italy (until 1983) 
Luxembourg 
(until 1979) 
 
Dealignment 
Austria (1970 
onwards) 
Finland (1966 
onwards) 
Flanders (1985 
onwards) 
Italy (1994 
onwards) 
Luxembourg 
(1979 onwards) 
Norway (1965 
onwards) 
Sweden (1991 
onwards) 
Wallonia (1987 
onwards) 
the Netherlands 
(1967 onwards) 
Germany (1987 
onwards) 
Italy (1983 
onwards) 
Luxembourg 
(2004 onwards) 
 
Realignment 
(and a new 
alignment) 
 Flanders (1965 
onwards) 
 
 
The erosion of voter alignment(s) along the dominant cleavage(s) was evident in most 
of the countries, regardless of which cleavage was dominant. Denmark and Flanders 
are the only exceptions here. The trend in Denmark suggests a continuity of alignment 
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along the class cleavage. A possible explanation for this is the electoral support of the 
new class – the white-collar strata (in particular public sector workers) for the Social-
Democratic parties. This explanation was supported by Kunsten (2005), who found 
that the Danish public sector (which is the largest European public sector, relatively) 
tends to vote for Left Socialist parties. Moreover, he discovered no significant 
differences between voters in the private and the public sectors regarding support of 
the Socialist-Democratic (SD) party; Kunsten explained that in Denmark, the former 
category is mainly employed in the services sector, rather than in the industry related 
spaces, as is the case in other European countries. 
 
In Flanders I uncovered a different process, i.e. voter alignment along the class 
cleavage in conjunction with a new alignment based on the religious cleavage, and 
later a dealignment from the class cleavage. Here, the strength of voter alignment 
along the religious cleavage, captured by the WCS index, has grown stronger than the 
class cleavage from the mid 1960s. This reveals a realignment phase – the party 
system has aligned along both cleavages since the mid 1960s. During mid 1980s, the 
WCS of the class cleavage decreased not only in comparison to the religious 
cleavage’s WCS value, but also in comparison to the overall WCS values measured in 
the first period. These changes indicate erosion or dealignment concerning the class 
cleavage, but not for the religious cleavage, which maintained its position, as is 
measured by the WCS index.  
 
The realignment that I identified only in the case of Flanders can be explained by the 
creation and institutionalisation of the sub-national party system. The new alignment 
along the religious cleavage, which emerged in the mid 1960s, occurred at the same 
period during which the Catholic Party (CVP/PSC) became the first Belgian party to 
split into two separate parties (in 1968). Both alignments were maintained during the 
period of party system establishment, when other Belgian parties – the Liberal party 
(PVV/PLP) and the Socialist party (BSP/PSB) – split (in 1971 and 1978 respectively). 
After the sub-national party system became institutionalised in the 1980s, erosion of 
the alignment along the class cleavage began, while the (new) alignment along the 
religious cleavage has remained strong.  
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6. 6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter shows that voter alignment along the class cleavage was stronger than or 
at least as strong as the alignment along the religious cleavage in almost all the 
studied countries, regardless of their dominant denomination. The only exceptions are 
Germany and the Netherlands, in which I have identified that voter alignment along 
the religious cleavage is stronger than that along the class cleavage.  
 
I also found that the religious distinction between Protestant countries and Catholic 
and mixed countries contributed to the strength of voter alignment along the class 
cleavage, as I discovered that the alignment along the class cleavage in predominantly 
Protestant countries was much stronger than in predominantly Catholic and mixed 
countries. These findings support Nieubeerta and Ultee’s (1999:136) argument that 
the Scandinavian countries (and the U.K.) had relatively high levels of class voting in 
the studied periods, when compared with other European countries.  
 
The level of voter alignment strength, however, is not helpful in predicting the point 
in time when voter alignment begins to erode. In some pre-dominantly Protestant 
countries the strong alignment along the class cleavage began diminishing in the mid 
1960s, while in predominantly Catholic and mixed countries this alignment eroded in 
the 1970s-mid 1980s. In two cases, drawn from both groups of countries, voter 
dealignment along the class cleavage did not commence until the early 1990s. The 
weakening of voter alignment along the religious cleavage occurred, by contrast, 
much later – from the mid 1980s. A possible explanation for this is that the salience of 
moral issues, including marriage and divorce, birth control, abortion, sex education, 
pornography and so on, has been “especially important since the late 1960s” 
(Lijphart, 1980:83); see also (Kriesi, et al., 2008a).    
 
The only cases in which alignments along the religious or class cleavages still persist 
are Denmark and Flanders. It seems likely that the persistence of the alignment along 
the class cleavage in Denmark can be explained by class-sector support. The 
establishment and institutionalisation of the sub-national party system in Flanders in 
the mid 1960s may account for its realignment along the religious cleavage. 
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Overall, I found that there has been a decline of alignment along the class cleavage, in 
contrast with Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) argument that the levels of Bloc Volatility 
of the class cleavage “offer strong confirmation of the freezing hypothesis” (Bartolini 
& Mair, 1990:101) (italics in original). I believe that these contradictory empirical 
findings are rooted in two explanations. Firstly, the time frames for each study 
differed. Secondly and more importantly, the methodology also differed. The 
employment of the WCS index allowed me to demonstrate that signs of the erosion of 
class-based voting were evident in some of the countries as early as the mid 1960s -
1970s. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
ALIGNMENT, REALIGNMENT, OR DEALIGNMENT IN TWO 
MANIFESTATIONS – A COMBINED ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Chapters Five and Six dealt with the issue of alignment in two of its manifestations. 
Chapter Five presented the socio-psychological approach and examined partisan 
alignment as articulated by patterns of partisanship, and Chapter Six presented the 
socio-structural approach and tested voter alignments along the class and religious 
cleavages. The combined research of these manifestations provides an up-to-date 
assessment of the phenomenon of alignment. In each of these chapters, I have 
examined patterns of alignment and its possible disappearance, either through shifts 
into a new alignment or through dealignment. Indeed, the division of the empirical 
analysis into two separate chapters, each examining one manifestation of alignment, 
has assisted in this study of the possibility (and timing) of changes in each 
alignment’s manifestations. However, the separation of the empirical research also 
conceals the broad picture of stability and change of alignment. Moreover, identifying 
a change in one or both manifestation(s) then raises the questions of how the 
realignment or dealignment process begins, how it develops over time, and what the 
possible links are between these processes and patterns of party system structure.  
 
Addressing these questions will provide empirical insights into the phenomena of 
realignment and dealignment in a multi-party system, and thus the basis for 
developing theoretical and conceptual knowledge of these two phenomena. This 
chapter combines the findings of the previous empirical chapters and analyses 
alignment as it is articulated simultaneously by both of the selected manifestations. It 
begins by raising the question of the durability of alignment in both manifestations. In 
order to identify a transition between the two manifestations of alignment, the 
occurrence of realignment and the shift into a dealignment across the manifestations 
is then discussed. Since in all the cases, apart from Denmark, signs of dealignment 
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were found in one or both manifestations, the chapter finishes by presenting models 
of the development of the dealignment process.  
 
7.1 Signs of Stability and Change of Partisan Alignment and Voter Alignment 
Along a Cleavage 
 
This research studies the phenomenon of alignment by examining its two 
manifestations. Chapter Five examined partisan alignment as articulated by patterns 
of party identification and stable party support. The latter was measured by trends in 
the proportions of voters who reported supporting the same party in two consecutive 
elections, based on individual-level data and its equivalent estimation - the Electoral 
Total Partisans (ETP), based on aggregate data (for an explanation of this index, see 
Appendix A). Chapter Six tested patterns of voter alignments along two socio-
structural cleavages – those of class and religion – the electoral closeness of which 
was measured by employing the Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) (for 
an explanation of this index, see Appendix A).  
 
Overall evidence for change is found through research into the two manifestations. 
Partisan dealignment was found in all cases except Luxembourg and Denmark. The 
transition into a situation of partisan dealignment occurred in two waves. The early 
and the major wave began in the mid 1960s and ended in the early 1970s, and 
included Finland (1970), Italy (1972), the Netherlands (1967), Norway (1973) and 
Wallonia (1965). The second, smaller wave occurred from the early 1980s to the early 
1990s, affecting Austria (1983), Flanders (1991), Germany (1990) and Sweden 
(1982). In Luxembourg, no signs of partisanships erosion were found. In addition, 
signs of partisan critical realignment were identified in the 1973 Danish election.  
 
The erosion of voter alignment along the class cleavage in predominantly Protestant 
countries began in the mid 1960s in Finland (1966) and Norway (1965). In 
predominantly Catholic and mixed countries it started slightly later, in the 1970s: 
Austria (1970), Flanders (1985), Luxembourg (1979) and Wallonia (1987). In two 
other cases it commenced in the 1990s: Italy (1994) and Sweden (1991). Alignment 
along the class cleavage weakened much earlier than the religious cleavage, which 
began diminishing from the mid 1980s onwards: Italy (1983), Germany (1987) and 
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Luxembourg (2004); it occurred earlier than this only in the Netherlands (1967). 
Evidence of persistence of voter alignment along the class cleavage was found in 
Denmark, and in Flanders a new voter alignment along the religious cleavage was 
created in the 1965 election. 
 
The different time periods of each manifestation, per case, are presented in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Alignment, Realignment or Dealignment in the two manifestations of alignment, in every election year between 1950 and 2010, per case 
 
Austria 
 
 1953 1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage     
Denmark 
 
 1950 1953 1953 1957 1960 1964 1966 1968 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007  
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan critical realignment and a new alignment  
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage  
Finland 
 
 
  1951 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage        
Flanders 
    
  
  1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007      
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment      
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage and a new 
alignment along the religious cleavages 
Voter dealignment along class cleavage and a (new) 
alignment along the religious cleavage    
  
Germany 
 
                       
 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009       
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment       
Cleavage Voter alignment along religious cleavage Voter dealignment along religious cleavage       
Italy (1st & 2nd Republics) 
 
 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignments along class and religious cleavages Voter dealignment 
along religious 
cleavage and 
alignment along class 
cleavage 
Voter dealignments along both 
cleavages 
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Luxembourg 
 
 1951 1954 1959 1964 1968 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009          
Partisan Partisan alignment          
Cleavage Voter alignments along religious and class 
cleavages 
Voter dealignment along class 
cleavage and alignment along 
religious cleavage 
Voter 
dealignments 
along both 
cleavages 
         
the Netherlands 
 
 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along 
religious cleavage 
Voter dealignment along religious cleavage     
Norway 
 
 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignment 
along class cleavage 
Voter dealignment along class cleavage        
Sweden 
 
 1952 1956 1958 1960 1964 1968 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class 
cleavage 
    
Wallonia 
 
    
 1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage     
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Taking into account the evidence of alignment in both manifestations gives us a clear 
picture of the phenomenon of alignment and an indication of the durability of the 
alignment in these two manifestations. Table 7.2 specifies the findings of alignment, 
realignment and dealignment as found across the two manifestations for each case. 
 
In almost half of the cases, alignment in both manifestations persisted only until the 
mid 1960s: Norway and Wallonia (until 1965), Finland (until 1966) and the 
Netherlands (until 1967). In other cases, it lasted into the 1970s: Austria (until 1970), 
Denmark (until 1973), Italy (until 1972), and Luxembourg (until 1979), and in 
Germany and Sweden it held until the mid 1980s (1987 and 1982, respectively).  
 
In Flanders, a new voter alignment along the religious cleavage was created in the 
1965 election, while alignment along the class cleavage continued. However, as I 
explained in Chapter Six, this realignment is explained by the supply aspect – the 
creation and institutionalisation of the sub-national Flemish party systems. The next 
shift in the Flemish party system is identified in 1985, when voter dealignment along 
the class cleavage began. 
 
Overall, this demonstrates that the transition from alignment into dealignment or to a 
new alignment, as articulated by both manifestations of alignment, occurred in a 
period of twenty-two years, from 1965 to 1987. As of the late 1980s, none of the 
cases has displayed a situation of alignment in both manifestations.  
   
The next question is a shift to what – was it a transition into dealignment, or was a 
new alignment between the electorate and parties created? In the previous two 
chapters, for each manifestation of alignment I established per case whether the 
alignment between voters and parties shifted into a new alignment (after a 
realignment) or eroded without the creation of a new alignment (dealignment). As I 
conducted the empirical research across both manifestations, evidence for any one of 
the three states (alignment, realignment or dealignment) could be found for each 
manifestation, at any time-point, in each case study. Therefore, theoretically, the 
separate analysis of the two manifestations of alignment could yield nine distinct 
situations or states, eight of which are a shift or transition from alignment in either or 
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both manifestations.1 Table 7.2 depicts these states and their associated empirical 
results.  
 
Table 7.2: States of Alignment, Realignment and Dealignment across the  
two manifestations 
 
  The first manifestation: partisan alignment 
 
  Alignment Realignment and a new 
alignment 
 
Dealignment 
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t 
Austria (1953-70) 
Denmark (1950-73) 
Finland (1951-66) 
Flanders (1950-65) 
Germany (1957-87) 
Italy (1953-72) 
Luxembourg (1951-
79) 
the Netherlands 
(1952-67) 
Norway (1953-65) 
Sweden (1952-82) 
Wallonia (1950-65) 
Denmark (critical 
realignment and a new 
alignment, 1973-) 
Italy (1972 -83) 
Sweden (1982-91) 
Wallonia (1965-87) 
Re
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ig
nm
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t 
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d 
a 
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w
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t 
Flanders (1965-
1991, along religious 
cleavage) 
 
 
 
 Flanders (1991-, along 
religious cleavage) 
 
D
ea
lig
nm
en
t 
 
Austria (1970-83) 
Finland (1966-70) 
Flanders (1985-91, 
along class cleavage) 
Germany (1987-90) 
Luxembourg (1979-
2004 along class 
cleavage), (2004 - 
along both 
cleavages) 
Norway (1965-73) 
 Austria (1983-) 
Finland (1970-) 
Flanders (1991-, along 
class cleavage) 
Germany (1990-) 
Italy (1983-94, along 
religious), (1994-, along 
both cleavages) 
the Netherland (1967-) 
Norway (1973-) 
Sweden (1991-) 
Wallonia (1987-) 
 
 
The empirical study, however, shows only six states that indicate a transition. Three 
of these states were seen in two cases: Denmark and Flanders. The remaining states 
concern an alignment (i.e. partisan alignment and/or voter alignment(s) along one or 
both cleavages) and/or a dealignment (i.e. partisan dealignment and/or the erosion of 
voter alignment(s) along one or both cleavages).  
                                                
1 There are eight states as alignment cannot transit into itself, therefore the combination of alignment in 
both manifestations is not counted.  
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One of these states occurs with a shift into partisan dealignment, while voter 
alignment(s) along one or both cleavages hold(s). This situation was found in Italy 
(between 1972 and 1983), Sweden (from 1982 until 1991) and Wallonia (between 
1965 and 1987).  
 
The opposite situation appears when voter dealignment(s) along one or both cleavages 
begin(s) while partisan alignment is maintained, as was seen in Austria (between 1970 
and 1983), in Finland (between 1966 and 1970), in Germany (between 1987 and 
1990), and in Luxembourg (between 1979 to 2004 along the class cleavage, and 2004 
onwards along both cleavages). To this group we can also assign Flanders, as it 
experienced partisan alignment between 1985 and 1991, while a new voter alignment 
along the class cleavage eroded and a new alignment along the religious cleavage was 
maintained. 
 
A state of dealignment across the two manifestations was found from the mid 1960s 
to the early 1970s only in Finland (since 1970), the Netherlands (since 1967), and 
Norway (since 1973). In the other cases, this occurred much later, in the 1980s and 
early 1990s: Austria (since 1983), Flanders (only along the class cleavage, since 
1991), Italy (from 1983 onwards along the religious cleavage and since 1994 along 
both cleavages), Germany (since 1990), Sweden (since 1991) and in Wallonia (since 
1987). 
 
The situation in Denmark is unique and therefore it is the deviant case in this 
research. My analysis of patterns of partisanship indicates a transition into a situation 
of partisan critical realignment in the 1973 election that was followed by a new 
alignment. This occurred in combination with a voter alignment along the dominant 
cleavage – the class cleavage.  
 
This state, which combines a realignment (and the creation of a new alignment) in one 
manifestation and an alignment in the other manifestation, was also identified in 
Flanders between 1965 and 1991. Here, a new voter alignment developed along the 
religious cleavage (together with continuity of voter alignment along the class 
cleavage), while the partisan alignment was maintained. In the cases of Denmark and 
Flanders, the state of realignment did not occur in both manifestations simultaneously. 
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In addition, in Flanders the partisan dealignment was found only 25 years after the 
new voter alignment along the religious cleavage was identified. This case, together 
with all the other cases, actually demonstrates that a state of realignment (and 
appearance of a new alignment) in one manifestation does not occur simultaneously 
or related to a state of dealignment in the other manifestation.  
 
States of dealignment in one or both manifestations have been identified in all the 
cases except Denmark. The next question this raises deals with state transition, i.e. the 
shift into dealignment and its development. How does this begin and how has it 
developed over time?  
 
In this research I employ a modular approach to the study of the two manifestations of 
alignment. Therefore, no theoretical or empirical restrictions were applied to any of 
the state transitions in the empirical study of these manifestations. A temporal 
examination of these transitions across both manifestations could yield an empirical 
and theoretical explication of two aspects of the development of the dealignment 
process:  
• Origin: Did the transition start in both alignment manifestations 
simultaneously, or did it begin in only one of the manifestations?   
• Process and Development: How does the dealignment process evolve, given 
its origin? 
 
In ten out of eleven cases, states of dealignment have been identified in one or both 
manifestations. We can recognise two main state transition models or scenarios for 
the dealignment process’s development. Figure 7.1 displays the state transition matrix 
of alignment and dealignment across manifestations.  
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Figure 7.1: State Transitions Matrix of Alignment and Dealignment  
across manifestations 
 
  TO STATE   
  Voter 
dealignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
alignment 
Voter alignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
dealignment 
Voter 
dealignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
dealignment 
FROM STATE Voter 
dealignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
alignment 
Luxembourg  Austria 
Finland 
Flanders 
Germany 
Norway 
 Voter alignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
dealignment 
  Italy 
Sweden 
Wallonia 
 Voter 
dealignment 
along 
cleavages(s) & 
partisan 
dealignment 
  the Netherlands 
 
The first state transition is a shift that begins when the dividing line(s) of (both) 
cleavage(s) lose (some of) their relevancy (voter dealignment(s) along one or both 
cleavages), and continues when parties lose voters’ durable support (partisan 
dealignment). In four cases, this occurred almost at the same time-point. In Finland 
and Germany the shift began as voter dealignment along the cleavage, and then 
spilled over in the next election, when a partisan dealignment began. In Flanders and 
Norway the shift occurred in the same direction and slightly later (with one election 
difference). In another case, Austria, the spill-over of the dealignment process 
commenced much later. Here the shift began as voter dealignment along the class 
cleavage in the 1970 election, and only after four election years (a period of 13 years), 
a partisan dealignment arose (in the 1983 election). 
 
In Luxembourg, we see a different scenario: signs of voter dealignment were 
identified along the cleavage(s), while the partisan alignment remained intact at least 
until the 2009 election. A possible explanation for this is my finding that alignment 
along the religious cleavage held until very recently – the 2004 election. Therefore, 
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based on the empirical trends in all the other cases, I predict that Luxembourg will 
follow the other cases and, with the erosion of voter alignments along both cleavages, 
signs of partisan dealignment will also appear.  
 
The second state transition is found in the other three cases, where the shift into 
dealignment began as partisan dealignment and only later affected voter alignment 
along the cleavage(s), after few election years. In Italy and Sweden this occurred after 
four and three election years (eleven and nine years difference) respectively, and in 
Wallonia after eight election years (a period of 22 years difference).    
 
Only in the Netherlands did the state transition into dealignment commence in the two 
manifestations simultaneously during the same election year – the 1967 election. A 
possible explanation is the depillarisation (or in Dutch ontzuiling), when “the role of 
ideology or religion within the subcultures has declined” (Anderweg & Irwin, 
2002:35). This was particularly true among Dutch Catholics. Bakvis (1981:521), for 
example, found that while in 1963 85 percent of Dutch Catholics voted for the 
Catholic People’s Party (KVP), in 1972 only 38 percent did so. He described these 
developments among the Dutch Catholic subculture and argued that the decline of 
Catholic support in the KVP is a result of “the transformation of the Dutch Catholic 
subculture into a much less cohesive body” (Bakvis, 1981:528). 
 
This situation, together with a very low threshold (0.67 percent since 1956 (Andeweg, 
2005:494; Farrell, 1997:70), has urged the electorate to move away not only from the 
parties that represent the main cleavage – the religious cleavage – but also from any 
established political party. This is illustrated by the same 1967 election in which the 
new progressive-liberal party, Democrats’ 66 (D66) achieved 4.5 percent of the valid 
votes in its first contested election. During this election, the Catholic People’s Party 
(KVP) and the Labour Party (PvdA) lost 5.4 and 4.4 percent of the votes respectively 
(my calculations). 
  
These two state transitions into the dealignment process provide insights into the 
origin and development of the dealignment process. They demonstrate that the 
process can commence in either alignment manifestation. They also demonstrate that 
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the process will appear in one manifestation first and subsequently spill over into the 
other manifestation. Therefore, the dealignment process develops in two phases.  
 
7.2 Conclusions 
 
This chapter deals with the topic of alignment in its both manifestations – partisan 
alignment and voter alignment along the class and religious cleavages – and presents 
a combined analysis of the manifestations. 
 
The empirical research indicates that the transition from alignment into dealignment 
or a new alignment, as articulated by either manifestation of alignment, occurred in a 
short period of twenty-two years, from 1965 to 1987. This is substantiated by the fact 
that as of the late 1980s, none of the cases has displayed a situation of alignment in 
both manifestations. Moreover, in the vast majority of the cases (eight out of eleven), 
diminishing of patterns of alignment occurred throughout the mid 1960s and mid 
1970s. Erosion of alignment happened in the mid 1980s only in Flanders, Germany 
and Sweden. This verifies earlier arguments, according to which the alignment 
between voters and parties in most of the European multi-party systems diminished 
somewhere between the mid 1960s and mid 1970s (e.g. (Dalton, et al., 1984c; Sartori, 
1994:50). The late erosion in the other three European multi-party systems can be 
explained as due to prominent political developments, which postponed the erosion. 
Flanders experienced the creation and establishment of new sub-national party 
system, and Germany dealt with reconstruction projects after the Second World War. 
 
In all the cases except Denmark, signs of dealignment are evident in at least one of the 
alignment manifestations. Realignment in either one of the alignment manifestations 
is identified only in Denmark and Flanders. These two cases indicate that realignment 
(and new alignment) does not occur in both alignment manifestations. Similarly, 
realignment cannot occur simultaneously with dealignment, but only when alignment 
in the second manifestation is maintained. These last two arguments warrant further 
empirical examination.    
 
The cases in which signs of dealignment have been identified in one or both 
manifestations draw a clear picture of how the dealignment process develops. The 
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empirical research proves that dealignment can start in either one of the 
manifestations. In addition, all the cases (apart from the Netherlands) show that the 
process is initially partial and begins as dealignment in one of the two manifestations. 
Subsequently, the erosion process is aggravated and becomes a full process of 
dealignment (identifiable when the signs of erosion appear in the second 
manifestation). This situation of full dealignment means that none of the mechanisms 
of alignment remain functional.  
 
This empirical research (described in two separate chapters) of partisan alignment and 
voter alignments along cleavages is not only based on different scientific approaches 
to studying voting behaviour, but also taps into different articulations of alignment. 
Each articulation therefore interprets different implications for the party system in the 
case a change occurring in one of these two alignment manifestations.  
 
Diminishing partisanship over time indicates an erosion of the allegiance of voters to 
any individual parties, but will not necessarily affect the parties that represent the 
salient cleavage(s), especially the dominant parties. By contrast, erosion of voter 
alignment(s) along one or both (the class and the religious) cleavages means that 
cleavage closure has decreased and the voters no longer vote according to class or 
religion, but this will not necessarily affect all parties. Having identified the origin 
and the development of the dealignment process, we will examine how its two phases 
– partial and full dealignment – tie in with the party system structure.  
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
THE PARTY SYSTEM STRCTURE IN CASES OF REALIGNMENT 
OR DEALIGNMENT – 
A MISSING PIECE IN THE PUZZLE 
 
 
 
 
The study of stability and change in the connections between voters and parties or, 
more specifically, the alignment, realignment, and dealignment of voters, has always 
attracted a considerable amount of attention in Political Science literature. Yet the 
study of the effects of realignment and dealignment on the party system structure has 
received very little attention. This chapter will show the problematic elements of the 
study of the three phenomena – alignment, realignment, and dealignment – at the 
party system level, and attempt to address these problems by suggesting a 
methodology for studying the issue. It will also present the results of my empirical 
research.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the effects of realignment and dealignment on 
the party system structure and presents possible scenarios of party system change 
during dealignment, secular realignment and after critical realignment. It then 
identifies the pitfalls in the indices and measures used in the literature for recognising 
transformations of the party system structure. In place of these indices and measures, 
it recommends an examination of the electoral party system structure and offers 
definitions and relevant typology that are deduced from typologies or classifications 
of party systems. After this methodological discussion, the chapter then examines ten 
case studies of polities that have experienced partial and/or full dealignment, and one 
case study of a polity that has gone through a partial realignment.  
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8.1 Between Concepts and Observations 
 
As part of their discussion of measurement validity, Adcock and Collier (2001:530-1) 
suggested a flowchart to depict the relationship between concepts and measurements. 
It is a four-step model for valid measurement: 1. the background concept (the broad 
constellation of meanings and understandings associated with a given concept); 2. the 
systematised concept (a specific formulation of a concept used by a scholar or group 
of scholars); 3. indicators (also referred to as ‘measures’ and ‘operationalization’); 4. 
scores for cases. Researchers following this four-step model will find that the study of 
the effects of realignment and dealignment on the party system structure is especially 
problematic for multi-party systems, as some steps from Adcock and Collier’s (2001) 
model are missing in this type of system.  
 
Background concept of realignment at the party system level for multi-party systems 
can be found in the literature. Arian and Shamir (2001:691), for example, reported on 
realignment in the Israeli party system after the 1977 election, and Hazan (2007:285-
6) discussed it as a possible scenario for the Israeli party system with the appearance 
of the middle party, Kadima. Systematised concepts of this type of shift, however, are 
rare, unlike for two-party systems (especially in the American literature), for which 
one can easily find systematised concepts of realignment referring to changes of the 
party system. In realignment, the balance of power within government is modified, or 
there is a shift of majority parties (Shea, 1999:33). In this latter scenario, variations 
amongst the systematised concepts are related to the necessity of this shift: some 
scholars do not consider it essential, since the transfer of voters between parties could 
even out (Trilling & Campbell, 1980:31) (for more on this subject, see Clubb, et al., 
(1980:77-83), or the voters could move away from the major parties to support 
(smaller) third parties (Pinkney, 1986:48). The same discussion is found regarding 
specific types of realignment: critical realignment and secular realignment. Some 
have argued that critical realignment includes a change in relative political power as 
majority parties become minorities (Burnham, 1975:6; Carmines & Stimson, 1984), 
without which the process could not be called a critical realignment (Petrocik, 1981). 
Others have not held such a strict view, arguing that this change may or may not 
occur (Campbell, et al., 1960; Ladd & Hadley, 1975; McMichael & Trilling, 1980; 
Nexon, 1980; Pomper, 1967). In the case of secular realignment, the differences are 
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even greater: some have argued that no change in the party system structure is 
expected (Dalton, 1984; Key, 1959; Nexon, 1980). This is in contrast to those who 
have seen this type of change as part of the secular realignment process (Abramowitz 
& Saunders, 1998).  
 
These parsimonious systematised concepts are clear definitions of the effect of 
realignment in two-party systems. Yet they cannot simply be transferred to multi-
party systems, due to the substantial difference between the two. While in a two-party 
system shifts in electoral strength and balance between parties are straightforward, in 
the case of multi-party systems these changes are much more minor, since the 
electoral differences between majority and minority parties are much smaller and 
there is no clear benchmark by which to identify these modifications. For this reason, 
Dalton (1996:192) defined a realignment as “significant shift in the group bases of 
party coalitions, usually resulting in a shift in the relative size of the parties’ vote 
shares” (Italics added). 
 
A systematised concept of the implications of realignment on party systems that can 
be applied to multi-party systems is that of Wolinetz (1988). He defined realignment 
as “substantially altering the format of party competition or redefining party 
alternatives” (Wolinetz, 1988:299). The main drawback of this definition is its 
ambiguity, as it includes generic terms such as ‘format of party competition’ and 
‘party alternatives’. The definition becomes clearer when one identifies several 
indicators for each of the systematised concepts that Wolinetz (1988:297-9) employed 
in his empirical discussion in the same paper. Alteration of the format of party system 
competition occurs when established parties merge, fade into insignificance, 
disappear, or lose their parliamentary representation. The redefining of party 
alternatives occurs when a new party succeeds in displacing previously established 
parties and acquires a major role in cabinet formations or policy-making.  
 
This list of indicators can easily be applied to two- and multi-party systems, yet the 
relevance of these indicators for the study of the effects of realignment on the multi-
party systems is questionable, especially regarding the second component: redefining 
party alternatives. In a two-party system, a change of the majority party includes a 
change of the governing party; in multi-party systems (in which the government 
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usually consists of several parties), by contrast, the pattern of government formation, 
and more specifically the inclusion of parties in a coalition government, might be due 
to reasons other than those related to electoral success, such as the coalition formation 
logic itself. For example, according to de Swaan’s (1973) argument on closed 
coalitions, the inclusion of new parties in government might be related to their 
positions on the Left-Right axis and not necessarily related to their electoral success.  
 
We should also keep in mind that the disappearance of an established party due to a 
merger between two or more parties (one of the Wolinetz’s indicators for measuring 
the alteration of the format of party competition) does not necessarily occur for 
reasons related to electoral circumstances, but can be due to other factors, such as 
those concerning the party elite. On top of this, as discussed in Chapter Four, a 
merger between parties is ipso facto a shift that forces the electorate to change its 
patterns of party support: therefore, this factor should be taken into consideration. I 
will return to this issue below. 
 
The study of how the party system is affected by a dealignment is even more 
problematic. As seen in the literature of realignment, it is not clear if the party system 
structure is affected during a period of dealignment. Crewe (1983) and LeDuc (1984) 
argued that electoral shifts may not translate into the party system, as they conceal 
each other or move in different directions. 
 
A second problem related to the impact of dealignment on the party system structure 
concerns the type of change occurring. Crewe (1983:211) studied the British two-
party system and suggested several scenarios of new endurable party balance, but also 
described the possibility of frequent changes. This last scenario, which Crewe named 
‘unstable dealignment’, is the most commonly expected scenario in the literature. 
Most scholars, however, have not used any definitions for describing the shifts 
expected during a dealignment. Instead they have employed several indicators to 
accommodate the dealignment’s effects. Some such indicators deal with the party 
system structure, such as increased fragmentation, the disappearance of old parties 
and the emergence of new parties, the emergence and marginalisation of new parties 
or an overall increase in the number of parties. Indicators that signal a change of 
voting behaviour but are also seen as signalling a change at the party system level, 
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such as an increase in electoral volatility, are also used. In summary, the study of the 
effects of dealignment is mainly based on indicators, which have not been developed 
from definitions. Based on Adcock and Collier’s (2001) model, this can be described 
as beginning research in the middle, i.e., the third stage, as the first two stages of the 
background of the concept (step one) and the systematised concept (step two) are 
missing!  
 
This discussion demonstrates the need to develop clear systematised concepts of the 
possible effects of realignment and dealignment on the party system in multi-party 
systems. In order to define these concepts, we need to identify the essence of the 
phenomena we investigate. To this end, we must re-examine the concept of the ‘party 
system’ and its meaning in the contexts of alignment, realignment, and dealignment. 
 
8.2 The ‘Party System’ and Its Usage in the Contexts of Alignment, Realignment, 
and Dealignment 
 
One of the first uses of the term ‘party system’ was in Duverger’s (1954) ‘Political 
Parties’. Duverger (1954:203) stated that “[w]ith the exception of the single-party 
states, several parties co-exist in each country: the forms and modes of their 
coexistence define the ‘party system’ of particular country being considered.” He 
explained that a party system is defined by particular relationships between 
characteristics such as numbers, respective size, alliances, geographical localisation, 
political distribution, and so on (Duverger, 1954:203). The interaction between parties 
is what Sartori saw as the essence of a party system; according to him, “a party 
system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” 
(Sartori, 1976:44) (italics in original). 
 
Later, Laver identified the interaction between parties as taking place in two arenas: 
in the legislative, where “the day-to-day politics of coalition are conducted”, and in 
the electorate, in which “the politics of electoral competition are conducted” (Laver, 
1989:203). Each of these arenas, according to Laver, is a separate party system; the 
first is the ‘legislative party system’, the second the ‘electoral party system’. 
Therefore, he argued, “[t]here is […] no simple thing that we can think of as ‘the 
party system’. Rather, there are several party systems operating in different arenas, 
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similar to each other yet different” (Laver, 1989:203); see also (Bardi, 1996). Along 
the same lines, Pennings (1998:79) stated that the study of party systems should focus 
on three aspects: votes, office, and policy, and explained that these elements are 
independent from each other, since a change in “one of these factors does not 
automatically involve changes in other factors.” Therefore, we should evaluate the 
relevance of each the three dimensions to the phenomena we wish to define.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the essence of the three phenomena concerns long-
term patterns of (dis)connection between the electorate and political parties. That said, 
we can see that the legislative party system (created because of the functional division 
between the electoral and parliamentary arenas) has nothing to do with the discussion 
of alignment, realignment, or dealignment, since the electorate does not have any 
influence on interactions within this system. The voters do not have any direct 
influence on the day-to-day interaction of parties in the legislative branch. Moreover, 
the possible influence of the electorate on the most basic interaction in the legislative 
branch, i.e., that between the government and the opposition regarding coalition 
government formation, is minimal. Research has showed that election results are not 
the only factor to constrain or influence government formation, but rather are one of 
several institutional and political factors (such as party positions and constitutional 
regulations) (Mattila & Raunio, 2004:265). Besides this, there may be a reverse 
relation of cause and effect: a change in the pattern of government formation might 
lead to electoral change, as Mair (2002a:105) proposed. According to him, within the 
limited combinations of coalition government formation, (or as Mair put it, the closed 
structure of competition) voters tend to vote strategically, so their preferences are also 
likely to be constrained. In party systems where the combination of government 
formation is broader, there is no need for voters to vote strategically. Following this 
logic, when the patterns of government formation are modified, the voters change 
their patterns of party support accordingly (Mair, 2008). This last argument of 
strategic voting, however, stands in contrast with assumptions of the socio-
psychological and socio-structural approaches and with the core argument regarding 
the phenomena under investigation here: that either partisanship or socio-structural 
group membership is the main explanation for party support. All in all, it is clear that 
the first dimension of a party system – voting – should be the core of our interest.  
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The study of election results, which encapsulates the degree of connection between 
voters and political parties, should also take into account the supply aspect – the 
electoral competition patterns between parties during elections. Changes of 
competition patterns on the supply side may not only affect the election results per se, 
but can even define the domain of this chapter – the party system structure. Recently, 
Bardi and Mair (2008) argued that a single polity might have several different party 
systems, such as a vertical division occurs as certain parties run for election only in 
specific parts of the electorate. All in all, it is clear that the effects of alignment, 
realignment or dealignment on the party system are manifested in the patterns of 
interaction between parties both before, and more importantly after, the election. Put 
differently, our domain in this chapter is the electoral party system.  
 
This clarified, I now return to my main task: finding systematised concepts. This 
chapter’s discussion of the existing systematised concepts for realignment in two-
party and multi-party systems makes clear that when realignment occurs, the 
electorate changes its electoral behaviour in such a way that a new structure of the 
electoral party system might be formed. In a scenario of critical realignment it is 
expected that the structural change will appear immediately after the critical election, 
the peak moment of the realignment. In contrast, secular realignment is a long-term 
process, during which the possible transformation of the party system structure will 
occur. On top of this, with the appearance of a new alignment, we expect this 
(possible) new structure to be durable, or, as Sundquist (1983:5) put it, to be “a lasting 
change”.  
 
Thus, my first hypothesis concerning realignment is: 
 
H1 The structure of the electoral party system will change and a new durable 
structure of electoral party system will be created immediately after the critical 
election(s) (the peak moment of the critical realignment), or during a period of secular 
realignment. 
 
This conceptual and empirical discussion has also pointed out that a new long-term 
party system structure can also be created during a period of dealignment. However, 
since all the eleven cases under investigation in this research have an electoral system 
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of proportional representation, I expect that the increasing numbers of voters with no 
party allegiance will create frequent shifts in the structure of the electoral party 
system. Alongside this is the question of the nature of the transformation. Some 
indicators suggest that during a dealignment period, the party balance will be 
dispersed, which implies that the party system structure becomes more fragmented 
(for instance, an increase in the level of fragmentation or in the number of parties, 
etc.).  
 
This leads me to draw two hypotheses concerning dealignment: 
H2 During a period of dealignment, the stable and durable electoral party system 
structure will disappear without a new, stable structure being formed.  
H3 During a period of dealignment, the structure of the electoral party system 
structure will become more fragmented. 
 
My semi-modular empirical analysis of patterns of partisan alignment and of voter 
alignment along a cleavage (see Chapter Seven) has demonstrated that the 
dealignmnet process develops in two phases. It begins in either one of the 
manifestations of alignment, and in this first phase the process is partial. In its second 
phase, the process will inevitably spill over into the other manifestation of alignment 
and become a full process of dealignment. In addition, as I explained in Chapter 
Seven, since the alignment mechanism of voters and parties for each of the 
manifestations is different, the effect of dealignment in each of these manifestations 
on the party system structure may be different. It would be interesting to examine the 
differences between these effects. 
 
Therefore, I will examine the two hypotheses concerning the period of dealignment in 
its two phases: as a partial and a full process. With regards to realignment, I could 
only examine the partial realignment that is identified in my empirical research. 
 
As my approach is semi-modular, theoretically the causality relationship may be the 
reverse of what is usually expected or assumed, as changes in the electoral party 
system might have kicked in before the dealignment or realignment began. Therefore, 
the timing of changes in the electoral party system versus those in the alignment 
manifestations is important, and will also be examined. 
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Having defined my expectations concerning changes in the electoral party system 
after or during re/dealignment, the next challenge is to find an appropriate method for 
testing these expectations. This brings me to the next problem of studying how a party 
system is affected by these phenomena: the difficulties of identifying change using 
various indices.  
 
8.3 The Difficulties of Identifying Alignment, Realignment or Dealignment Using 
Various Indices 
 
Study of the effects of re/dealignment on the party system is usually undertaken using 
several indices. Some indices aim to evaluate the party system structure, such as 
Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of Parties (ENP); Rae’s (1967) 
Fragmentation index (for an explanation of both indices, see Appendix A). Some are a 
formula for examining the Left-Right polarisation of relevant parties, such as was 
suggested by Shahla and Beloussov (Klingemann, 1985),1 while others count the 
number of major parties or number of relevant parties (e.g. (Bardi, 1996b; Dalton, et 
al., 1984a; Klingemann, 1985; Knutsen, 2004; Lane & Ersson, 1987). Such study is 
sometimes even done using indices that aim to measure the aggregate change of party 
support, such as Pedersen’s (1979) Total Volatility index (TV) (e.g. (Dalton, et al., 
1984a; Lane & Ersson, 1987; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Pennings, 1998:84). Some 
indices measure electoral support for different groups of parties, for example, the 
Functional Orientation index and the Radical Orientation index (for explanation of 
these indices, see notes 8, 9 in Chapter Two) or other categorisations of party families 
(Sundberg, 1999). Study of the effects of re/dealignment on party structure may also 
use indices related to the study of cleavage alignment, such as Bartolini and Mair’s 
(1990) Bloc Volatility index (e.g. (Bardi, 1996b; Klingemann, 2005; Lane & Ersson, 
1987).  
 
                                                
1 The formula regarding the Left-Right polarisation of relevant parties is: 
          n-1 n-1 
          !  ! abs (Pj+1- Pi)                                                
P=      i=1j=1                                           
      2X (round(N/2) X round(N/2-0.5) 
Where Pi stands the Left-Right policy position of the party I and Pj stands for the Left-Right party 
policy position of party j, and n is the N is the number of parties (Klingemann, 2005).  
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All my hypotheses deal with change in the structure of the electoral party system. 
Two of the hypotheses, however, are impossible to test based on the existing indices 
for two reasons. 
 
The first relates to the failure of the indices to identify change in party system 
structure. Pedersen (1980:389) demonstrated the inability of the Fractionalisation 
index to test change in party systems. According to him, this index and the other six 
indices of fragmentation,2 cannot measure change since they are insensitive to the 
identities of the individual parties. Instead Pedersen suggested the use of the TV 
index. Mair (2002a) also criticised the application of the Fractionalisation and ENP 
indices for studying party system change, as both indices treat the differences between 
party systems as a matter of degree rather than kind. In other words, they cannot 
identify change in the type of party system. Therefore, a study based on any of these 
indices would fail to identify change in the electoral party system structure. The same 
argument can be applied to any other index that measures changes of electoral 
behaviour, such as the TV index. Evans (2002:160) has already criticised the use of 
indices that capture shifts in voting behaviour to study party system structure. He 
argued that their use implies the assumption that there is a connection between these 
two phenomena, despite the fact that high volatility “is precisely a necessary (though 
not sufficient) condition of a change in party system type.”  
 
The second failure of these indices is related to identification of the durability of the 
electoral party system structure. Mair (2002a:63-4) explained that the 
Fractionalisation and ENP indices treat changes in party systems as continuous 
phenomena, and therefore are biased against the identification of stability, which is 
essential for identifying an (new) alignment. 
 
8.4 Finding a New Method to Identify Change in the Electoral Party System in 
the Context of Realignment and Dealignment 
 
                                                
2 The other indices were the Gini-coefficient, the index of Fractionalisation as corrected by Sartori, 
Flanagan’s index of Fragmentation, Milder’s index of Two-Party Competition, the index of Potential 
Competition and the index of Multipartism. 
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My challenge is to find a method that enables identification of stability and change in 
the structure of the electoral party system. This system has two components, which 
are related to each other: patterns of parties’ strength (i.e. electoral support), and party 
interactions. The new method must be able to capture them both. One way to do this 
is to examine typologies of party systems that include these two aspects, and to 
develop necessary conditions for the identification of stability and change in the 
electoral party system structure in multi-party systems.  
 
Several typologies of multi-party systems can be found in Political Science literature. 
The first was proposed by Blondel (1968), who suggested distinguishing between 
two-party systems, two-and-a-half-party systems, multi-party systems with one 
dominant party, and multi-party systems without a dominant party. Blondel’s 
typology suggested that there are two aspects to the study of multi-party systems. The 
first is the number of parties – are there two, two-and-a-half, or more parties in the 
system? The second aspect deals with electoral support for the two largest parties. 
Blondel observed that in a two-party system the two major parties get at least 90 
percent of the votes, in a two-and-a-half-party system the first two parties receive 
between 75 and 80 percent of the votes, and in a multi-party system with a dominant 
party, this party will receive about 40 percent of the electorate and gain about twice as 
many votes as the second-largest party. He also found that in a two-party system the 
ratio of the difference in electoral support for the two largest parties is 1.6, and in a 
two-and-a-half-party system the proportion of electoral support between the first two 
parties is below 1.6.    
 
Sartori’s typology (1976) included more categories for multi-party systems, 
distinguishing between one-party, hegemonic party, predominant party, two-party, 
moderate pluralism, and polarised pluralism. This classification of the party system 
was based on two elements, the first of which was the number of parties. Sartori 
distinguished between limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, and an atomised party 
system. ‘Limited pluralism’ includes party systems with three to five parties, while 
‘extreme pluralism’ indicates six to eight parties. Sartori (1976:123), however, did not 
count all parties participating in the election, but only ‘relevant’ parties, which in his 
view were those with either coalition or blackmail potential. There are two problems 
with this criterion. The first is its meaning. While the first condition – coalition 
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potential – is clear (defined as a party that has participated in or supported a 
government coalition), the second is difficult to apply, and researchers have largely 
ignored it.  Klingemann (2005:33), for example, defined relevant parties as those 
“which either have participated in or supported governments.” The second problem is 
that Sartori counted parties according to their relevance (or irrelevance) to 
government coalitions, an aspect that is not part of our domain in this thesis.3 This is 
also true for the second element in Sartori’s typology: the ideological distance 
between parties, or, in Sartori’s words (1976:128) “the overall spread of ideological 
spectrum of any polity.” For this he distinguished between a centrifugal and a 
centripetal direction of party competition. Our interest, however, is in patterns of 
electoral competition between parties and party support, and not in the ideological 
spectrum of the party systems.  
 
Siaroff (2000), who elaborated on Blondel’s and Sartori’s typologies (Wolinetz, 
2006), suggested distinguishing between eight different party systems: two-party 
systems, two-and-a-half-party systems, moderate multi-party systems with one 
dominant party, moderate multi-party systems with two main parties, moderate multi-
party systems with a balance among the parties, extreme multi-party systems with one 
dominant party, extreme multi-party systems with two main parties, and extreme 
multi-party systems with a balance among the parties. The allocation of party systems 
to one of these categories is based on four criteria: 1. two-party seat concentration 
(2PSC), 2. the number of parties winning three per cent or more of the filled seats 
(P3%S), 3. seat ratio between the first and second parties (SR1:2), and  4. seat ratio 
between the second and third parties (SR2:3). The first criterion distinguishes 
between a two-party system and a two-and-a-half-party system (in the former the first 
two parties receive at least 95 percent of the vote, while in the second they receive 
between 80 and 95 percent). The second criterion distinguishes between two-party 
systems (in which there are only two winning parties), and two-and-a-half-party 
systems and moderate multi-party systems (in which there are between three and five 
winning parties), and extreme multi-party systems (in which there are more than five 
winning parties). The last two criteria will help us to distinguish between a party 
system with a dominant party (the ratio between the first two parties will be 1.6 or 
                                                
3 The same can be said against Mair’s (2002a; 2006) typology. He proposed the study of different party 
systems on the basis of the prevailing mode of government alternation. 
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more), a party system with two main parties (where the ratio of the shares of the two 
largest parties will be below 1.6, and that for the second and the third largest parties 
will be 1.8 or more), and a party system with a balance among the parties (the ratio of 
the shares of the two largest parties will be below 1.6, and for the second and the third 
largest parties it will be below 1.8). 
 
These four different criteria again emphasise the most important elements for 
identifying the electoral party system structure: the number of parties and the electoral 
support for the two largest parties. 
 
These three typologies of party systems can help us identify important aspects of the 
study of the electoral party system structure. The first is the level of electoral 
competition, i.e., how competitive is the contest between parties for votes? Here I 
distinguish between weak competition, moderate competition, and wide competition. 
The second aspect is that of electoral strength, or the party dominance structure. 
Following Blondel (1968) and Siaroff (2000), I differentiate between multi-party 
systems with one dominant party, multi-party systems with two main parties, and 
multi-party systems with balance between the parties. 
 
In order to identify the party system structure, I use several indicators. 
The first aspect – the level of competition – is identified according to the number of 
parties. Here I distinguish between three cases: a multi-party system with three to five 
parties, a multi-party system with six to eight parties, and a multi-party system with 
over eight parties. Since I am concerned with patterns of electoral support, I count 
only parties that receive at least three percent of the valid votes. I am aware that by 
doing so, I will not count all parties that have obtained seats in the parliament, such as 
the Dutch Second Chamber (de Tweede Kamer) (as the (lowest) threshold in the 
Netherlands (since 1956) stands on 0.67 (Andeweg, 2005:494; Farrell, 1997:70), but I 
suspect that these parties have very little influence on the interaction between parties 
before and after the election. Concerning Germany and the second Italian Republic 
(between 1994 and 2005), which have a mixed electoral system, my research includes 
only the ‘second vote’ (the votes for party lists). This is in order to make my research 
comparable to all the other cases, which have electoral systems of proportional 
representation (PR). 
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The second aspect – party dominance – is examined by using several indicators to 
gauge electoral support for the two largest parties. This is a combination of three 
measures: electoral support for the largest party, electoral support for the two largest 
parties, and the ratio of the shares of electoral support for the largest and the second 
largest party. Following Blondel (1968) I hold that a multi-party system with a 
dominant party is a system in which the largest party receives at least 39 percent of 
the votes and two largest parties together gain less than 75 percent of the votes, or in 
which the two largest parties gain at least 75 percent of the votes and the largest party 
receives at least twice as many votes as the second party, so that the ratio of shares of 
electoral support between the largest and the second largest parties is more than 2.  A 
multi-party system with two dominant parties is identified when the two largest 
parties receive at least 75 percent of the votes and the largest party gains less than 
twice as many votes than the second largest party. A multi-party system with 
balance between the parties is identified when the largest party gains less than 39 
percent of the votes and electoral support for the two largest parties is less than 75 
percent. 
 
These two aspects together yield nine different multi-party structures: weak 
competition with one dominant party (model no. 1), weak competition with two 
dominant parties (model no. 2), weak competition with balance between the parties 
(model no. 3), moderate competition with one dominant party (model no. 4), 
moderate competition with two dominant parties (model no. 5), moderate competition 
with balance between the parties (model no. 6), wide competition with one dominant 
party (model no. 7), wide competition with two dominant parties (model no. 8), wide 
competition with balance between the parties (model no. 9). Table 8.1 displays the 
conditions for the different models of electoral party system structure. 
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Table 8.1: The conditions based on the two aspects for different models of  
multi-party systems 
 
 Weak competition 
(3-5 winning parties) 
Moderate competition 
(6-8 winning parties) 
Wide competition 
(9 or more winning 
parties) 
One dominant party 
(2 largest parties <75% 
& largest party " 39%, 
or 2 largest parties 
"75% & largest 
party/second largest 
party " 2) 
1 4 7 
 
Two dominant parties 
(2 largest parties "75% 
& largest party/second 
largest party #2) 
 
2 5 8 
 
Balance between the 
parties 
(2 largest parties <75% 
& largest party <39%) 
 
3 6 9 
 
While these indicators can provide a sense of the electoral party system structure, they 
are based only on election results. It is possible, however, that the main components 
of the electoral party system change and yet its structure remains the same. This 
occurs, for example, when the identity of one of the dominant parties changes. Such a 
change in identity occurs when the largest or second largest party in one of the 
elections has reached this position for the first time, or when a new pattern is created, 
for example when a party that has consistently been the second largest succeeds in 
becoming the largest party for the first time. 
 
These three criteria – number of parties, electoral support for the first two parties, and 
the identity of the largest parties – encapsulate the possible changes to the structure of 
the electoral party system. Yet, as I discussed above, this structure might also change 
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when the parties themselves shift their patterns of electoral competition. This may 
happen, for example, when there is electoral cooperation between parties, with the 
parties forming an electoral alliance and creating a cartel. A good example of this is 
the French party system, in which the parties (due to the French electoral system) 
encourage electoral agreements during the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Another example is that of parties deciding to compete only in specific constituencies 
and not nationwide, or vice versa. Changes such as these may affect the election 
results and have consequences for the electoral party system structure; therefore, they 
will be discussed in depth. 
 
Since each of the criteria can indicate change in the electoral party system, I 
employed them to test my hypotheses and to examine what happened at the party 
system level after or during realignment and dealignment. I also operationalised the 
necessary empirical conditions for validating each one of the possible hypotheses. For 
identifying the structure of the electoral party system, I analysed its structure in each 
election year: for each case, in every election year, I decided which model this party 
system possessed according to my typology, and examined the identity of its two 
largest parties. The full data is presented in Table 8.2 and in Appendix F. This was 
done in order to test my hypotheses regarding the possibility of change in the electoral 
party system and its competitiveness after or during re/dealignment. 
 
H1 concerns the creation of a new durable structure of the electoral party system after 
or during a period of realignment. A new electoral party system structure is identified 
when one or more of the typology’s three criteria indicate(s) a shift from one model of 
party system structure to another. The durability of this new structure is identified 
when it remains in place for a period of at least a decade and in at least three 
successive elections.  
 
On the other hand, according to H2, during a dealignment the long-standing party 
system structure will disappear. This is identified when one or more of the typology’s 
three criteria of electoral party system structure indicate(s) frequent changes in the 
party system structure: at least two changes or more over a period of ten years, in at 
least three successive elections.  
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H3 also deals with the patterns of electoral competition during a dealignment period. 
It is expected that competition between the parties will be increasingly fragmented. 
This is identified when the typology’s criteria point to a shift towards a more 
fragmented party system and/or when electoral strength is distributed between more 
parties (for example, a shift from a model of weak to moderate competition, or from 
two dominant parties to balance between the parties, etc.).  
 
In the next section, I present the results of empirical research into the party system 
structure in eleven European party systems. In ten of these cases (Austria, Finland, 
Flanders, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Wallonia) my analysis of the patterns of partisan alignment and of voter alignments 
along the class and religious cleavages identified a dealignment in both or one of 
these alignment manifestations at different time-points. H2 and H3 will be examined 
in all of these ten cases. To examine the effect of partial vs. full dealignment, I will 
first examine the cases of full dealignment: the periods of time in which both 
manifestations are in a state of dealignment. I will then analyse partial dealignment, in 
which only one manifestation is found to be in a state of dealignment. 
 
In two cases, I identified a partial realignment. In Denmark, signs of a partisan critical 
realignment were found in the 1973 election (which was followed by a new 
alignment), while the voter alignment along the class cleavage remained stable. In 
Flanders, a partial realignment was identified when a new voter alignment along the 
religious cleavage appeared in 1965, during a period of partisan alignment. This 
situation held until 1985, when voter dealignment along the class cleavage began. 
However, I decided not to examine the Flemish case as throughout this period 
(between 1968 and 1978 elections) the current Flemish party system was created as 
the major parties split one after another (on this issue, see Chapter Four). Thus my 
hypothesis concerning realignment – H1– will be tested only for the Danish case.  
 
8.5 The Empirical Results 
 
The principal goal of this analysis is the identification of possible changes in the 
structure of the electoral party system after or during realignment, and throughout 
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dealignment, as it is classified by the party system structure – the dominance of a 
specific party or parties and its competitiveness. 
 
There are two hypotheses regarding possible change during dealignment. One 
concerns the frequency of shifts in the party system structure. In order to identify a 
shift, I first need to examine whether a durable structure of the party system has ever 
appeared in each of the cases under investigation here.   
  
Before identifying any change, I must identify the durable characteristics of the party 
system structure. Based on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal piece and more 
specifically their ‘freezing’ hypothesis, I assume that the period between 1950 and the 
mid 1960s was stable, and throughout this period one model of party system structure 
held firm. Put differently, I expect the typology’s three criteria to show that the 
structure of the electoral party system remained stable from the first election (in or 
after 1950) onwards, and held at least until the mid 1960s 4. The data have confirmed 
this expectation.  
 
Table 8.2 shows that apart from Germany and Luxembourg, the three criteria indicate 
that in all the cases that experienced dealignment in both manifestations – a full 
dealignment – or only in one of the manifestations – a partial dealignment – the 
electoral party systems were stable at least until the mid 1960s.  
 
This is true for Austria (until 1970) and Wallonia (1965) (both with the model of 
weak competition with two dominant parties, model 2), Sweden (until 1988, with the 
exception of the 1968 election when the identity of the second party changed 
temporarily; the model of weak competition with one dominant party, model 1) and 
Norway (until 1973, the model of moderate competition with one dominant party, 
model 4). Over the entire period, the Finnish electoral party system structure 
remained the same (the model of moderate competition with balance between the 
parties, model 6), but the identity of the first party changed temporarily in the 1962 
election.  
 
                                                
4 As I excluded the German 1953 election, my study of the German party system begins with the 1957 
election. 
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In Flanders, Italy and the Netherlands, the typology suggests that the party system 
structures were based on two similar models. In Flanders (until 1971) there was weak 
competition with one or two dominant parties (models 1 + 2) and in the Netherlands 
(until 1972) there was weak or moderate competition with balance between the parties 
(models 3 + 6). In Italy throughout almost the entire period the party system can be 
characterised as exhibiting moderate competition with one dominant parties or with 
balance between the parties (models 4 + 6), until the first election of the second 
Italian Republic (the 1994 election), when the identity of the first two largest parties 
changed. 
 
Concerning my analysis of the structure of the electoral party system in the second 
Italian Republic, I must clarify that I cannot be sure that the data for electoral support 
is valid, since the new electoral systems force the parties to form electoral alliances or 
“pre-electoral cartels of parties,” in Giannetti and Laver’s words (2001:529) (for more 
details of the new electoral systems, see Chapter Four). As the electoral competition 
between most of the parties is in patterns of cartels, the share of electoral support for 
each party does not represent the electoral support for parties competing with each 
other individually, but it does give an “indication of the relative strength of individual 
members of the cartel” (Giannetti & Laver, 2001:531). 
 
Only in the cases of Germany and Luxembourg does the typology indicate that the 
electoral party system stabilised somewhere between late 1950 and the mid 1960s. In 
Germany, the three typology criteria confirm that the structure of the electoral party 
system changed in the first two elections – 1957 and 1961 – as the electoral party 
system structure went from being a moderate competitive party system with one 
dominant party (model 4) to being a weak competitive party system with balance 
between the parties (model 3). In addition, in the first election (1957) the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) was the largest party, and in the second election (1961) the 
Social Democrats (SPD) took its place. These transitions may be due to two reforms 
in the German electoral system: in 1953, the 5 percent threshold was raised from the 
regional to the national level, and in 1956 the ‘one-district-seat waiver’ for obtaining 
a seat amongst the proportional representation distribution seats was replaced by a 
‘three-district-seats waiver’ (Sallfeld, 2005:218). These two reforms not only reduced 
the opportunity for small parties to obtain large electoral support, but they also 
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explain the electoral alliance between the German Party (DP) and the CDU in some 
northern constituencies in 1957-61 (Sallfeld, 2005:218). These electoral system 
reforms together with the DP-CDU electoral pact are the reasons for the decrease in 
number of parties in 1961 (decreased to four) and for the switch between the CDU 
and the SPD as the largest party. All in all, the criteria suggest that the stabilisation of 
the party system emerged slightly later – in 1965 – as the model of weak competition 
with two dominant parties (model 2), which held until 1987. Concerning 
Luxembourg, the typology indicates that in the first three elections the party system 
changed from weak competition with two dominant parties (in the 1951 election; 
model 2) to one dominant party (in 1954 election; model 1), and then to balance 
between the parties (in 1959; model 3). This last structure held until 1979, and 
therefore I assume that the electoral party system only stabilised from the 1959 
election onwards.   
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Table 8.2: Periods of alignment, realignment (and a new alignment) and dealignment in both alignment manifestations, the party system model, 
and the direction of fragmentation, in every election year, between 1950 and 2010 
 
Austria 
 
 1953 1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage     
Party system structure 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 2     
Direction of  
fragmentation       *      
! " 
 
 !* 
  
    
Type of change       7      6 4    3,7       
Denmark 
 
 1950 1953 1953 1957 1960 1964 1966 1968 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007  
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan critical realignment and a new alignment  
Cleavage Voter alignment along class  
Party system 
structure 4 4 4 4 4 1 3 3 3 9 6 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6  
Direction of  
fragmentation      ! "   "* ! " ! *       *    
Type of change      2 4   1,8 2 1 2 8       7    
Finland 
        
 1951 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignment along class 
cleavage 
Voter dealignment along class cleavage 
       
Party system 
structure  
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
       
Direction of  
fragmentation  
   *  *      *    * 
       
Type of change     7  8      7    8        
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Flanders 
                         
  1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010     
Partisan  Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage 
 
Voter alignment along class 
cleavage 
Voter alignment along class cleavage and a new voter 
alignment along religious cleavage 
Voter dealignment along class cleavage and a (new) voter 
alignment along religious cleavage     
Party system 
structure 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 3 6 
    
Direction of  
fragmentation 
  " ! " !  " !   "*  "   * * !** *" 
    
Type of change   4 3 4 6  4 3   4,8  1   7 8 2,7,8 1, 7     
Germany 
 
 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009        
Partisan  Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage  Voter alignment along religious cleavage Voter dealignment along religious cleavage        
Party system structure 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 6 4 6 6 6        
Direction of  
fragmentation  !"* !      " * "* ! "  *  
      
Type of change  2,4,7 3      6 7 1,7 3 4  7        
Italy (1st & 2nd Republics) 
 
 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignments along class and religious cleavages Voter dealignment 
along religious 
cleavage and 
alignment along class 
cleavage 
Voter dealignments along both 
cleavages 
       
Party system structure 4 4 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6        
Direction of  
fragmentation   " ! "      * *    
       
Type of change   4 3 4      7 7           
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Luxembourg 
                
       
 1951 1954 1959 1964 1968 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009          
Partisan Partisan alignment          
Cleavage Voter alignments along religious and class 
cleavages 
Voter dealignment along class 
cleavage and alignment along 
religious cleavage 
Voter 
dealignments 
along both 
cleavages   
       
Party system structure 2 1 3 3 3 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6          
Direction of  
fragmentation 
 ! "    " ! " ! "* ! " 
  
       
Type of change  3 4    1 2 1 2 1,8 2 1          
the Netherlands 
 
 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010     
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment     
Cleavage Voter alignment along 
religious cleavage 
Voter dealignment along religious cleavage     
Party system structure 6 6 3 3 6 6 9 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6     
Direction of  
fragmentation  
 !  "  " !     " * *   *     
Type of change    2   1  1 2,7,8     1 8 8   7     
Norway 
                
       
 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009        
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment        
Cleavage Voter alignment 
along class cleavage 
Voter dealignment along class cleavage        
Party system structure 4 4 4 4 4 6 4 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6        
Direction of  
fragmentation   
   " ! " ! "  *   
 
       
Type of change      4 3 4 3 4  8           
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Sweden 
 
 1952 1956 1958 1960 1964 1968 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010    
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealignment    
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage    
Party system structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 4 6 4 6 6    
Direction of 
fragmentation      
*       " " ! " ! "     
Type of change      8       1 4 3 4 3 4     
Wallonia 
 
 1950 1954 1958 1961 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010    
Partisan Partisan alignment Partisan dealigmnent    
Cleavage Voter alignment along class cleavage Voter dealignment along class cleavage    
Party system structure 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 3 6 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3    
Direction of  
fragmentation    
 "*    ! " " !!   "   * *    
Type of change     4,8    3 4 1 2,3   4   7 7    
Index: Partisan or Voter Alignment/ Realignment/ Dealignment as is found based on my analysis of partisanship and voter alignment along class and religious 
cleavages in chapters Five and Six respectively. 
Party system structure is the model of the party system as based on the criteria’s typology: (1) weak competition with one dominant party, (2) weak 
competition with two dominant parties, (3) weak competition with a balance between the parties, (4) moderate competition with one dominant party, (5) 
moderate competition with two dominant parties, (6) moderate competition with a balance between the parties, (7) wide competition with one dominant party, 
(8) wide competition with two dominant parties, (9) wide competition with a balance between the parties. 
Type of change are: (1) no of parties increased (2) no. of parties decreased (3) electoral support for the first party increased (4) electoral support for the first 
party decreased (5) electoral support for the second party increased  (6) electoral support for the second party decreased (7) identity of the first party changed 
or a switch between the first and second party (8) identity of the second party changed. 
Signs of " stands for increase of competitiveness, signs of ! stands for decrease of competitiveness and sign of * stands for a change of the identity of one of 
the first two parties. 
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The next question is, what occurred in the electoral party system during dealignment? 
I begin by examining the cases in which both alignment manifestations were in a state 
of dealignment – a full dealignment – and will then study the cases for which a state 
of dealignment was found only in one of the manifestations – a partial dealignment.  
Table 8.2 specifies for each case the timing of partisan dealignment and/or a 
dealignment(s) along the class and religious cleavages, and the different party system 
structures as identified by the typology’s three criteria in each election year. It also 
shows the direction of change – whether the competition between parties became 
more fragmented (signed as !) (for example, when the party system structure shifted 
from one dominant party to two dominant parties, etc.), or whether the party system 
structure became less fragmented (signed as ") (when, for example, the number of 
parties decreased). Changes in the identity of one of the first two parties are also 
flagged (*). In addition, the table marks the type of change that created the shift in the 
electoral party system. 
 
A full dealignment was found in eight multi-party systems: Austria (since 1983), 
Finland (since 1970), Flanders (since 1991), Germany (since 1990), Italy (since 
1983), the Netherlands (since 1967), Norway (since 1973), Sweden (since 1991) and 
Wallonia (since 1987), as is presented by Table 8.2. 
 
Apart from Finland, in all the multi-party systems that experienced dealignment in 
both manifestations, the party system structure shifted and modification occurred 
several times, so that at least two modifications are found in a period of ten years and 
in at least three successive elections, with the exception of the 1980s in the 
Netherlands, the 1990s in Wallonia and the 2000s in Norway.  
 
In Finland, on the other hand, throughout the period of full dealignment (from the 
1970 election onwards), the typology identified only three shifts in the electoral party 
system: the identity of the second party changed twice (in 1970 and 2007), and in 
1991 the identity of the first party changed. On top of this, the modifications were not 
frequent and occurred a long time after each other: the gap between the first and the 
second change was more than 20 years (with 6 election years), and that between the 
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second and the third changes was more than 15 years (with four election years). My 
finding supports Pesonen’s (2001) argument, according to which the Finnish Party 
System is characterised by continuity at least until the 1990s, with only a few changes 
occurring. This, according to Pesonen (2001), can be explained by the success of the 
main parties – the Social Democrats, the Finnish People’s Democratic Union (SKDL), 
the National Coalition (the Conservative), and the Centre party (K) – in broadening 
their social base with new generations of voters and people in white collar 
occupations. Shifts in the social base of party support for these parties might be 
related to the fact that Finland (compared with other Western countries) was 
industralised late, and its social changes occurred rapidly (Pesonen, 2001). 
 
Therefore, I can confirm that during a full dealignment the electoral party system 
changes very frequently, as was expected by H2. Overall, two different patterns of 
timing for the beginnings of party system structure shifts can be identified. Firstly, 
there may be a simultaneously shift, as in Germany, Norway, Sweden, where the 
modifications occurred at the same time that the full dealignment began. Secondly, 
there may be a follow-up shift, when change in the electoral party system begins 
several election years after the full dealignment began, as identified in Austria, the 
Netherlands and Wallonia, where changes were identified after two or three elections 
(in the 1990, 1972 and 1995 elections, respectively). In Italy, this happened much 
later. While dealignment in both its manifestations was identified in the 1983 election, 
changes of the electoral party system surfaced only during the second Italian 
Republic, when in each election different electoral cartels were formed. While in the 
first election held after the electoral reform (1994) and in the 2008 election there were 
three cartels, in 1996, 2001 and 2006 there were only two. In addition, the members 
of the cartels changed in every election year.5 A possible explanation for this late 
                                                
5 The electoral cartels in the 1994 election included: 1. Freedom Pole and Good Government (which 
included Go Italy (FI), the National Alliance, the North League, the Pannella List-Reformers, the 
Center Christian Democracy (CCD) and the Center Union (UDC); 2. The Progressive Alliance (which 
included the Party of Democratic Left, the Communist Refoundation, the Greens, the Socialist Party, 
The Network, the Democratic Alliance, the Christian Socialists (CS), and the remnants of PSI); 3. Pact 
for Italy (which included the Popular Party and the Segni Pact). In the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections 
there were only two electoral cartels. In 1996 there were the Freedom Pole (that included Go Italy (FI), 
the National Alliance, the Christian Democratic Centre (CCD), the United Christian Democrats (CDU) 
and the Olive Tree (with the Party of Democratic Left (PDS), the Greens, Pop – SVP- PRI-UD-Prodi, 
Dini List – Italian Renewal, and the Sardinian Action Party (PSdAz). In the 2001 election there were 
the House of Freedom (which included Go Italy (FI), the National Alliance (NA), the Center Christian 
Democracy (CCD), the Center Union (CDU), the Northern League (NL), the New Italian Socialist 
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effect is the patterns of clientalism, corruption and patronage evident during the first 
Italian Republic. 
 
Although the Italian electoral system during the first Republic was PR, scholars 
described the Italian party system as an imperfect two-party system (Galli, 1966) (as 
cited in (Koff & Kopff, 2000:33). The two leading parties – the Christian Democrats 
(DC) and the Communists (PCI) – received 64.3 percent of the votes on average until 
1992 (Bull & Newell, 2005:39). On top of this, the electoral support for parties was 
stable mainly due the partitocrazia: “the network of state, party and economic elites 
infiltrated by clientalism, corruption and patronage” (Koff & Kopff, 2000:33). In this 
system, party leaders were more concerned with gaining rewards for their parties than 
with working for the national interest, while the vast public sector made many people 
feel they owed their jobs to their parties, and therefore they tended to vote for their 
employer (Koff & Kopff, 2000:33). 
 
I will now examine partial dealignment, in which a state of dealignment is found only 
in one of the two manifestations. I begin with those cases in which partisan 
dealignment was found, while voter alignment along the class or religious cleavage 
remained intact. Three cases are relevant here – Italy (in the 1972, 1976, and 1979 
elections), Sweden (in the 1982, 1985, 1988 elections) and Wallonia (between the 
1965 and 1987 elections). These cases demonstrate that changes of party system 
structure can occur when the partial dealignment period begins. Notably, these 
changes occur much less frequently than in cases of a full dealignment. 
 
As mentioned above, in Italy the changes in the party system began much later – only 
from 1994. In Sweden, they occurred in the third election after the beginning of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Party and Independents) and the Olive Tree (with the Democratic Left, Daisy, Sunflower, the 
Democratic Italian, the Communists, the South-Tyrol People’s Party, and Independents). In the 2006 
election there were the House of Freedom (with Go Italy (FI), the National Alliance (NA), the Center 
Union (CDU), the Northern League (LN), the Movement for Autonomy (MPA), the New Christian 
Democracy (DC), the New Socialist Party (NSPI), Italy in the World, and others) and the Union (which 
included the Democratic Left (DS), Daisy (DL), the Communist Refoundation (RC), Rese in the Fist 
(Rnp), the Party of Italian Communists (PdCI), Italy of Values (IdV), the Greens, the Unions of 
Democrats for Europe (UDEUR), L’Unione-Prodi, the Alliance for the Aosta Valley, and others). In 
the 2008 election there were the Democratic Party (PD) (DS and Margherita, and the Radical Party) 
and Di Pietro - Italy of Values (IdV), the Left-The Rainbow (the Communist Refoundation (RC), the 
Party of Italian Communists (PdCI), the Greens and the newborn Democratic Left) and the People of 
Freedom (PDL) (which included Go Italy (FI) and the National Alliance (AN) (Ignazi, 1994; 2002; 
2007). 
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partisan dealignment (in the 1988 election). Only in Wallonia, the first shift was 
identified in the election during which the partisan dealignment began: the party 
system structure changed. However, the subsequent changes in the party system 
occurred only after more than 15 years, in the 1977 election and the following three 
elections. 
 
The second scenario of partial dealignment is when voter alignment along at least one 
of the cleavages disappears, while the electorate (as partisan) remains aligned with its 
party. This period is very short in three cases – Finland (only between 1966 and the 
subsequent election in 1970), Flanders (between 1985 and 1991), Germany (only 
between 1987 and the subsequent election 1990) and Norway (between 1965 and 
1973). In Finland, Flanders and Norway, voter dealignment occurred along the class 
cleavage and in Germany along the religious cleavage. Modifications of the electoral 
party system were identified only in the German 1987 election and in the 1987 
Flemish election. This type of partial dealignment over a longer period is found in 
other cases: Austria (between 1970 and 1983) and Luxembourg (in which the 
dealignmnet along the class cleavage began in 1979, and along both cleavages began 
in 2004). 
 
In Austria the typology indicates that a shift of party system structure over the period 
of partial dealignment occurred only at the beginning of the period, in 1970, when the 
identity of the second party changed.  
 
Regarding Luxembourg, in the period from 1970 to 1999 (when there was voter 
alignment along the religious cleavage, but dealignment along the class cleavage), the 
typology suggests that the Luxembourgian electoral party system structure was one of 
balance between the parties, but the scale of competition swung between weak and 
moderate (models 3 and 6). In addition, the typology suggests that in the 1999 
election the identity of the second party changed. 
 
Fluctuation in the competition scale during this period occurred due to shifts in the 
supply side: in 1984 the number of relevant parties went down from six to five, when 
two parties (the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the ‘list of Enrôlés de force’) did 
not contest the election. The number of relevant parties also decreased in 1994 
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election as the two Green parties – Green Alternative (GAP) and the Green Left 
Ecological Initiative (GLEI) – ran together for the parliament.6  
 
All these cases again demonstrate that transformations of the electoral system party 
system in a partial dealignment do not occur very frequently. In addition, similar to 
the case of a full dealignment, in some of these cases the shifts occurred either when 
the process of erosion began (such as in the cases of Austria and Germany), and in the 
following years (as is found in Luxembourg and Wallonia). In other cases it occurred 
only in later elections (Flanders and Sweden). 
 
The next question concerns what kind of modification occurred, and whether it 
pointed in a specific direction. According to H3, I expected that during periods of 
dealignment the structure of the electoral party system would become more 
fragmented, indicating that party balance became more dispersed.  
  
My typology, which evaluates changes of the party system structure, identifies a shift 
based on three criteria: the number of parties, the electoral support for the two largest 
parties, and the identity of these parties. The first two criteria give an indication of the 
degree of fragmentation; as I explained above, an increase of the number of parties or 
a decrease of the electoral support for the first two parties indicate that the party 
system has become more fragmented. The opposite trend suggests that the 
fragmentation of the party system has decreased. A change in the identity of one of 
the first two parties, however, does not imply that the level of fragmentation has 
altered.  
 
Table 8.3 summarises the shifts identified in all eight cases during periods of full 
dealignment. I treat each shift as an independent event, regardless of its timing.  
 
In total, 43 shifts were counted. Twelve (27.90 percent) of them indicate that the 
electoral party system in a multi-party system becomes more fragmented during a 
period of full dealignment, as the number of parties increased and/or the electoral 
support for the first two largest parties decreased. However, almost the same number 
                                                
6 The two parties officially merged in 1995. 
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of shifts – ten (23.26 percent) – reveal that the direction of fragmentation changed, as 
the number of parties decreased and/or the electoral support for the two largest parties 
increased. On top of this, many more transformations – twenty-one (48.84 percent) – 
occurred when the identity of one of the two largest parties changed, indicating no 
change in the level of fragmentation!  
 
Moreover, upon closer inspection of the trends for each case separately (presented in 
Table 8.2), it is clear that in all cases except Finland, Italy and Wallonia, two 
directions of fragmentation were found! Put differently, my examination based on the 
typology’s three criteria demonstrates that during a period of full dealignment, the 
party system not only becomes more fragmented. 
 
Table 8.3 – Changes of party system structure, as identified by the typology’s three 
criteria, over periods of full and partial dealignment 
 
  The party system 
became more 
fragmented 
The party system 
became less  
fragmented 
No change of 
party system 
competitive 
Full dealignment Number of parties 4 (9.30%) 2 (4.65%)  
 Electoral support 
for first-two 
parties 
 
8 (18.60%) 
 
8 (18.60%) 
 
 Identity of the 
first two parties 
  21 (48.84%) 
 Sum = 43 
(100%) 
12 (27.90%) 10 (23.26%) 21 (48.84%) 
Partial 
dealignment 
Number of parties 7 (38.89%) 3 (16.67%)  
Electoral support 
for first-two 
parties 
 
4 (22.22%) 
 
1 (5.56%) 
 
 Identity of the 
first two parties 
  3 (16.67%) 
 Sum = 18 
(100%) 
10 (58.82%) 5 (29.41%) 3 (16.67%) 
 
Different results were found during periods of partial dealignment. In total, 18 
transformations were identified, ten of which (58.56 percent) indicate increased 
fragmentation. In addition, only five shifts (27.78 percent) occurred in the opposite 
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direction (the number of parties decreased or the electoral support for the first two 
largest parties increased), and three of these shifts (16.67 percent) occurred in no 
specific direction (the identity of the two largest parties changed). No difference 
concerning the type of change was identified regarding the two sorts of partial 
dealignment.7 This demonstrates that during partial dealignment, regardless of in 
which manifestation it occurs, there is more chance that the shifts of the electoral 
party system will point towards an increasing level of fragmentation. 
 
The next question is, what occurs during and after realignment in a multi-party 
system? The only case that may answer this question is Denmark, for which I 
identified a partisan (critical) realignment. My analysis of partisanship in Chapter 
Five demonstrates that Denmark experienced a critical realignment (which occurred 
in the 1973 election) followed by a new alignment. 
 
First, I had to analyse the party system structure before the partisan realignment began 
and identify the party system structure according to my typology. The typology’s 
three criteria suggest that between 1950 and 1960, the party system structure was that 
of moderate competition with one dominant party (model 4). In 1964, the structure 
transformed into one of limited competition with one dominant party (model 1), as the 
number of parties decreased. In the following election (1966) it again transformed, 
this time into a model of limited competition with balance between the parties (model 
3), as the electoral support for the dominant party – the Social Democrats (SD) – 
declined below 39 percent. In the critical election (1973) the electoral party system 
structure became that of wide competition with balance between the parties (model 9). 
This occurred when the number of parties increased and the Progress Party (FP) (a 
party that ran for the parliament for the first time in this election) became the second 
largest party. In the 1975 election, the number of parties decreased and the party 
system was characterised as that of moderate competition (model 6), but in the 
following two elections – 1977 and 1979 – it again swung between the models of 
wide and moderate competition (models 9 and 6 respectively), due to changes in the 
number of parties. Since then, the party system structure remained one of moderate 
                                                
7 In the case of partial dealignment as is indicated by partisan dealignment, from seven shifts that are 
identified, four of these changes indicate on increasing levels of fragmentation. In the case of voter 
dealignment along the cleavage, from eleven transformations, six of them point out on higher 
fragmentation.  
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competition with balance between the parties, and only in the 2001 election did the 
identity of the largest party change: the previously first party – the Social Democrats 
(SD) – lost its position as the largest party to one of the second largest parties – the 
Danish Liberals (V) – for the first time since 1950! The Danish Liberals succeeded in 
holding their position in the following two elections (2005 and 2007). 
 
In the critical election moment and in the two subsequent elections the Danish party 
system transformed, and has stabilised only since the 1979 election (during the new 
alignment), retaining the same structure until the 2001 election. This evidence partly 
supports H1, as it indicates that the electoral party system structure modifies with 
critical realignment. Contrary to our expectation, the Danish case also suggests that in 
case or critical realignment in multi party system, post effect shifts may occur in the 
succeeding elections, immediately after the critical election. The transformations in 
the 1964 and 1966 elections, before the critical realignment phase, however, require 
closer examination. These changes indicate opposing trends: on one hand, the number 
of parties in the 1960 election decreased (an indication of less fragmentation), while 
on the other hand the electoral support for the first party (SD) declined below 39 
percent. Nevertheless, the model of party system that appeared in the 1966 election 
(seven years before the partisan realignment began) and held until 1973 (the critical 
election) might indicate that shifts in the electoral party system precede those of the 
alignment manifestation. These findings might suggest that a partisan (critical) 
realignment can be identified first in the electoral party system, before it gathers 
speed with the momentum of a critical election. 
 
8.6 Changes in Party System Structure during periods of Realignment and 
Dealignment –Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents a solution to a problem that has been insufficiently discussed in 
the literature of re/dealignment: the effects of these phenomena on the party system 
structure in multi-party systems. Firstly, it clarifies that the possible effect of electoral 
re/dealignment is felt in what is called the ‘electoral party system’. It is expected that 
with critical realignment a new durable electoral party system will be created. 
Regarding dealignment, two expectations can be identified. One expectation is that 
the stable and durable electoral party system structure will disappear without a new, 
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stable structure being formed, and the second implies that the party system structure 
becomes more fragmented. 
  
This chapter demonstrates that the existing methods used to examine these possible 
effects cannot differentiate between the diverse models of party system structure, as 
the indices (such as the Fractionalization index, and the Effective Number of Parties) 
produce continuous numbers and are not sensitive to shifts concerning party identity. 
To address these deficiencies, I developed a typology that can assist in identifying the 
electoral party system structure at any point in time for every multi-party system. This 
typology is based on three criteria: the number of parties, the electoral support for the 
two largest parties, and their identity. The chapter then presented the results of 
empirical research into ten cases in which full dealignment (when dealignment is 
identified in both alignment manifestations) or partial dealignment (when dealignment 
is identified only in one of the alignment manifestations) has been identified at some 
point between 1965 and 2010, and one case in which a partial realignment has 
occurred since 1973.   
 
This typology of electoral party systems has shown that during periods of full 
dealignment, the party system structure modifies very frequently, indicating that this 
party system is no longer stable and durable. Put differently, the empirical research 
confirms that when dealignment occurs in both alignment manifestations, it affects 
the electoral party system structure. The effect is not necessarily immediate, but in a 
few cases it did appear shortly after the full dealignment started. This later effect is 
true also for periods of partial dealignment. On top of this, the empirical analysis 
demonstrated that during this period the party system structure modifications occurred 
only occasionally.    
 
Equally importantly, the empirical research has demonstrated that during full 
dealignment, the party system structure does not necessarily become more 
fragmented, but the direction of competition also swings towards the opposite 
direction. In cases of partial dealignment, on the other hand, there is more chance that 
the level of fragmentation will increase! 
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Regarding the effect of partial realignment on the electoral party system structure, this 
research has tested only one case in which a combined model of partisan realignment 
appeared: a critical realignment and a new alignment discovered in Denmark. The 
Danish critical realignment election was that of 1973. The typology suggests that the 
party system structure changes not only in the peak moment – the critical election – 
but also in the first few subsequent elections, while shifts cease as time goes on. In 
addition, the typology has uncovered a few transformations of the electoral party 
system that occurred before the process of partisan (critical) realignment began, 
which might suggest a much more complex effect. However, these last findings are 
based on only one case study and should be tested in other similar cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
ALIGNMENT, REALIGNMENT AND DEALIGNMENT IN 
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS FROM 1950 TO 2010 – 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
On 18th April 2011, a few days after the official results of the Finnish national 
election were published, Ilkka Ruostetsaari (a Finnish political analyst) told the AFP 
news agency that the election outcome was astonishing: "The True Finns' victory, 
surpassing every poll and every expectation of a drop on election day... plus the total 
collapse of the Centre – the whole thing is historic," (BBC mobile news Europe, 18 
April 2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13107620). No political analyst 
or poll predicted these developments in the latest national election in Finland, in 
which an extreme-Right party – the True Finns – succeeded in obtaining almost the 
same number of votes as the Social Democratic party, with an increase of 15 percent 
from the previous election. Through this result, the True Finns took the position of 
one of the established parties, the Centre, and became the third largest party in 
Finland with 39 seats in the parliament, only three seats less than the Social 
Democrats and four seats more than the Centre. Yet, from a comparative perspective 
there is nothing new in this story of unexpected election results and the electoral 
success of a relatively new party. Similar events have occurred earlier; to name only a 
few examples: Dutch party the List of Pim Fortuyn (LPF) received 17 percent of the 
votes when it ran for the first time in a parliamentary election and became the second 
largest party. Much earlier, in 1973, the Danish Progress party (FP) ran for parliament 
for the first time and achieved 15.9 percent of the votes, becoming the second largest 
party. 
 
These instances of earthquake elections stand contrary to the empirical and theoretical 
arguments of early Political Science literature. Sixty-five years ago, when the study of 
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political behaviour began1, two of the main approaches for studying party support – 
the social-psychological and the social-structural approaches – argued for the 
existence of voters’ long-term party allegiance. The two approaches differ in how 
they explain the mechanism that created this voter alignment. As Chapter Two 
presented, the socio-psychological approach looks at individual party allegiance, 
which is created by identification and/or long-term party support. The socio-structural 
approach argues that the durable connection between voters and parties is created 
along socio-structural cleavage lines.  
 
Since the 1970s, there has been an empirical dispute in Political Science literature 
about whether or not the connection between voters and political parties in Western 
democratic countries has remained relatively stable and structured. Chapter Three 
outlined this discussion and showed that based on existing research, we cannot come 
to a definite conclusion as to whether and how the party systems of Western 
democratic countries have changed since the 1970s, and what shifts, if any, have 
occurred. Studying this long debate presents us with three different research results. 
The first suggests that the party systems are still in an alignment. The relationship 
between voters and parties has hardly changed: voters are still affiliated to political 
parties in much the same way as they always have been, and the connection between 
voters and parties is stable.  
 
The other two empirical results argue for the recognition of a change in the patterns of 
alignment. The social-psychological and the socio-structural approaches, which 
emphasise ‘alignment’, are also the basis for explaining these new empirical 
developments. 
 
The second empirical argument influenced by the socio-structural approach suggests 
that since the 1970s, the connection between voters and parties has been changed by 
the appearance of a new cleavage, which functions as a basis for a new voter 
alignment. According to this view, at some point since the 1970s we have witnessed a 
wide-scale realignment. The third empirical argument suggests that since the 1970s 
                                                
1 According to Carmines and Huckfeldt (1996:223), the birth of the modern era in political behavior 
research was marked by the publication of Lazarsfeld and his colleagues’ book The People’s Choice in 
1944. 
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the party systems of industrialised democracies have been experiencing a process of 
dealignment: the connection between voters and political parties has diminished but a 
new or alternative connection has not asserted itself.  One of the models for 
explaining dealigment follows the social-psychological approach, stressing the 
psychological aspects behind voter behaviour, and holds that cognitive transformation 
and mobilisation of voters has unravelled their connection with political parties. This 
model assumes that some of the traditional functions of political parties are no longer 
needed. 
 
Chapter Three demonstrated that these different results are rooted in a conceptual 
problem, reflecting what is in part an empirical dispute and in part a conceptual 
dispute. The conceptual problem is that there is no single agreed operational 
definition for either realignment or dealignment. These two closely related concepts 
are used in very different ways by different authors, and are applied at a number of 
different levels of analysis. Indeed, there are probably too many operational 
definitions of realignment and too many indicators (which function as operational 
definitions) associated with dealignment. The operational definitions of realignment 
and the indicators of dealignment differ from one another at three levels – the 
electorate, the party system structure, and the cleavage. As far as the electorate is 
concerned, we see major differences between the treatment of voters as individuals 
and the treatment of voters as members of various social or ideological groups. The 
concept of ‘cleavage’ is defined in three different ways – as an electoral distribution, a 
socio-structural division, and as a major conflict. Finally, the literature of realignment 
and dealignment is not clear regarding the effect of a change in the third level – the 
party system structure.  
 
In order to solve this conceptual problem, I suggested examining the question of 
stability and change of voters-parties ties and its effect on the party system structure 
using a semi-modular approach, which separately analyses two sorts of alignment 
manifestation: partisan alignment and voter alignment along a cleavage. This assists 
us to identify empirically, and to understand both theoretically and conceptually, the 
development of the processes underlying realignment and dealignment. This study is 
designed as a comparison between “relatively similar” cases, which examines eleven 
European multi-party systems between 1950 and 2010. 
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Chapter Five followed the socio-psychological approach in its attempt to examine the 
first manifestation of alignment – partisan alignment. It analysed trends of 
partisanship as articulated in its two meanings: party identification and stable party 
support. It was necessary to combine these two articulations not only because of the 
absence of strong evidence for decreasing numbers of party identifiers, but also due to 
major scholarly critique of the phenomenon of ‘party identification’ in a multi-party 
system. Trends of long-term party supporters were measured in patterns of party 
support between two successive elections for the whole electorate (including those 
who did not participate in the election and those who cast blank or invalid votes). This 
was achieved by employing two indicators that are based on individual-level data (i.e. 
the proportion of those reporting support for the same party in two succeeding 
elections) and aggregate data (its equivalent estimation, the Electoral Total Partisans 
index (ETP) (for an explanation of this index, see Appendix A). Combining the 
results of the two manifestations of partisanship, Chapter Five showed that 
partisanship eroded over time in all the case studies but two (Luxembourg and 
Denmark). This indicates that a partisan dealignment has occurred. The shift to 
partisan dealignment happened in two waves. The early and the major wave had 
already begun in the mid 1960s and ended in the early 1970s, while the second 
smaller wave began in the early 1980s and concluded in the early 1990s.  
 
Voter alignments along the class and religious cleavages were examined in Chapter 
Six, which represented the second approach (the socio-structural). It identified that 
voter alignment along class cleavage was stronger than alignment along the religious 
cleavage in all the case studies, regardless of religious domination, apart from 
Germany and the Netherlands. The measurement of cleavage electoral closeness was 
obtained by employing the Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS) (for an 
explanation of this index, see Appendix A). In two other cases – Italy and 
Luxembourg – alignments along both cleavages were found to be salient at the same 
level. Denominational difference has little effect on the appearance of erosion of the 
alignment along the dominant cleavage. In some predominantly Protestant countries, 
this erosion began in the mid 1960s, while in predominantly Catholic and mixed 
countries it began in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in two cases – Italy and 
Sweden – (one predominantly Catholic the other predominantly Protestant), it 
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commenced only in the early 1990s. On top of this, Chapter Six revealed that the 
weakening of the alignment along the class cleavage occurred much earlier than for 
the religious cleavage, as the latter only began diminishing in the mid 1980s (with the 
exception of the Netherlands). Evidence of persistence of voter alignment along the 
class cleavage was found in Denmark, and in Flanders this persistence was evident for 
the new alignment along the religious cleavage.  
 
The evidence of both manifestations of alignment provides a detailed picture of the 
phenomenon of alignment and an indication of its durability. Chapter Seven analysed 
the evidence for stability and change in both manifestations. It identified that the 
transition from alignment into dealignment or realignment in at least one of its 
manifestations, occurred during a short period of about twenty years, between the mid 
1960s and mid 1980s, in all of the eleven European multi-party systems. In the vast 
majority of the cases, diminishing of patterns of alignment were identified throughout 
the mid 1960s and mid 1970s. This substantiates earlier arguments that suggested the 
alignment between voters and parties in most of the European multi-party systems 
diminished at some point between the mid 1960s and mid 1970s; e.g. (Dalton, et al., 
1984c; Sartori, 1994:50).  
 
This analysis of state transitions into realignment and dealigmnent has identified that 
realignment in one of the alignment manifestations only occurs when no change 
occurs in the other manifestation, which remains in a situation of alignment. This 
means that only a small portion of the electorate is available to become attached to 
other parties, and to be involved in realignment along a new cleavage. This is 
coherent with Stubager (2010a), who found that the realignment of Danish voters 
along the new cleavage of education has been embodied by small parties.  
 
Examination of these state transitions along the temporal dimension has demonstrated 
that the dealignment process can begin in either manifestation, and has two phases of 
development. It starts in one of the manifestations (the partial phase), and then spills 
over into the other manifestation, at which point the process of dealignment runs 
wider and deeper and evolves into a full dealignment.  
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In Chapter Eight, we found that over period of dealignment the electoral party system 
is no longer stable and durable. On top of this, we saw that there is a difference 
between a full dealignment and partial dealignment when it comes to their effects on 
the party system structure. During periods of dealignment at both manifestations – full 
dealignment – the structure of the electoral party system changes very frequently. 
However, when the dealignment process occurs in only one of the manifestations – 
partial dealignment – the shifts of party system structure happen only occasionally.  
  
Based on a typology of party system structure (that uses three criteria: the number of 
parties, electoral support of the two largest parties, and their identities), Chapter Eight 
demonstrated that the changes of party system structure following partial or full 
dealignment may not take effect at the beginning of a dealignment process, but rather 
may occur later on. These findings validate Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967:50) freezing 
hypothesis, as the erosion of voters-parties ties began in some of the case studies in 
the mid 1960s, but its effect on the party system structure commenced only in the 
1970s, with the exception of the creation of the sub-national party systems in 
Belgium. 
 
In addition, my analysis has demonstrated that in periods of partial dealignment there 
is high probability that the competition between the parties will be more fragmented. 
During a period of full dealignment, on the other hand, the competition between 
parties does not necessarily become more fragmented, but the party system structure 
transforms in both directions – both more and less fragmentation is evident.  
 
All in all, we can summarise the development of the process underlying dealignment 
in a multi-party system as a process that begins with erosion of the alignment of 
voters along the main cleavages or with declining levels of partisanship (this is the 
first phase, in which the process is partial). The process will then progress and 
become wider and deeper, so that no mechanisms of voter alignment – partisanship 
or alignments along cleavages – will function (this is the second phase, in which the 
process becomes a full dealignment). Throughout the two phases of the dealignment 
process, the structure of the electoral party system will be modified, but the shifts will 
not necessarily begin immediately. During its partial phase, modifications of party 
system structure will occur only occasionally and chances are high that the party 
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system structure will become more fragmented. In the second phase of full 
dealignment, the party system structure will change very frequently, but will not 
necessarily become more fragmented.  
 
My empirical analysis and my conceptual contribution to analysis of the dealignment 
process in multi-party systems emphasises the crucial necessity of studying the 
phenomena of alignment along two of its manifestations – partisans and along 
cleavages. In my empirical research, I demonstrated that both realignment and 
dealignment begin as shifts in either one of the manifestations of alignment. 
Therefore, a study that does not examine both manifestations of alignment will not 
examine the whole picture: therefore, it may not be able to pin down electoral 
transitions or to distinguish between the two phases of the dealignment process.  
 
Sartori (1984:22) reminded us that “[c]lear thinking requires clear language. In turn, a 
clear language requires that its terms be explicitly defined.” As the concepts of 
‘realignment’ and ‘dealignment’ emerged in reaction to the conceptualisation of 
‘alignment’, which is a complex phenomenon in itself, I believe that both these terms 
should be employed only in this context and should not be used in the study of related 
issues. In addition, as was discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the concepts of 
‘alignment’ and ‘realignment’ suffer the problem of homonymy (one word, many 
meanings), as is evident by the two mechanisms of alignment, and the diverse 
definitions employed by scholars. A solution for this problem, proposed by Sartori 
(1984:38), is the use of separate terms. I have demonstrated that realignment and 
dealignment both commence in one manifestation of alignment, while the other 
manifestation remains temporarily in a situation of alignment. This finding, along 
with Sartori’s suggestion, strongly suggests that when one studies either phenomenon 
(realignment or dealignment), he/she should specify the alignment’s manifestation 
(for example, partisan dealignment, or voter realignment along a cleavage): the 
generic terms of ‘realignment’ or ‘dealignment’ should not be used. 
 
My empirical research, however, included only European multi-party system 
countries. It is recommended that future research apply these conceptual findings to 
countries with multi-party systems in which the main cleavages are not socio-
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structural (for example, Israel), and to countries with different socio-structural 
cleavage histories (for example, new democracies). 
 
The identification of state transitions from alignment into realignment or dealignment 
is based in the major part of this research on indices of volatility – the ETP and WCS. 
Regarding the use of these kind of indices (i.e. those that are based on measurement 
of electoral volatility) in the study of the effect of the dealignment process (in its 
partial or full phase) on the party system structure, I have proved that any index based 
on volatility cannot be employed in the study of electoral party systems, as there is no 
association between the two. As Evans (2002:160) has previously explained, “[high 
volatility] is precisely a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of a change in 
party system type.”  
    
I have demonstrated in this research that during a full dealignment, the party system 
does not become more fragmented. Earlier research had already showed that the 
fragmentation level increased mainly in a specific period: the 1980s to 1990s (Best, 
2007)2, as measured by the index of Effective Number of Parties (ENP) (for an 
explanation of this index, see Appendix A). Moreover, the same research pointed out 
that in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands (if we combine the Christian parties), 
the ENP level had already raised in the 1950s to 1960s (Best, 2007:25), a period 
widely assumed to be characterised by stable party systems. These empirical results 
have revealed the absence of continuously increasing trends of fragmentation during a 
period of dealignment. This observation, together with scholarly criticism of the 
application of this index for studying party system change (see Chapter Eight), prove 
that any index which measures fragmentation (for example, ENP, or Dunleavy and 
Boucek’s (2003) index of Number of Parties) should not be employed for studying the 
effect of the dealignment process on the party system structure. It should be noted that 
my research has only examined cases of (European) multi-party systems. Further 
research must be done into fragmentation in other types of party systems, for example 
two-party systems. 
 
                                                
2 This research examines Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States; between 1950 and 2005. 
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In this research, I only focused on the two main socio-structural cleavages and did not 
examine alignment along any alternative new cleavage (such as the Post-Materialist 
or the globalisation cleavages). However, my findings suggest that realignment may 
occur when one of the alignment manifestations is effective. This confirms that for 
the time being, realignment in either alignment manifestation is not evident. If it was 
evident, increasing volatility rates would be observable “as a result of this 
repositioning and realigning of established parties” (Kriesi et al., 2008a:13-4) along 
the new cleavage. This being the case, volatility rates would drop not long after the 
new alignment appeared. However, I found empirical evidence that almost all the case 
studies are going through (full) dealignment, with steady high level of volatility. 
 
My empirical research confirms for Political Science researchers and for politicians 
that most European multi-party systems are currently in a state of disconnection 
between voters and parties. This has been the case since some point in time between 
the mid 1960s and mid 1980s and will probably continue for a long time: no signs of 
realignment have appeared. Therefore, dealignment should not be viewed in a 
negative light, but rather should be seen as part of what Enyedi (2008:299) called “the 
process of democratization, when ‘voters begin to choose’.” 
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APPENDIX A 
 
INDICES 
 
 
 
 
1. Volatility indices 
 
The Total Volatility index  (TV) measures the quantity of voters that shift their vote 
between two consecutive elections, calculated as the total percentages which point to change 
for each party between two successive elections. The total change for all of the parties is then 
divided by two. 
The change in the strength of party ‘I’ since the previous election (!Pi,t) is calculated as: Pi,t 
– Pi, t-1.  
 
Therefore, the total change of the party system (total net change) (TNCt) is calculated as: 
 !!!!"#!!!!!!!  
 
(Pedersen, 1979, 1983)  
 
The Bloc Volatility index (BV) is calculated by using the Total Volatility index, but the 
calculation is based on blocs of parties rather than on individual parties. 
The formula for Bloc Volatility is: 
 
(Bloc Volatility= ! PiV + PjV +PkV! + ! PoV + PmV + PnV)! 
                        2 
or simply              ! PiV + PjV +PkV! 
 
where PV is the individual volatility of parties i,j,k, etc.  
 
(Bartolini & Mair, 1990:313) 
 
The Cleavage Salience index (CS): Bloc volatility  * 100 
                       Total volatility 
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The Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience index (WCS):  
 
 
where BV is bloc volatility, TV is total volatility and BES is bloc electoral support (in 
numbers). 
 
The Electorate Total Partisan index (ETP) is the TV index’s complementary number, 
calculated by subtracting the TV index level from the percentages of the valid votes in the 
current election.  
 
!!"! ! ! !!!"!"# ! !!"!"#!!!!!!!  
 
* Change in the electoral strength of party ‘I’ (as measured by its proportion of valid votes 
from the whole electorate in the current election) since the previous election (!EPi,t) is 
calculated as: EPi,t – EPi, t-1. 
 * This is divided by two, in order to account for the fact that when one party “wins”, the 
other party “loses”. 
* Subtracting the index score from the fraction of valid votes in the current election (VVi,t).  
 
 
2. Other indices 
 
 
Rae’s Fragmentation index is computed as:  
n 
1-"Ti# 
i=1 
 
Ti=any party’s decimal share of the vote (Rae, 1967) 
Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is calculated as: 
 
1/ "Pi# 
 
Pi= the proportion of votes (or seats) won by party i. 
WCS= 1! BVTV
"
#
$
%
&
'(BES
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APPENDIX B 
 
COMPOSITION OF PARTY BLOCS ALONG THE DIFFERENT 
CLEAVAGES, PER CASE 
 
 
 
 
 Class Cleavage Religious Cleavage 
Austria Socialists (SPÖ), Austrian 
People’s Opposition 
(WOV)/Communists and Left 
Socialists (KuL)/ Communist 
Party (KPÖ), Democratic 
Progressive Party (DFP), 
Socialist Left Party (SLP)/ The 
Left 
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), 
the Christians (DC)* 
Denmark Social Democrats (SD), 
Communist Party (DKP)/ The 
Unity List (ELRG), Socialist 
People’s Party (SF), 
Left Socialist Party (VS) 
Christian People’s Party (KrF)/ 
Christian Democrats (KD) 
Finland Social Democrats (SSP), the 
Finnish People’s Democratic 
Union (SKDL)/Left Alliance 
(V), Social Democratic League 
of Workers and Smallholders 
(TPSL)*, Communist Party 
(SKP)*, For Peace and 
Socialism (KTP)*, The Finnish 
Workers' Party (STP)* 
Christian League (SKL)/ 
Christian Democrats (KD) 
Flanders Flemish Socialist Party (BSP), 
Flemish Socialist Party – 
Different) (SP. A) & SPIRIT 
(SPSp)*, Communist Party 
(KP)* 
Christian People’s Party  (CVP)/ 
Christian Democratic and 
Flemish (CD & V), Christian 
Democratic and Flemish (CD & 
V) & (NVA)* 
Germany Social Democrats (SPD), 
Communist Party (KPD), All-
German People’s Party (GVP)*, 
Action for Democratic Union 
(ADF)*, German Peace Union 
(DFU)*, Democratic Socialist 
(PDS)/ the Left (L) 
Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU), Christian Social Union 
(CSU) 
Italy Communist Party  (PCI/ PDS), 
the Democrats of the Left (DS)* 
Proletarian Unity*,  
Party of the Italian Communist 
(PdCI)*, Communist Re-
foundation (RC)*,  
Continuous Struggle (LC)*, 
Socialist Party  (PSI), New 
Italian Socialists Party (NPSI)*, 
United Socialist Party *,  
Social Democrats (PSDI), 
Christian Democrats (DC), 
Popular Party (PPI)*, Christian 
Democratic Centre (CCD)*, 
Christian Democratic Centre 
(CCD) - United Christian 
Democrats (CDU)*/Union of 
Christian and Centre Democrats 
(UDC)*, Segni Pact*  
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Socialist Party of Proletarian 
Unity  (PSIUP), Democratic 
Party of Proletarian Unity for 
Communism (PdUP)*, 
Democratic Proletarian (DP), 
Democrats Socialist (DS), 
Italian Socialists (SI)*, 
Democratic Party (PD)*, The 
Left-The Rainbow (SA)* 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ (POSL)/ 
Social- Democratic Party  
(LSAP) 
Communist Party (PCL), 
Socialists,  
Social Democratic Party (PSD),  
Independent Socialists, The Left 
Christian Social Party (PCS)/ 
Christian Social Peoples Party 
(CSV) 
the Netherlands Communist Party (CPN), 
Labour Party (PvdA), 
Democratic Socialists 70 (DS 
70), Pacifist Socialist Party 
(PSP), Green Left (GL), 
Socialist Party (SP) 
 
Anti Revolutionary Party 
(ARP), Catholics/ Catholic 
People’s Party  (KVP),  
Christian Historical Union 
(CHU), Political Reformed 
Party (SGP)*, Reformed 
Political League (GPV), Roman 
Catholic Party (RKPN)*, 
Catholic National Party (KNP)*, 
Evangelical People’s Party 
(EVP)*, Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA), Reformed 
Political Federation (RPF)*, 
Christian Union (CU)* 
Norway Labour party (DNA), 
Communist Party (NKP), 
Socialist Left Party (SV) 
Christian People's Party (KrF), 
Christian Unity Party (KSP)* 
Sweden Social Democrats (SdaP), 
Communist Party (SKV)/ Left 
Party (V) 
Christian Democratic Party 
(KdS) (the results of 1985 are 
those with the Centre Party (C) 
Wallonia Francophone Socialist Party 
(PS), Communist Party (PC)* 
Christian Social Party (PSC)/ 
Democratic Humanistic Centre 
(CDH) 
* Assignment of party by author based on party ideology.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
NATIONAL SURVEYS DATASETS AND SOURCES 
 
 
 
 File numbers Source 
Belgium 1991 P1228 Data Archiving and Networked  
Belgium 1995 P1422 Services (DANS) 
Belgium 1999 P1693  
Belgium 2003  ISPO - K.U.Leuven, PIOP - 
U.C.Louvain 
Denmark 1971-98 ZA-Nr. 3911 The European Voter Database*  
Denmark 2001 dat12516 Danish Data Archive (DDA) 
Denmark 2005 dat18184  
Finland 1991 FSD1018 
 
Finnish Social Science Data 
Archive 
(Pesonen, et al., 1991) 
(Gallup, 1995) 
 
Finland 1995 
 
FSD1031 
Finland 1999 FSD1042 (Moring & Gallup, 1999) 
Finland 2003 FSD1260  (Karvonen, et al., 2003) 
Finland 2007 FSD2269 (Paloheimo, et al.  2007) 
Germany 1961-94 ZA-Nr. 3911 The European Voter Database*  
Germany 1998 ZA3083 ZACAT 
Germany 2002 ZA3861  
Germany 2005 ZA4559  
Germany 2009               ZA5303  
Italy 1994 ITA1994 Italian National Election 
Studies (ITANES) Italy 1996 ITA1996 
Italy 2001 ITA2001  
Italy 2006 ITA2006  
Italy 2008 ITA2008 
the Netherlands 
1967 
P0044 DANS 
the Netherlands 
1972 
P0353  
the Netherlands 
1977 
P0354  
the Netherlands 
1981 
P0350  
the Netherlands 
1986 
P0866  
the Netherlands 
1989 
P1000  
the Netherlands 
1994 
P1208  
the Netherlands 
1998 
P1415  
the Netherlands 
2002-03 
P0353  
Norway 1965-97 ZA-Nr. 3911 The European Voter Database*  
Norway 2005  Norwegian Social Science 
Service Data (NDS) 
Sweden1956-98 ZA-Nr. 3911 The European Voter Database*  
Sweden 2002 VALU2002 (0787-001) Swedish Social Science Data 
Service Sweden 2006 VALU2006 (0844-001) 
*GESIS 
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APPENDIX D 
 
NAMES OF VARIABLES, PER DATASET 
 
 
 
 
  PI Turnout recent 
election 
Party support 
recent election 
Turnout present 
election 
Party support 
present election 
Weight variable 
Belgium 1991   V44  V31 v_weight 
Belgium 1995   Q59 Q43.1 Q42 Lsv_vla; 
Lsv_wal 
Belgium 1999   R43 Missing R35_1 Lsp_belg 
Belgium 2003   q23_1  q32 w agev_vla w 
Denmark  1971-98 STRENGTH RECALL 
TURNOUT 
RECALL 
CHOICE 
TURNOUT PARTY 
CHOICE 
for 1998 
election: 
weigpo98 
Denmark 2001 V0051 V0032 V0022 vegtede 
partiandele fv 
Denmark 2005 V0118 V0037 V0020 politisk wegt 
Finland 1991  V130 V131  V264 My calculation 
Finland 1995   V110  V73* My calculation 
Finland 1999  Q32 Q33 Q3 Q5 My calculation 
Finland 2003  Q32 Q33 Q9 Q10 My calculation 
Finland 2007  Q23 Q23b 
 
Q21 Q21c My calculation 
Germany 1961 STRENG61 TURNOUT2 PARTY 
CHOICE2 
TURNOUT PARTY 
CHOICE 
-- 
Germany 1965 STRENG65      
Germany 1969-94 STRENGTH      
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Germany 1998 V7 V194 V196  V197* My calculation 
Germany 2002 vpidststrk V330 V70* My calculation 
Germany 2005 V17c (Staerke 
der Parteinaehe) 
V21 (Teilnahme 
BTW05) 
V22b 
(Zweitstimme 
BTW02) 
V18 (Teilnahme 
BTW05) 
V19b 
(Zweitstimme) 
My calculation 
Germany 2009 POST052 PREV087 POST002 POST004 My calculation 
Italy 1994 -- Q34 Q14 Q27 -- 
Italy 1996 -- Q133 Q143 Q154 -- 
Italy 2001 -- E7 E20 --  
Italy 2006 -- C80_2 (C808) C133B (C119) C140 
(CAMERA1. 
C.123) 
-- 
Italy 2008 -- D053 D119 D123 -- 
the Netherlands 1967 -- V054 V026 --  
the Netherlands 1971 R226, R230 V272 V273 V763 V764 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1972 VAR224, 
VAR226 
V154 V155 V143 V150 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1977 V159,  
V161 
V94 V95 V315 V323 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1981 V019 V016 V017 V512 V513 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1982 V1021 V1171 V1172 V1045 V1046 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1986 V024 V203 V204 V180 V181 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1989 V027 V055 V056 V146 V147 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1994 V026 V055 V056 V280 V281 My calculation 
the Netherlands 1998 V0058 V0165 V0166 V0610 V0611 CBD 
the Netherlands 2002 V0112 V0235 V0236 V0646 V0647 SDELM02 
 
the Netherlands 2003 -- V0646 V0647 X0195 X0196 SDELM03 
the Netherlands 2006 V065 V220 V 221 V510 V512 SOCIO DEM 
FOR ALL 
WAVES 
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Norway 1965-97 STRENGTH RECALL 
TURNOUT 
RECALL 
CHOICE 
TURNOUT PARTY 
CHOICE 
-- 
Norway 2005 V299 (pidstyrk) V242 V220 V223  
Sweden 1956-98  
STRENGTH 
RECALL 
TURNOUT 
RECALL 
CHOICE 
TURNOUT PARTY 
CHOICE 
Only for 1970 
and 1976: 
Weight 70, 
Weight 76 
Sweden 2002 -- V20 V7 My calculation 
Sweden 2006 -- V13 V7 My calculation 
* question of vote intention 
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Names of variables as they appeared in the national election surveys, which 
were collected in the European voter datasets 
 
  STRENGTH RECALL 
TURNOUT 
RECALL 
CHOICE 
TURNOUT PARTY 
CHOICE 
Denmark 1971 V254  V241  V318 
 1973 V161  V154  V146 
 1975 V64  V40  V33 
 1977 V177  V207  V26 
 1979 V161  V165  V94 
 1981 --  V182  V232 
 1984 V110  V63  V2 
 1987 --  V38b  V8b 
 1988 --  *V92  s3 
 1990 V245  V148  V143 
 1994 V32  V31  V11 
 1998 V45  V44  V4 
Germany 1961 V175 --  V90 V91 
 1965 V172 -- V202 V113 V114 
 1969 -- V183 V185 V615 V617 
 1972 V306 V170 V172 V263 V266 
 1976 V553 V513 V515 V434 V437 
 1980 V299 V10 V12 V246 V248 
 1983 V396 V278 V278 V272 V274 
 1987 V418 -- V206 V361 V362 
 1990 V607 V172 V173 V489 V490 
 1994 V176 V172 V173 V9 V11 
Norway 1965-
97 
Strength Recall Turnout Choice 
Sweden 1956-
98 
PIS VOTER PARTYR VOTE PARTY 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TURNOUT, INVALID VOTES AND ‘NOT VOTING’ RATES IN 
FLANDERS AND WALLONIA 
 
 
 
 
The data for these two regions were calculated based on constituencies-level data, as is 
specified in Caramani (2000) and based on the official election results. Due to the discussion 
on the Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde area, some districts in this area were excluded (Brussels was 
excluded between 1961-91, and from 1995 onward the Anderlecht, Brussel, Elsene, 
Schaarbeek, Sint-Gillis, Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, Sint-Joost-Ten-Node, and Ukkel were 
excluded). Table 1 specifies the turnout and valid votes rates for each region, in each election 
year, over the same period, while Table 2 presents the constituencies distribution per region 
between 1950 and 2010. 
 
 
Table 1: Turnout and valid vote, per region, in each (national) election year 
 
 Flanders 
 
 Wallonia  
 Turnout Valid votes Turnout Valid votes 
1950 
 
93.41 88.35 92.18 87.63 
1954 
 
93.76 88.75 92.84 87.95 
1958 
 
93.81 89.15 93.04 88.50 
1961 
 
93.14 88.24 91.48 86.58 
1965 
 
92.61 86.06 90.63 84.49 
1968 
 
91.11 
 
84.25 
 
88.74 
 
83.43 
 
1971 
 
92.63 
 
84.59 
 
90.22 
 
83.95 
 
1974 
 
91.49 
 
84.06 
 
89.20 
 
82.52 
 
1977 
 
95.89 
 
89.39 
 
94.81 
 
87.31 
 
1978 
 
96.05 
 
88.37 
 
93.71 
 
85.34 
 
1981 
 
95.75 
 
88.61 
 
93.69 
 
86.88 
 
1985 
 
94.84 
 
88.05 
 
92.91 
 
85.64 
 
1987 94.74 88.68 92.54 86.37 
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1991 
 
94.28 
 
88.23 
 
91.67 
 
84.33 
 
1995 
 
92.51 
 
86.09 
 
90.53 
 
82.92 
 
1999 
 
92.30 
 
87.12 
 
89.36 
 
81.53 
 
2003 
 
93.36 
 
89.32 
 
83.65 
 
83.65 
 
2007 
 
92.68 88.54 89.91 75.45 
2010 90.82 86.05 87.68 81.27 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The constituencies of Flanders and Wallonia, 1950-2010 
 
Flanders 
 
Wallonia 
Antwerpen, Mechelen, Turnhout, 
Leuven, Brugge, Veurne-Diksmuide-
Oostende, Kortijk, Roeselare-Tielt, 
Ieper, Gent-Eeklo, Sint Niklaas, 
Dendermonde, Aalst, Oudenaarde, 
Hasselt, Tongeren-Maaseik, Aarlen-
Marche-Bastenaken 
Nivelles, Mons, Soignes, Tournai-Ath-
Mouscron, Charleroi, Thuin, Liège, Huy-
Waremme, Verviers, Arlon-Marche-
Bastogne, Neufchâteau, Namur, Dinant 
Antwerpen, Mechelen-Turnhout, 
Leuven, Brugge, Veurne-Diksmuide-
Ieper-Oostende, Kortrijk-Roeselare-
Tielt, Gent-Eeklo, Sint-Niklaas-
Dendermonde, Hasselt-Tongeren-
Maaseik 
Nijvel, Mons-Soignes, Tournai-Ath-
Mouscron, Charleroi-Thuin, Liège-Luik, 
Huy-Waremme, Verviers, Arlon-Marche-
Bastogne-Neufchâteu-Virton, Namur-
Dinant-Philippeville 
Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-
Vlaanderen, Vlaams-Brabant, West-
Vlaanderen 
Luxemburg, Henegouwen, Luik, Namen, 
Walloon Brabant 
Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-
Vlaanderen, West-Vlaanderen, Leuven 
and kantons of Halle, Vilvoorde, 
Lennik, Meise, Zaventem and Asse 
Luxemburg, Henegouwen, Luik, Namen, 
Walloon Brabant 
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APPENDIX F  
 
THE IDENTITY OF THE TWO LARGEST PARTIES, PER 
CASE, BETWEEN 1950 AND 2010 
 
 
 
 
 Period First party Second party 
Austria 1953-1966 Social Democrats (SPÖ)/Austrian People's 
Party (ÖVP) 
 1970-1999, 2006- Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) 
Austrian People's 
Party (ÖVP) 
 2002 Austrian People's 
Party (ÖVP) 
Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) 
Denmark 1950-1966 the Social 
Democratic Party 
(SD) 
the Agrarian Liberals 
(V) 
 1968-1971 the Social 
Democratic Party 
(SD) 
Conservatives (KF) 
 1973-1977 the Social 
Democratic Party 
(SD) 
Progress Party (FP)/ 
the Agrarian Liberals 
(V) 
 1981-1998 the Social 
Democratic Party 
(SD) 
Conservatives (KF) 
 2001- Agrarian Liberals 
(V) 
the Social Democratic 
Party (SD) 
Finland 1951-58, 1966 Social Democrats 
 
Agrarian Union (M), 
Centre Party (K)/ 
Finnish People’s 
Democratic Union 
(SKDL)/ Left 
Alliance 
 1962 Agrarian Union (M), 
Centre Party (K) 
Social Democrats 
 1970-87 Social Democrats National Coalition/ 
Finnish People’s 
Democratic Union 
(SKDL)/ Left 
Alliance 
 1991-2003 Centre Party (K)/ Social Democrats 
 2007 Centre Party (K) National Coalition 
Flanders 1950-1978 Catholic Party 
(CVP/PSC), 
Flemish Christian 
People’s Party (CVP) 
Socialist Party (POB/ 
BSP/PSB), 
Flemish Socialist 
Party (BSP) 
 1981-1995 Flemish Christian 
People’s Party (CVP) 
Flemish Socialist 
Party (BSP)/ Party of 
Liberty and Progress 
(PVV) 
 1999 Party of Liberty and 
Progress (PVV) 
Flemish Christian 
People’s Party (CVP) 
 2003 Party of Liberty and 
Progress (PVV) 
Flemish Socialist 
Party (BSP) 
 2007 Christian Democratic Flemish Bloc (VB) 
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and Flemish (CD & 
V) 
 2010 New Flemish 
Alliance (N-VA) 
Christian Democratic 
and Flemish (CD & 
V) 
Germany 1953-57 Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) 
Social Democrats 
(SPD) 
 1961-87; 1994-
2005 
Social Democrats 
(SPD) 
Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) 
 1990, 2009 Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) 
Social Democrats 
(SPD) 
Italy 1953-1992 Christian Democrats 
party (DC) 
Communist Party 
(PCI), in 1992 
Democratic Party of 
the Left (PDS) 
 1994- Go Italy (FI)/ Democratic Party of the Left 
(PDS), in 1996 the Party of the Democratic 
Left (PDS), in 2006 the Olive Tree List, in 
2008 the Democratic Party (PD) 
Luxembourg 1951-1994, 2004- Christian Social 
Party (PCS), 
Christian Social 
Peoples Party (CSV) 
Socialist Workers’ 
(POSL), Social- 
Democratic Party  
(LSAP) 
 1999 Christian Social 
Party (PCS), 
Christian Social 
Peoples Party (CSV) 
Democratic Party 
the Netherlands 1952-1972 Catholic People’s Party  (KVP)/  Labour Party  
(PvdA) 
 1977-1994, 2003- Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)/ Labour 
Party  (PvdA) 
 1998 Labour Party  (PvdA) People's Party for 
Freedom and 
Democracy  (VVD) 
 2002 Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA) 
List Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF) 
 2010 People's Party for 
Freedom and 
Democracy  (VVD) 
Labour Party  (PvdA) 
Norway 1953-1993 Labour party (DNA) Conservatives, 
Unionist Party (H) 
 1997- Labour party (DNA) Conservatives, 
Unionist Party (H)/ 
Anders Lange, 
Progress Party (FRP) 
Sweden 1952-1964 Social Democrats (S) People’s Party, 
People's Party the 
Liberals (FP)/ The 
Right Party 
(Conservatives), 
Moderate Unity Party 
 1968- Social Democrats (S) Agrarian Party, 
Center Party/ People’s 
Party, People's Party 
the Liberals (FP)/ The 
Right Party 
(Conservatives), 
Moderate Unity Party 
Wallonia 1950-1961 Socialist Party (POB/ 
BSP/PSB), 
Catholic Party 
(CVP/PSC), 
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Francophone 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Walloon Christian 
People’s Party (PSC 
 1965-2003, 2010 Francophone 
Socialist Party (PS) 
Walloon Christian 
People’s Party 
(PSC)/Party of 
Liberty and Progress 
(PLP) 
 2007 Party of Liberty and 
Progress (PLP) 
Francophone Socialist 
Party (PS) 
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SAMENVATTING 
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Toen men begon met het bestuderen van politiek gedrag, 65 jaar geleden1, pleitte twee van de 
destijds invloedrijkste stromingen voor het bestuderen van partijbinding, de sociaal-
psychologische en de sociaal-structurele stroming, voor het bestaan van een langdurige relatie 
tussen partijen en kiezers.  
 
De twee stromingen verschillen van elkaar in de manier waarop zij het mechanisme uitleggen 
dat ten grondslag ligt aan kiezersalignment. Zoals beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2, kijkt de 
sociaal-psychologische stroming naar individuele partijbinding, welke tot stand komt door 
vereenzelviging en langdurige kiezersbinding. De sociaal-structurele stroming bepleit de 
totstandkoming van kiezerstrouw aan partijen langs de lijnen van sociaal-structurele 
scheidslijnen. 
 
Vanaf 1970, zien we dat er een empirische discussie wordt gevoerd onder politieke 
wetenschappers rond de vraag of de relatie tussen kiezers en politieke partijen in westerse 
democratieën al dan niet stabiel en gestructureerd is gebleven. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft deze 
discussie en laat zien dat we, gebaseerd op huidig onderzoek, geen uitsluitsel kunnen geven 
of en hoe partijstelsels in westerse democratieën zijn gewijzigd sinds 1970 en of er 
verschuivingen hebben plaatsgevonden. De genoemde empirische discussie voorziet ons van 
drie verschillende onderzoeksresultaten. De eerste suggereert dat de partijstelsels nog steeds 
in een toestand van ‘alignment’ verkeren, waarin de relatie tussen de partijen en de kiezers 
nauwelijks is veranderd. Kiezers zijn traditiegetrouw geaffilieerd met een partij en de kiezer-
partijrelatie is stabiel. Het tweede onderzoeksresultaat past in de redeneertrant van de sociaal-
structurele stroming. Zij suggereert dat de kiezer-partijrelatie vanaf 1970 is veranderd door de 
totstandkoming van een nieuwe scheidslijn die functioneert als de basis voor een nieuw 
kiezersalignment. Volgens dit gezichtspunt zien we vanaf 1970 op brede schaal re-alignment. 
Het derde onderzoeksresultaat ondersteunt het empirische argument dat de partijstelsels van 
geïndustrialiseerde democratieën vanaf 1970 door een proces van dealignment gaan. Binnen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Volgens Carmines & Huckfeldt (1996:223) wordt het begin van het moderne onderzoek naar politiek gedrag 
gemarkeerd door de uitgave van het boek van Lazarsfeld en zijn collega’s: The People’s Choice in 1944. 
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dit kader, is de oude kiezer-partijrelatie zwakker geworden, terwijl de vorming van een 
andere relatie nog niet zijn intrede heeft gedaan. Eén van de modellen die wordt gebruikt 
voor het beschrijven van dealignment, volgt de sociaal-psychologisch benadering, 
waarbinnen de psychologische aspecten van kiezersgedrag worden benadrukt. Deze vertrekt 
vanuit de aanname dat de cognitieve transformatie en de mobilisatie van kiezers hun binding 
met een partij hebben ontrafeld. 
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien, dat het bestaan van drie verschillende onderzoeksresultaten te maken 
heeft met een conceptueel probleem dat op zichzelf weer deels een empirische en deels een 
conceptuele discussie is. 
 
Het conceptuele probleem bestaat eruit dat er geen operationele definitie bestaat voor 
realignment en dealignment waarover consensus bestaat onder alle politieke wetenschappers. 
Deze twee nauw verwante concepten worden op uiteenlopende manieren gebruikt door de 
verschillende wetenschappers en toegepast op verschillende analyseniveaus. De operationele 
definities van realignment en de indicatoren voor dealignment verschillen van elkaar op drie 
verschillende niveaus: het electoraat, de scheidslijn en het effect van een verandering in 
partijstructuur. 
 
Om dit conceptuele probleem te kunnen oplossen, stel ik voor om nader te kijken naar 
stabiliteit en veranderingen in kiezer-partijrelaties en hun effect op de structuur van 
partijstelsels, waarbij ik gebruik maak van aan semi-modulaire aanpak. Met deze semi-
modulaire aanpak kunnen de twee verschijningsvormen van alignment gescheiden worden 
geanalyseerd. De twee verschijningsvormen zijn partij-alignment en kiezersalignment als 
gevolg van een scheidslijn. Met deze aanpak  kunnen “relatief vergelijkbare” gevallen 
worden onderzocht, in dit geval elf Europese meer-partijstelsels – Oostenrijk, België, 
Denemarken, Finland, Duitsland, Italië, Luxemburg, Nederland, Noorwegen en Zweden, 
allen tussen 1950 en 2010. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeer ik hoe aanhangers van de sociaal-psychologische benadering de 
eerste verschijningsvorm van alignment – partij-alignment pogen te onderzoeken. Zij 
analyseren trends in partijaanhang die tot uiting komen in de twee betekenissen van het 
woord: partijvereenzelviging en stabiele steun aan een partij. Zij analyseren trends onder 
trouwe partijaanhangers door patronen in partijaanhang te meten voor twee opeenvolgende 
verkiezingen voor het hele electoraat (Hierin worden ook kiesgerechtigden die geen stem 
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uitbrachten of een blanco of ongeldige stem uitbrachten meegenomen). Hiervoor werden 
twee indicatoren gebruikt die zijn gebaseerd op individual-level data (d.w.z. het aandeel dat 
aangeeft in twee opeenvolgende verkiezingen voor dezelfde partij te hebben gestemd) en 
geaggregeerde data (die worden geschat door de Electoral Total Partisans Index (ETP), 
waarbij de TV index wordt afgetrokken van het percentage ongeldige stemmen in de meest 
recente verkiezingen). Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat, wanneer de resultaten voor de twee 
verschijningsvormen van partijaanhang worden gecombineerd, deze afneemt voor op twee na 
alle gevallen (Luxemburg en Denemarken zijn de uitzonderingen). Dit laat zien dat 
partijdealignment heeft plaatsgevonden. De verschuiving naar partijdealignment vond plaats 
in twee golven. De vroegste en grootste golf begon reeds in de midden jaren ’60 en eindigde 
begin jaren ’70. De tweede en kleinere golf begon in de vroege jaren ’80 en nam af in de 
begin jaren ’90. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt kiezersalignment langs de klasse en religieuze scheidslijnen onderzocht 
onder the sociaal-structurele benadering. De electorale loyaliteit aan een zuil is gemeten door 
gebruik te maken van de Bloc-Weighted Cleavage Salience Index (WCS) (naar de aangepaste 
index van Bartolini en Mair (1990) Cleavage Salience (CS) index2 en te controleren voor de 
electorale steun voor de blokken die de scheidslijnen vormen.  
 
Het verschil in denominatie heeft weinig effect op de afname van alignment langs de meest 
dominante scheidslijn. In sommige overwegend protestantse landen, begon deze afname in de 
midden jaren ’60 terwijl deze in overwegend katholieke en gemengde landen begon in de 
jaren ’70 en de midden jaren ’80. In twee gevallen, echter – Italië (overwegend katholiek) en 
Zweden (overwegend protestant) begon de alignment pas af te nemen tegen het begin van de 
jaren ’90. Bovendien laat Hoofdstuk 6 zien dat de afname van alignment langs de 
klassenscheidslijn veel eerder plaats had dan die langs de religiescheidslijn. Deze laatste 
begon pas af te nemen in de vroege jaren ’80 (m.u.v. Nederland). In Denemarken bleef de 
kiezersalignment langs de klassenscheidslijn voortbestaan, terwijl in Vlaanderen 
kiezersalignment langs de religiescheidslijn persisteerde. 
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De bewijsvoering ten faveure van de twee verschijningsvormen van alignment geeft een 
gedetailleerd plaatje van het alignmentfenomeen en zijn bestendigheid. In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt 
het bewijs voor stabiliteit en verandering in beide verschijningsvormen geanalyseerd. Hier 
wordt vastgesteld dat de overgang van alignment naar dealignment of realignment langs 
tenminste een van de verschijningsvormen plaatsvond in een periode van ongeveer 20 jaar, 
lopend van midden jaren ‘60 tot midden jaren ‘80. In veruit de meerderheid van de gevallen 
werd een afname van alignment vastgesteld in de periode van midden jaren ’60 tot midden 
jaren ’70. 
 
Een nadere analyse van de toestandsovergangen naar realignment en dealignment laat zien 
dat realignment binnen een van de verschijningsvormen van alignment alleen plaatsvindt als 
geen verandering binnen de andere verschijningsvorm optreedt. De verschijningsvorm blijft 
in een toestand van alignment. Een studie naar de toestandsovergangen langs de tijdsas laat 
zien dat het proces van dealignment  kan beginnen in beide verschijningsvormen en twee 
fasen doorloopt. Dealignment begint in één van de verschijningsvormen (de partiële fase) en 
loopt daarna over in de andere verschijningsvorm. Vanaf hier verbreedt en verdiept het 
proces van dealignment zich en evolueert naar een toestand van volledige dealignment. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 presenteer ik mijn bevindingen dat gedurende een periode van dealignment  
het electorale partijstelsel al niet meer stabiel en duurzaam is. Daarnaast is er een verschil 
tussen volledige en gedeeltelijk dealignment wanneer wordt gekeken naar het effect op de 
partijenstructuur. In het geval van dealignment voor beide verschijningsvormen (volledige 
dealignment) verandert de structuur van het partijstelsel heel frequent. Als het 
dealignmentproces zich daarentegen alleen voltrekt in één verschijningsvorm (gedeeltelijke 
dealignment), is er slechts incidenteel sprake van verschuivingen in de partijenstructuur. 
 
Hoofdstuk 8 laat zien dat, kijkend naar de typologie van de structuur van een partijstelsel (die 
drie criteria omvat: het aantal partijen, electorale steun voor de twee grootste partijen en hun 
specifieke identiteit), veranderingen in de structuur van het partijstelsel als gevolg van 
gedeeltelijke of volledige dealignment zich niet zozeer aan het begin, maar later in het 
dealignmentproces optreden. Deze bevindingen valideren de freezing hypothesis van Lipset 
en Rokkan (1967:50) tegen de situatie waarin de afname van de binding tussen kiezers en 
partijen volgens sommige studies reeds begon rond midden jaren ’60, maar het effect op de 
structuur van het partijstelsel pas in de jaren ’70 zichtbaar werd. België vormt daarop een 
uitzondering met twee sub-nationale partijstelsels. 
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Mijn analyse toont ook aan dat in perioden van gedeeltelijk dealignment de competitie tussen 
de partijen naar alle waarschijnlijkheid meer gefragmenteerd zijn. In een periode van 
volledige dealignment, daarentegen, is de competitie tussen partijen niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
gefragmenteerder: de structuur van het partijstelsel kan zowel meer als minder fragmentatie 
vertonen. 
 
Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat het proces dat ten grondslag ligt aan dealignment in een 
meerpartijenstelsel begint met de afname van de alignment van kiezers langs de voornaamste 
scheidslijnen tussen partijaanhangers (dit is de eerste fase, waarin er (nog) sprake is een 
gedeeltelijk dealignment proces). Het proces verbreedt en verdiept zich daarna met als 
gevolg dat de fundamenten onder kiezersalignment – partijbinding en alignment langs 
scheidslijnen -  niet meer functioneren (dit is de tweede fase, waarin een situatie van 
volledige alignment ontstaat).  
 
In de loop van de twee fasen van het dealignmentproces verandert de structuur van het 
electorale partijstelsel, maar de veranderingen treden niet noodzakelijkerwijs met 
onmiddellijke ingang in. Gedurende de gedeeltelijke fase, zijn de veranderingen in de 
structuur van het partijstelsel slechts incidenteel van aard en kan deze met grote 
waarschijnlijkheid gefragmenteerd raken. In de tweede fase van volledige dealignment, 
verandert de structuur van het partijstelsel frequenter, maar is deze niet per definitie 
gefragmenteerder. 
 
